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Neoclassical theory assumes that economic agents are atomistic, in the sense that each
individual is too small relative to the market to affect prices and each others’ decisions. In
such a setting, it is only natural to imagine that economic agents are purely selfish, only
seeking to maximize own profit or utility. However, many interesting economic settings are
characterized by the interaction among a small number of agents, in which they recognize that
the combination of their strategic choices ultimately determine all participants’ outcomes.
While many advances were made under the assumption that individuals’ preferences were
like in the neoclassical theory, experimental evidence pointed to deviations from the behaviors
predicted by such game-theoretical models.1 Rotemberg (2006) surveys both theoretical and
empirical evidence for the presence of altruism in the workplace, be it displayed among
employees towards one another, towards the employer, and also from the employer towards
the subordinates. Capraro and Rand (2018) and Bilancini et al. (2020) find compelling
∗Toulouse School of Economics. E-mail: roberto.sarkisian@tse-fr.eu
1The interested reader can refer to Kolm and Ythier (2006a,b) for an extensive review on the experimental
and behavioral literatures of other-regarding preferences, in particular altruism, gift-giving and reciprocity.
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experimental evidence that individuals display moral preferences, that ultimately induces
them to do what they think is morally right.
On the theoretical side, many classes of preferences were proposed to explain individual
behavior, such as reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), inequity aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), warm-glow (Andreoni, 1990), and
altruism Becker (1974, 1976). More recently, Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016, 2017) has
shown that a novel class of preferences, called homo moralis, is the one favored by long-term
evolution.
Along with the efforts mentioned above, Andreoni and Miller (2002), Bellemare et al.
(2008), Bellemare et al. (2011), Fisman et al. (2007), Bruhin et al. (2019), and Alger et al.
(2019) among others try to empirically identify the underlying preference classes of individ-
uals agents across different settings. Among their results, Bruhin et al. (2019) show that
pure selfishness does not emerge as a temporally stable preference type, while altruism and
behindness averseness do. Alger et al. (2019) expand on Bruhin et al. (2019)’s analysis to
allow for strategic interactions and find that Kantian morality as part of the motivation
behind individuals’ choices.
In the following essays, I will study the effects of two classes of other-regarding preferences
in contracting situations, namely altruism and homo moralis. My focus in this two classes is
due to the fact that they are behaviorally indistinguishable in certain environments (Alger
and Weibull, 2013; Bergström, 1995), which naturally leads to the questions of whether one
preference class can be preferred over the other by a third party tasked with contracting
such agents and if such prosociality can foster or hinder the development of certain markets.
The first three essays look closely at the problem faced by a principal who must design
compensation schemes for homo moralis or altruistic agents, and how different types and
degrees of other-regarding preferences will affect the optimal incentive scheme, the relative
importance of variable income to fixed income in these contracts and, ultimately, which
class of other-regarding preferences is the most preferred by the principal depending on the
production technology and performance measures available to the principal. The fourth
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and last essay studies how other-regarding preferences may affect the emergence of markets.
More precisely, I study how altruism can deter the emergence of formal insurance markets
by sustaining cross-insurance transfers between individuals in detriment to the purchase of
private insurance policies.
1.1 Contracting with Moral and Altruistic Agents
The first essay of this thesis focuses on the productive relationship between a principal and
a team of agents. In this moral-hazard-in-teams setting, individuals can exert either a high
level of effort or no effort, and thus stochastically affect the binary outcome of the principal.
Because effort is costly, the principal must design a compensation scheme that induces the
agents to exert the high level of effort, which is assumed to be preferred by the principal
over no effort.
I assume that each team is composed by two symmetric agents, that can be characterized
by two different types of prosocial preferences: altruism or homo moralis.2 Moreover, the
agents’ preference type is common knowledge, and so is the common degree of prosociality.
In this setting, the principal must then design the compensation schemes for each preference
type, and then determine which type of prosocial preferences lead to higher expected profits.
This article builds upon the literature on moral hazard in teams (Holmström, 1982;
Mookherjee, 1984; Itoh, 1991; Che and Yoo, 2001) and is related to the question of incentive
provision for agents with prosocial preferences, such as the works of Itoh (2004), Rey-Biel
(2008), Englmaier and Wambach (2010), and Livio (2015) among others. While the afore-
mentioned studies analyze the optimal incentive scheme for a given preference class, my
contribution is the comparison on the incentive structure proposed to the two preference
classes, namely altruism and homo moralis.
It should come as no surprise that highly moral or altruistic agents are preferred by the
2Standard selfish preferences can be seen as a particular case of either type of prosocial preference, and
the standard results on the literature are recovered by the appropriate choice of the degree of prosociality,
namely zero.
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principal to less prosocial individuals. Indeed, as prosociality increases, the cost of an agent
shirking also increases due to the internalization of the reduced expected wages for their
partner. Therefore, the principal can offer less high-powered contracts to the agents while
incentivising both participation and high effort. However, for the same degree of prosociality,
choosing a team of altruistic agents over a team of homo moralis agents or vice-versa also
depends on the productive technology of the relationship between the two parties, a novelty
in the literature.
The reason behind this important role of the production technology is how different
prosocial types compute the gains of a deviation. On one hand, altruistic individuals are
going to weight their own gain of lowering effort to the expected loss in wages of their partner
while the latter holds his effort constant. On the other hand, a homo moralis agent would
weight the gain of reduced effort to the expected loss in own wage if his partner were to shirk
as well.
I thus show that homo moralis agents will only be preferred by the principal over altru-
istic agents if: (i) the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to efforts; (ii) the
probability of a high realization of output conditional on both agents exerting effort is suffi-
ciently high; and (iii) the outside option for the agents is zero or the degree of prosociality
is sufficiently low.
1.2 Screening Moral and Altruistic Agents
While the model in the first essay shows how a principal can profit by choosing a team with
certain type of prosocial preferences depending on the production technology and the degree
of prosociality, the whole analysis is based on the strong assumption that the principal knows
exactly whether he is facing a team of altruistic or homo moralis agents. The second essay
relaxes this assumption, and asks whether the principal is capable of designing a menu of
contracts that not only induces the agents to participate and exert the high level of effort,
but also to induce them to reveal their preference type.
In this setting of screening followed by moral-hazard (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Jul-
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lien et al., 2007; Ollier and Thomas, 2013; Maréchal and Thomas, 2018), I extend the analysis
of Sarkisian (2017) to consider the relationship between heterogenous social preferences and
the possibility of screening via a menu of contracts, much in the same spirit as von Siemens
(2011). In contrast to von Siemens (2011), which screens different degrees of other-regarding
preferences (namely inequity aversion), the goal in this chapter is to screen the two different
classes of other-regarding preferences present in Sarkisian (2017).
Looking at space of contracts that satisfy the participation and incentive compatibility
constraint for the moral-hazard-in-teams problem, one realizes that there exists equilibria in
which the different preference types truthfully reveal their private information. However, all
these equilibria are sustained by constructing a menu containing contracts at the intersection
of the sets satisfying the aforementioned constrains for each type. This implies that, for any
pair of contracts, two diametrically opposed equilibria exist: one in which each group accepts
the contract designed for them, and another in which they take each others’ offers.
I then ask whether the principal can design a more stringent menu, one satisfying the
participation and incentive compatibility constraint for the moral-hazard-in-teams problem
plus an incentive compatibility for the screening problem. The answer then is negative:
separating equilibria will exist only if one of the moral-hazard-in-teams constraint is relaxed.
If the participation constraint is the one abandoned, the principal offers a menu of contracts
that only attracts one type of prosocial preferences, namely the cheapest to hire according
to the results of the first essay. On the other hand, if the effort incentive compatibility
constraint is relaxed, the principal can offer a menu of contracts inducing different levels
of efforts for each preference class, and this additional dimension allows the principal to
successfully screen homo moralis and altruistic agents.
Last, but not least, I show that pooling equilibria also exists for both high or no effort,
by offering contracts satisfying the most stringent constraints of the moral-hazard-in-teams
problem.
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1.3 Optimal Contracting with Moral Agents
Up to this point, I have considered environments in which the principal can only observe
a single performance measure of the agents’ combined efforts, and is therefore limited to
offering the later contracts conditioned on this single measure.
On the other hand, when each agent has an individual performance measure, the space of
contracts than can be offered by the principal is substantially increased, since now she is able
to contingent each agent’s compensation scheme in all observable measures. In particular,
the principal can now design tournaments, which have been shown to be optimal for the
principal when the agents have selfish preferences and the efforts independently affect the
individual performance measures (Che and Yoo, 2001).
In this third essay, I study what is the optimal incentive scheme proposed by a principal
faced with two homo moralis agents and individual performance measures. I find that,
contrary to the case with purely selfish preferences, tournaments can never be optimal when
agents are risk averse.3 Indeed, in most cases, a relative performance scheme, in which an
agent is paid only if his own output is high, is the optimal scheme for incentivising homo
moralis agents.
The worse performance of tournaments when agents are characterized by homo moralis
preferences is directly related to how such individuals internalize a lower effort. Because an
agent deviating to a lower effort believes his partner would follow him suit, the incentives
provided by a tournament for an agent not to lag behind are reduced, and could only be
compensated by an inefficiently high (and not profitable) prize offered by the principal.
This chapter contributes to the literature exploring optimal incentive schemes for other-
regarding preferences, such as the analysis on inequity aversion (Itoh, 2004; Rey-Biel, 2008;
Englmaier and Wambach, 2010), reciprocity (Livio, 2015), and altruism (Dur and Sol, 2010;
Dur and Tichem, 2015). In particular, I derive the optimal incentive scheme for a novel
class of other-regarding preferences, namely homo moralis, and show the suboptimality of
3Even with risk-neutral homo moralis agents, the principal is at best indifferent between tournaments
and other incentive structures.
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tournaments as an incentive scheme, in contrast to the existing literature.
1.4 Altruism and Insurance Markets
Which factors contribute to the emergence of formal institutions? Alternatively, which
factors prevent it? It is not uncommon to observe interactions between market institutions
and nonmarket trades in modern societies. One such example is agents relying not only on
insurance policies to protect themselves against occasional losses, but also on family members
and friends to help in adverse situations. Recent surveys suggest that in most cases reliance
on nonmarket trades are more pronounced in either less developed societies (Cox et al., 2006;
Cox and Fafchamps, 2008) or those where kinship among its members is higher (Costa-Font,
2010), while more developed societies correlate with stronger formal institutions, such as
large banking and credit markets.
A large body of literature has been developed in the last decades focusing on remittances,
credit cooperatives and risk-sharing either in rural areas or in developing countries. For
the most part, transfers among agents in these settings rely on the repeated structure of
the analysis, being largely sustained by the threats of punishment and exclusion from kin
networks in the future.
I consider a static model where agents can engage in three actions: (i) insurance policies
purchase, to cover their losses in an adverse situation; (ii) self-protection, i.e. exerting effort
to avoid a loss from happening; and (iii) cross-insurance, by transferring resources to one
another in order to share the risk each individual face.
The analysis is divided in three parts. The first one abstracts from the agents’ effort
choice, by taking the probabilities of suffering losses to be exogenous. I then show that a
selfish agent can free-ride on an altruistic partner’s transfers and not buy insurance. Quali-
tatively, a similar result hold in the second part of the analysis, where efforts are endogenous,
the main difference being that the uninsured agent will generally exert higher effort than his
counterpart due to the higher risk the former faces. The final part introduces a principal
who can design the contracts being offered to the two agents. I show that although there
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are gains of trade to be had by all parties if both agents are obliged to buy insurance, self-
protection and cross-insurance may crowd-out formal insurance when the decision to buy
the firm’s policies is a strategic choice of the agents.
Such results suggest that, in the case of remittances in particular, firms seeking to enter
in a market where a high proportion of selfish agents live, and who rely on transfers coming
from their altruistic partners elsewhere, may not have sufficient demand to operate. On the
other hand, if both agents must buy insurance policies, I show that gains of trade can always
be obtained among the three parties when both agents display the same degree of altruism.
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Team Incentives under Moral and Altruistic Preferences:




This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo
moralis preferences (Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2016), i.e. their utility is represented by
a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a
moral hazard in teams setting with two agents whose efforts affect output stochastically,
I demonstrate that the power of extrinsic incentives decreases with the degrees of
morality and altruism displayed by the agents, thus leading to increased profits for
the principal. I also show that a team of moral agents will only be preferred if the
production technology exhibits decreasing returns to efforts, the probability of a high
realization if output conditional on both agents exerting effort is sufficiently high and
either the outside option for the agents is zero or the degree of morality is sufficiently
low.
Keywords: Moral hazard in teams, optimal contracts, homo moralis preferences,
altruism.
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1 Introduction
Teamwork permeates economic activities. In some cases, different skills are needed comple-
menting each other to complete a project; in other cases, division of labor plays a crucial
role in timely delivery of a product. Partnerships, group projects and team sports are but
a few examples in which individuals team up to achieve a certain goal. With the exception
of partnerships, it falls upon an employer to hire the team of employees to fulfill the task at
hand. In particular, as expenditure in recruitment and assessment surges1, with US compa-
nies spending on average around US$4000 per hire, an increase of nearly 15% in the last four
years, it is clear that recruitment and talent research divisions have turned their attention
to more than the job applicants’ professional abilities. As a matter of fact, common practice
includes the analysis of criminal2 and credit histories3, and more recently, social networks as
well4.
While employees’ technical skills are important, interest in their personal characteristics
other than job-relevant skills may be related to the now widespread knowledge that eco-
nomic agents are not purely selfish, often displaying other-regarding preferences (Fehr and
Schmidt, 2006; Kolm and Ythier, 2006a,b; Kahneman et al., 1986, 1991). The literature
in behavioral and experimental economics strongly suggests that social preferences affects
outcomes in standard economic models (Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Bowles and Polania-Reyes,
2012). Bandiera et al. (2005), Bandiera et al. (2010), Barr and Serneels (2009) and Rotem-
berg (2006) analyze, in particular, the role other-regarding preferences play in interactions
among employees in models of the workplace. The main findings in this literature show
that the employees’ concerns towards one another affect not only the provision of effort, but
also the compensation schemes that are offered. Thus, it is only natural to wonder what an
1See O’Leonard et al. (2015).
2See the Society for Human Resource Management survey results at
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Pages/criminalbackgroundcheck.aspx
3See the Society for Human Resource Management survey results at
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Pages/creditbackgroundchecks.aspx
4See, for instance, Brown and Vaughn (2011).
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ideal team would look like, for a given set of skills: would it be a team composed of selfish
individuals, whose only concern is their own gains? Or maybe a group of altruistic agents,
who would be content in increasing their workmates’ wellbeing? Perhaps a crew of moral
employees deriving satisfaction in choosing actions they think are the right ones? This is the
question I address in this paper.
In view of the overwhelming experimental evidence of behaviors that are incompatible
with purely selfish preferences (Kolm and Ythier, 2006a,b; Thaler, 1988; Tversky and Thaler,
1990), it is important to understand how prosocial preferences affect behavior in the work-
place, and by extension, the design of contracts in the workplace. I propose a model to
address this question.
Specifically, I focus on the optimal compensation schemes that should be used in a stan-
dard moral hazard setting to incentivise the employees to fulfill their tasks. In doing so, I
am able to compare the profits obtained by the employer from a team composed of individ-
uals with different kinds of prosocial preferences. Although I do not study the recruitment
process per se, I am able to make predictions about which preferences the principal would
prefer.
The framework utilized is the multiagent moral hazard model, as first proposed by Alchian
and Demsetz (1972) and Holmström (1982), where a risk-neutral principal hires a team of
two risk-averse agents. The agents can exert costly effort in order to stochastically affect the
realization of output. By assumption, efforts are simultaneously and independently chosen
by the agents, and cannot be observed by the principal. On the other hand, output is
observable by third parties after being realized, and can thus be contracted upon.
In the behavioral economics literature several classes of prosocial preferences have been
proposed. I analyze two of them. The first one is altruism (Becker, 1974), a class which
has been extensively used in the literature on the voluntary contribution of public goods.
This is natural since one can think of efforts made in the context of teamwork in a firm as
contributions to a public good (the firm’s profit). Second, in light of recent results by Alger
and Weibull (2013, 2016), who show that a particular, novel, class of preferences stands out as
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being favored by evolution, I compare the optimal contract under altruism with the optimal
contract under this class of homo moralis preferences, a convex combination of selfishness
and morality. In sum, my model allows to address the following questions: if an employer
could choose between a team of two moral agents and a team of two altruists, which team
would he prefer, and why5?
I characterize the optimal contract for a team of equally altruistic agents and a team of
equally moral agents, and compare them. First, I find that the trade-off between risk-sharing
and incentive provision is present, as in the case with standard selfish preferences. However,
as intuition would suggest, I find that high-powered incentives are less needed to induce
effort as the agents become more concerned about the right thing to do or about each other’s
material payoff, and that the principal’s expected profit obtained from the interaction with
each team is increasing in the team’s degree of morality or altruism. Second, if efforts are
symmetric and could be contracted upon, the principal would be better off hiring a team
of altruistic agents over the other ones, for any degrees of morality and altruism, because
altruism towards one’s partner reduces the payment necessary to induce participation, one
effect that is not present with selfish or moral preferences. On the other hand, when efforts
are not observable, which team is going to be preferred depends on the production technology:
in particular, if the stochastic production technology displays increasing returns to efforts,
the altruistic team is the cheapest to hire. This is a consequence of the different nature
of each class of preferences. While altruistic agents derive benefits from increased material
payoffs of their fellows, moral agents take satisfaction in doing the right thing. Intuitively,
a higher effort under increasing returns drastically increases the expected material payoff
of the agents, from which altruism is based upon. Meanwhile, the choice of the right thing
to do depends only on the contract offered by the principal, and not on the production’s
underlying technology. Therefore, under increasing returns, altruistic agents possess higher
5Alger and Weibull (2013) shows that homo moralis and altruistic preferences are behaviorally alike in
many situations, and a similar point can be found in Bergström (1995). However, this is not the case in this
exposition, as will be seen later on.
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intrinsic motivation to exert the high level of effort, thus demanding a less high-powered
contract and saving costs for the principal.
This paper is closely related to the moral hazard literature, in particular to two of its
strands: moral hazard in teams and moral hazard with prosocial preferences. Holmström
(1982) and Mookherjee (1984) characterize the basic results on moral hazard in teams that
are used to build the model below6. Itoh (2004), Englmaier and Wambach (2010), Rey-Biel
(2008) and Livio (2015) study optimal incentive schemes under different prosocial prefer-
ences: the first three focus on inequity aversion, while the last models agents exhibiting
reciprocity concerns towards each other. None of them, however, raises the question of
which preferences yields the least cost to the principal.
The analysis below differs from the previous literature in two crucial points: first, it
considers homo moralis preferences, which hasn’t, to the best of my knowledge, been done
before in a contracting setting, thus presenting a simple environment where the principal
can profitably explore idiosyncracies generated by those and altruistic preferences. Second,
and more importantly, it contrasts the optimal contracts under each class of preferences, and
derives conditions under which the principal would prefer hiring one team over the other,
therefore providing a rationale for firms to collect soft information on potential employees
to compose teams that will minimize the total payments to be made.
I proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the environment, while Section 3 and 4 study the
optimal contract assuming efforts are contractible and non-contractible, respectively. Section
5 concludes. For ease of exposition, all proofs are relegated to Appendix C.
2 The Model
I analyze the interaction between a principal and two agents, denoted by i ∈ {A,B}. The
principal hires the two agents to work on a joint task, which generates revenue x ∈ {xH , xL}
to the principal, where xH > xL. Each agent can exert either a low or a high effort level
6Che and Yoo (2001) study optimal incentives for teams in a repeated setting.
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ei ∈ {0, 1}. Efforts determine revenues stochastically, according to the following probability
distribution

eB = 1 eB = 0
eA = 1 p2 p1
eA = 0 p1 p0

Throughout, I assume that revenue is never certain and that the probability of achieving a
high outcome is increasing in the total effort exerted by the agents: 1 > p2 > p1 > p0 > 0.
If effort is costless, the assumption above indicates a preference of the principal for both
agents to exert effort. However, effort is costly to each agent; for each i = A,B7,
c(ei) =
 c > 0 if ei = 1,0 if ei = 0.
The principal offers the agents contracts wi(x), i = A,B, specifying payments that will
follow each realization of revenues. The principal is assumed to be risk neutral, and his
payoff is given by
V (x,wA(x), wB(x)) = x− wA(x)− wB(x).
Denote by π(ei, ej, wi(x)) the expected material payoff accruing to agent i from the
effort choices (ei, ej) and wage schedule wi(x), for i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. I restrict attention




i ) determining the payments following good and bad
realizations of revenues. In what follows, the material payoff function takes the expected
additively separable form









where u : R+ → R is the function that associates the agent’s consumption utility to each
amount of money. The dependence of i’s expected material payoff on ej comes from the
effect of the other agent’s effort on the probability distribution of revenues. The agents are
7In reality agents may differ in their respective cost of effort, but this is not pursued in this paper because
it doesn’t qualitatively change the results, at the same time it adds a more cumbersome notation.
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risk averse towards wages: u(w) is assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave8.
The principal faces either a team consisting of two agents characterized by homo moralis
preferences with degree of morality κi ∈ [0, 1], represented by the utility function
UHM(ei, ej,wi, κi) = (1− κi)π(ei, ej,wi) + κiπ(ei, ei,wi), (2)
a team comprised of two altruistic agents, whose preferences are summarized by the utility
function
UAlt(ei, ej,wi,wj, αi) = π(ei, ej,wi) + αiπ(ej, ei,wj), (3)
for αi ∈ [0, 1] and i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. Both specifications take the standard selfish
preferences as a special case (κi = αi = 0), and this will allow comparisons between the
results to be presented below and the benchmark moral hazard problem.
As pointed in Alger and Weibull (2013) and Bergström (1995), this specification of pref-
erences for altruistic agents gives rise to the behavioral equivalence between homo moralis
preferences and altruism for αi = κi in many classes of games. With that in mind, I will
make the following assumption for the rest of the exposition.
Assumption 1: αA = αB = κA = κB = θ.
Thus, the agents’ utility function are simplified to
UHM(ei, ej,wi, θ) = (1− θ)π(ei, ej,wi) + θπ(ei, ei,wi), (4)
UAlt(ei, ej,wi,wj, θ) = π(ei, ej,wi) + θπ(ej, ei,wj). (5)
The relationship among the three parties unfolds as follows. First, the principal offers
each agent a contract wi, which can be either accepted or rejected by the agents. If at least
one agent rejects the contract, the game ends and every party receives his own reservation
8The assumption that u(·) is strictly concave can be relaxed, and the same model below can be solved
in a setting with risk-neutral agents and limited liability constraints, where the qualitative results are not
changed from the analysis below.
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utility. If both agents accept the principal’s offers, they play a normal form game9: both
of them must simultaneously and independently choose an effort level, from which revenues
will be realized according to the probability distribution given by the production technology
above. Payments are made according to the schedules proposed by the firm and the agents’
payoffs in the normal form game are given by their expected utilities with regard to received
wages, efforts and preferences. While each agent’s effort choice is private information, rev-
enues and wages are publicly observable. It is also assumed that the agents’ preferences are
common knowledge10.
3 Studying the Benchmark: The Contractible Effort
Case
As a starting point, I derive the optimal contract assuming efforts are observable and con-
tractible by the principal, to serve as a benchmark for later results. In what follows, I assume
that each agent possesses an outside option that gives him utility u ≥ 0 if he does not accept
the principal’s contract offer. Therefore, agent i ∈ {A,B} is willing to participate in the
proposed relationship iff
U(ei, ej,wi,wj, θ) ≥ u. (IR)
As discussed in the previous section, standard selfish preferences are a particular case of
both homo moralis and altruistic preferences, and for ease of exposition, I begin this and the
next section by analyzing the optimal contract for that instance. Thus, under contractible





u′(wLi )[1− p(ei, ej)]
9The normal form game here is comprised of the set of players {A,B}, the common set of pure strategies
S = {0, 1}, and payoff function U(ei, ej ,wi,wj , θ).






which implies wHi = w
L
i = wi = u
−1 (u+ c(ei)) for ei ∈ {0, 1}. The intuition here is the
same as in the classical moral hazard problem with one principal and one agent: if effort is
contractible, the principal optimally offers a constant wage schedule remunerating the agent
according to his reservation utility and the cost of the principal’s desired level of effort.
When the principal faces a team of altruistic agents, he solves
maxwA,wB p(eA, eB)
(
xH − wHA − wHB
)
+ (1− p(eA, eB))
(























A ) + (1− p(eA, eB))u(wLA)− c(eA)
]
≥ u (IRB)
An interior solution is characterized by the KKT first-order conditions
− p(ei, ej) + λip(ei, ej)u′(wHi ) + λjθp(ei, ej)u′(wHi ) = 0
− [1− p(ei, ej)] + λi[1− p(ei, ej)]u′(wLi ) + λjθ[1− p(ei, ej)]u′(wLi ) = 0,




for any choices of effort (eA, eB) ∈ {0, 1}2 and i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. Therefore, if agents are
altruistic, the optimal contract under verifiable efforts proposes a constant wage schedule,








which is well-defined for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to see that for θ = 0 this is exactly the same
expression as for the optimal contract under verifiable efforts in the benchmark case, while
that for any positive degree of altruism, it is lower than it would be for selfish agents.
11Since 1 ≥ p2 > p1 > p0 ≥ 0 and u′ > 0 by assumption, the first-order conditions imply that λi +λjθ > 0
for i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j.
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Finally, consider the team with homo moralis preferences, in which agent i ∈ {A,B} is
willing to participate in the proposed relationship iff
UHM(ei, ej,wi, θ) = (1− θ)π(ei, ej,wi) + θπ(ei, ei,wi) ≥ u,
i.e. iff
u(wHi )[(1− θ)p(ei, ej) + θp(ei, ei)] + u(wLi )[(1− θ)(1− p(ei, ej)) + θ(1− p(ei, ei))]− c(ei) ≥ u.
Some points are noteworthy. First, as mentioned before, in the case where θ = 0 this
participation constraint reduces to the usual (IR) constraint in the benchmark moral hazard
problem, since the selfish preference is a particular case of this framework. Second, for θ = 1,
Uκ(ei, ej,wi, 1) = π(ei, ei,wi). In this case, agent i’s choice of effort does not depend on
agent j’s effort choice, and choosing ei becomes an individual decision problem. Third, if
ei = ej = e ∈ {0, 1}, the participation constraint collapses into
p(e, e)u(wHi ) + (1− p(e, e))u(wLi )− c(e) ≥ u,
Note here that the agents’ degrees of morality are irrelevant and the participation constraints
are exactly the same as those that would be obtained in a symmetric equilibrium in the
benchmark moral hazard problem: by imposing ei = ej, both expected material payoffs
terms are identical, and since the utility function is constructed as a convex combination of
these functions the expressions above are obtained.
By Assumption 1, every agent in each team is identical to his partner, since the only
source of heterogeneity in the general formulation was given by the preferences. Therefore,
I will restrict attention to symmetric choices of effort eA = eB in the rest of the discussion
12.
Proposition 1: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, there exists c∗ > 0 such that for all
c ∈ (0, c∗) the principal induces agents in the teams of moral or altruistic agents to exert
high effort by means of a constant wage.
12In Appendix B I show that relaxing both these assumptions leads to a Borch rule for moral agents that
demands nonconstant wages when efforts are observable, in stark contracts to the literature with selfish and
altruistic agents.
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This result is not surprising: if efforts are contractible, the principal compensates the
agents with a fixed transfer in case they exert the desired level of effort, or punish them
if there is a deviation. Also, if the cost of exerting effort is small, then the amount the
principal has to transfer back to the agents in order to have an increased chance of obtaining
a high realization of revenues is also small, and thus profitable to implement. Moreover,
since I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, the degree of morality plays no role when
I consider a team of homo moralis agents: the compensation schedule and effort choices are
exactly the same as those obtained in the benchmark problem.
Now I can focus on the central question of the paper: given the optimal contracts that
induce the desired level of effort, which team should the principal hire?
Proposition 2: Suppose assumption 1 holds, efforts are verifiable and the principal wants
both agents to make the high effort. For any θ ∈ [0, 1], the principal prefers hiring the team
of altruistic agents team of selfish and moral agents.
Intuitively, in situations where someone fails to do the right thing, a moral agent derives
part of his utility from contemplating what would happen if everyone did the right thing. If
both agents do in fact exert high effort, the contemplation in question does not add utility
beyond the material utility that the agents thus obtain. By contrast, for altruistic agents,
any choice but high effort decreases the material payoff of both agents, and consequently all
the utility of each altruistic employee. Therefore, intrinsic motivation is larger for altruistic
agents and a team comprised of such employees is less costly for the principal.
4 Moving to the Second Best: Non-contractible Efforts
Throughout the rest of the exposition, I focus on contracts that induce both agents to
participate in the relationship and also exert the high level of effort (e = 1).
As a benchmark, focus first on standard selfish preferences. If efforts are non-contractible























Manipulating the incentive compatibility constraint yields
u(wHi )− u(wLi ) ≥ cp2−p1 . (ICi)
By assumption, c > 0 and p2 > p1. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint implies a
monotonicity constraint on the wages following a good and a bad realization of output, since
u(.) is assumed to be strictly increasing. Standard arguments show that both the incentive
compatibility and the individual rationality constraints must bind at the optimum, so that




S ) such that








Given the incentive compatibility constraint, it is clear that ∆wS ≡ wHS − wLS > 0.
Of course, if the principal wishes to induce the agents not to exert effort, a constant wage
schedule wH = wL = w = u−1 (u) would be optimal. Comparison of the principal’s profits
when agents exert effort and shirk show that the former is preferred by the employer for any
c ≤ cS, 0 < cS < c∗.
Under altruistic preferences for the agents, the principal’s problem is
maxwH ,wL p2(x
H − 2wH) + (1− p2)(xL − 2wL)
s.t. (1 + θ)[p2u(w













H) + (1− p1)u(wL)− c
]
. (IC)
Rewrite the incentive compatibility constraint as
u(wH)− u(wL) ≥ c
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1)
, (7)
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and notice that the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in the degree of altruism α. The
intuition behind this is the tradeoff between explicit and intrinsic incentives. Indeed, as the
agent cares less about his own material payoff relative to that of his teammate, the intrinsic
incentive derived from an increase in the probability of a high realization of output (and a
consequent raise in the expected material benefit of his partner) becomes larger than the
explicit incentives given by a high powered contract in inducing the agent to exert the high
level of effort.
The proposition below characterizes the optimal contract13.
Proposition 3: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. There exists cAlt > cS such that, for all
c < cAlt, it is optimal for the principal to induce both altruistic agents to exert effort, eA =
eB = 1, by means of a contract wAlt
∗ = (wHAlt, w
L
Alt) such that
∆wAlt ≡ wHAlt − wLAlt ≤ ∆wS
∀θ ∈ [0, 1], with strict inequality for any θ > 0.
Close inspection of the incentive compatibility constraint shows that any contract that
would induce a selfish agent to exert the high effort would also induce an altruistic employee
to do the same. Also, for any given contract an increase in θ would increase the utility of
each agent. Hence, the principal can profit by reducing both wages14. This argument is
formally stated below.
Corollary 1: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, the principal’s expected profits are strictly
increasing in θ.
Last, I consider homo moralis preferences. The principal must choose wage vectors
13In Appendix A I show that the optimal contracts for both moral and altruistic agents may lead to
multiplicity of equilibria in their effort choices, as in Holmström (1982).















































i )− c) + (1− p2)(u(wLi )− c)
]
≥ u (IRi)




i ) + (1− p2)u(wLi )− c ≥ u,
since, in equilibrium, the principal’s offer induces the symmetric effort choice eA = eB = 1.
The incentive compatibility constraint also simplifies to
p2u(w
H











i ) + (1− p0)u(wLi )
]
.
The right-hand side of this inequality highlights an interesting fact: a positive degree of
morality implies the agent internalizes the cost of choosing a low effort by evaluating what
would happen if the other agent also were to make the same decision. This is very different
in nature to how an altruistic agent evaluates any deviation: while the latter considers only
the effects of his own deviation on his own material payoff and on his partner’s, the former
would consider the effect of the same deviation being made by his partner on his own payoff.
Besides, by force of the assumptions presented above, further manipulation of (ICi) yields
u(wHi )− u(wLi ) ≥
c
(p2 − p1) + θ(p1 − p0)
, (8)
where c
(p2−p1)+θ(p1−p0) > 0. Because of the strict concavity of u(·), the incentive compatibility
constraint for moral agents also implies a monotonicity condition on the optimum compen-
sation schedules offered by the principal, even when the agents display the highest degree of
14
morality. This last remark implies that the intrinsic incentives of the most moral agent are
not sufficiently large to overcome the need to provide him with explicit incentives to exert
the high level of effort.
Proposition 4: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. There exists cHM > cS such that, for all c <
cHM , it is optimal for the principal to induce both moral agents to exert effort, eA = eB = 1,
by means of a contract wHM
∗ = (wHHM , w
L
HM) such that
∆wHM ≡ wHHM − wLHM ≤ ∆wS
∀θ ∈ [0, 1], and strict inequality for θ > 0.
The intuition behind the monotonicity constraint is the same as in the benchmark model:
if wages following a low realization of revenues were larger than their counterpart after a
good realization, then agents would prefer to exert low effort in order to receive this higher
compensation and save in the cost of exerting effort.
The novelty in the results relates to how the compensation schedules varies with respect
to the degree of morality θ. Keeping in mind that u′ > 0, one can see that as θ increases
the right hand side of (ICi) becomes ever smaller, albeit positive. This implies that the gap
in wages following good and bad realizations of revenues must decrease, since the incentive
compatibility constraint binds, but monotonicity still holds. Intuitively, the principal can
reduce the compensation over high realizations of revenues given to an agent who is very
concerned about doing the right thing. But at the same time, he must increase wages after
bad outcomes in order to satisfy the participation constraint.
Because of this diminishing wage gap, intuition would suggest the first-best result is
obtained for a sufficiently high degree of morality. However, this is not the case. To see this,
take θ = 1, where agent i’s preferences are purely Kantian and, thus, his utility is completely
characterized by the expected material payoff π(ei, ei). Although the participation constraint
doesn’t vary with the agent’s degree of morality15, the same is not true for the incentive
15For symmetric equilibrium choices of effort.
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compatibility constraint. Now, when considering the pros and cons of a deviation in terms
of effort choice, agent i internalizes what would happen if agent j were to do the same.
Specifically, this entails a reduction in the probability of the good revenue being realized
from p2 to p0, instead of the reduction to p1 in the selfish term. This internalization is
reflected in the (ICi) constraint, which becomes




The denominator on the right-hand side is exactly the difference in the probabilities discussed
above. Taking θ = 1 makes the incentive compatibility constraint for a team of moral agents
as easy to satisfy as possible, but it still binds, thus pushing the optimal contract away from
the first-best one (constant wage schedule).
Given this behavior of wage schedules with respect to the degree of morality, a natural
question to be asked is whether the principal is better off with highly moral agents or not.
The answer is unconditional, and presented in the following result.
Corollary 2: The principal’s expected profit is strictly increasing in θ.
Corollary 2 contrasts with the contractible effort case, where the principal’s profits were
identical when hiring a team of selfish agents or a team of moral agents, for any degree of
morality the last would display. Mathematically, the result is a consequence of the individual
rationality constraints being identical in both cases, while the incentive compatibility con-
straint has a smaller right-hand side under moral agents than under selfish ones. Intuitively,
the principal exploits the agents’ morality, as he did with altruistic employees as well, to in-
duce high effort by means of less high-powered incentives, while inducing participation with
a slightly increased payment after a bad realization of output. Thus, one concludes that the
expected savings in wages after a good realization made by the principal by choosing a high
morality agent offsets the expected increase in payments after low revenues.
One remark is in order here. Because of the assumption that 1 > p2 > p1 > p0 > 0
and the monotonicity condition implied by the incentive compatibility constraints for each
16
preferences, it is the case that U(0, 1,w; θ) ≥ U(0, 0,w; θ), where w is the optimal contract
offered by the principal. Thus, using the (IC) constraints again, I have that U(1, 1,w; θ) ≥
U(0, 0,w; θ), so the agents have no incentives to jointly deviate to shirking. The same is also
true for altruistic agents.
So far, I have showed that the principal can attain higher profits by exploiting the agents’
morality or altruism, thus reducing high-powered explicit incentives in the optimal contract
in such a way that participation and incentives to exert high effort are still satisfied. There-
fore, from the employer’s perspective, knowing which class of preferences demands the least
amount of explicit incentives is crucial. Lemma 1 tells us that the answer to that question
depends on the stochastic production technology.









sign as (p2 − p1)− (p1 − p0).
In other words, if the stochastic technology presents increasing returns on aggregate
efforts, the optimal contract under homo moralis preferences is (weakly) more high-powered
than its counterpart under altruism when κ = α: any contract inducing moral agents to exert
high effort would do the same to altruistic employees. The converse is true if the technology
has decreasing returns on efforts. This can be seen in Figure 1. The middle (green) line
represents the incentive compatibility constraint for altruistic agents, whose format is not
affected by the production technology. The top (red) and the bottom (blue) lines are the
graphic representations of the (IC) constraint for moral agents when p2 − p1 > p1 − p0 and
p2 − p1 < p1 − p0, respectively16.
16If p2 − p1 = p1 − p0, both lines coincide with the (IC) for altruistic agents.
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Figure 1: Comparing the power of optimal contracts
HM: p2 − p1 > p1 − p0
HM: p2 − p1 < p1 − p0
Altruism
Given the result above, one would expect that the principal’s expected payoff will be uni-
formly higher if the agents are altruistic rather than moral when the production technology
presents increasing returns to efforts, while the opposite would be true if decreasing returns
are present. The flaw with such a logic is not considering the effects of the binding individual
rationality constraints, which implied under contractible efforts that the team of altruistic
agents was always the cheapest to hire. In particular, remember that for altruistic agents
the outside option u is divided by 1 + θ in the participation constraint, a factor that is not
present under selfish and moral preferences. This implies that wLAlt should also be smaller
than wLHM
17. However, the principal has clear preferences over the composition of the team,
and the result below precisely states when one team is preferred over the other.
Theorem 1: Assume the principal offers contracts wHM and wAlt to homo moralis and
altruistic agents, respectively, inducing them to exert the high level of effort. Also, assume
Assumption 1 holds. Then, if the stochastic production technology exhibits
1. increasing returns to efforts (p2−p1 ≥ p1−p0), the principal is better off hiring a team
of altruistic agents over a team of moral agents;
17This intuition in indeed right, and integrates the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix.
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2. decreasing returns to efforts (p2 − p1 < p1 − p0) and
• the outside option is zero (u = 0), the principal prefers a team of moral agents;
or
• the outside option is positive and the degree of morality is sufficiently low (u > 0,
κ→ 0), the principal prefers a team of moral agents only if p2 > p2 ∈ (0, 1).
Under increasing returns to efforts, an altruistic team is cheaper for the principal because
of two reasons. First, the wage that must be paid after a bad realization of output is smaller
than its counterparts under selfish or moral preferences, and this is a consequence of the
fact that the former’s consideration with regards to the payoff of his partner slackens the
participation constraint. On the other hand, such concern also slackens the incentive com-
patibility constraint in this case, because exerting efforts drastically increases the probability
of being successful, thus providing implicit incentives for the altruistic worker to exert effort
and requiring a less high-powered contract to be proposed by the employer.
Such a difference in the intrinsic incentives to exert effort disappear when the production
technology has constant returns, so that the power of the contract remains the same for both
teams. However, it is still the case that the principal exploits the fact that altruistic agents
derive utility from each other’s material payoff, and can thus pay them less.
The third case, with decreasing returns to efforts, is the most interesting, because the
preference of the principal results from the net effect of two opposing forces. While it is still
true that wLAlt ≤ wLHM , Lemma 1 states that now the power of the contract required by moral
agents is smaller than the one for altruistic agents. In the range where such a reduction is the
most drastic, the principal will prefer the team of moral agents rather than altruistic ones.
The first condition for this to happen is that the probability of a success when both agents are
exerting effort is sufficiently high, as can be seen from the incentive compatibility constraints.
The second condition is that either the outside option for the agents be zero, or that if it is
positive, the degree of morality or altruism be close to zero. If both cases, the participation
constraints for moral and altruistic agents become arbitrarily close (identical if u = 0) so that
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the exploitability of altruistic preferences, described in the preceding paragraph, becomes
small, and the principal profits by hiring the agents demanding the least powered contracts:
the moral agents in this case.
Figures 2a, 2b and 2c provide an example of Theorem 1 for u(w) =
√
w. Figure 2a
represents the case where the production technology exhibits increasing returns to efforts.
With the exception of θ = 0, where both teams are identical to the selfish agents, the
principal’s profit is higher with a team of altruistic agents (V Alt) than with a team of moral
agents (V HM).










Figure 2a: Comparing principal’s profits for p2 − p1 ≥ p1 − p0
Figure 2b exemplifies the case with decreasing returns to efforts, zero outside option
for the agents and a high probability of success if both agents exert effort (namely, I set
p2 = 0.9). As Theorem 1 states, under these conditions V
HM(θ) ≥ V Alt(θ) for all equal
degrees of morality and altruism.
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Figure 2b: Comparing principal’s profits for p2 − p1 < p1 − p0
Finally, Figure 2c plots the ratio V HM/V Alt for decreasing returns to efforts and u = 0.2.
Contrary to the previous case where u = 0, the difference in the participation constraints
for moral and altruistic agents make it unprofitable to the employer hiring the moral team
if θ becomes larger, since the decrease in wLAlt would be, in expected terms, sufficient to
compensate the savings related to the power of the contract. This is represented by the
region in the figure in which V HM/V Alt ≤ 1.









Figure 2c: Comparing the ratio of principal’s profits for p2 − p1 < p1 − p0
Therefore, a rationale in terms of the principal’s expected profits is given for trying
to sort employees with respect to their preferences. If the production technology exhibits
increasing returns with respect to efforts, the principal’s choice is straightforward: always
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choose to employ altruistic agents. However, if the condition does not hold, employing
moral individuals may lead to higher profits in comparison to both altruistic and purely
selfish agents.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a comparison between the optimal contracts offered to teams of agents,
who may be characterized by either homo moralis preferences or altruism towards each
other. These contracts were explored in situations where the teams have only two agents
with binary choices of efforts, affecting stochastically the revenues accrued by the principal.
Under contractible efforts, I show that altruistic agents are more exploitable by the
principal, in the sense that the employers needs to pay a smaller wage to induce participation
of the those agents when compared to the case where he would hire a team of selfish or
moral employees. When efforts are no longer contractible, this exploitability also shows up
for moral agents, and I show that the larger the degree of altruism or morality displayed
by the members of each team, the higher the expected profits for the principal. Then, the
natural question is which class of preferences would require smaller wages to exert effort and
participate in the contractual relationship?
The main finding is that the principal obtains a higher expected profit hiring a team
composed of moral agents under restrictive conditions: first, that the stochastic technology
exhibits decreasing returns with respect to efforts; second, that the outside option of the
agents yield zero utility or third, that the degree of morality is sufficiently low.
It is noteworthy that even in such a simple environment prosocial preferences affect the
contractual design, by adding a third channel to the traditional trade-off between risk-sharing
and incentive provision. In effect, the principal will be better off employing a team of either
altruistic or moral agents instead of a team composed solely of selfish employees, since a
higher degree of morality and altruism decreases the amount of explicit incentives provided
by the optimal contracts to induce the agents to exert effort. However, this additional
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channel is not enough to completely extinguish the need for explicit incentives even then
the agents are purely moral or altruistic. Because it is more costly to the principal to hire
a team of selfish agents, the exploitability of prosocial preferences can thus explain costly
acquisition of job applicants’ soft information in the labor market. These departures in terms
of the incentive compatibility constraints can be used to empirically test the underlying
preferences of employees, by means of the powers of the contracts. This is particularly true
when monitoring of the employees’ activities is available to the employer, since selection of
non-constant contracts would be evidence of moral agents.
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A Multiplicity of Equilibria
The optimal contracts derived in the main text are such that the principal can induce
both agents to exert the high level of effort e = 1, both for the homo moralis or altruistic
teams. However, the strategy profile (eA, eB) = (1, 1) may not be the unique Nash equi-
librium of the simultaneous game played by the pair agents for a given contract. Indeed,
let U(ei, ej,wi,wj; θ) denote agent i’s expected utility under this contract and degree of
morality or altruism θ18. Then, the stage game played by agents 1 and 2 can represented by
eB = 1 eB = 0
eA = 1 U(1, 1,wA,wB; θ) U(1, 0,wA,wB; θ)
eA = 0 U(0, 1,wA,wB; θ) U(0, 0,wA,wB; θ)
From the principal’s problem, the incentive compatibility constraint implies that
U(1, 1,wA,wB; θ) ≥ U(0, 1,wA,wB; θ),
i.e. given that the other agent is already exerting the high level of effort, it is not profitable
for agent A to shirk when his compensation follows the optimal contract w∗. Since this is
true for both agents, it follows that (eA, eB) = (1, 1) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for
w∗.
However, the comparison between U(1, 0,wA,wB; θ) and U(0, 0,wA,wB; θ) is not clear.
In particular, if the latter is greater than the former, then (eA, eB) = (0, 0) would constitute
another pure strategy Nash equilibrium for w∗.
18Given the symmetry of the problem, I focus attention on agent A and drop the subscripts. The same
results would hold for agent B by simply reversing the effort choices eA and eB .
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Under homo moralis preferences, note that
U(0, 0,w∗; θ) ≥ U(1, 0,w∗; θ)⇔
p0u(w
H) + (1− p0)u(wL) ≥ (1− θ)[p1u(wH) + (1− p1)u(wL)− c] + θ[p2u(wH) + (1− p2)u(wL)− c]⇔
c ≥ u(wH)[(1− θ)p1 + θp2 − p0] + u(wL)[(1− θ)(1− p1) + θ(1− p2)− (1− p0)]⇔
c ≥ u(wH)[(1− θ)p1 + θp2 − p0]− u(wL)[(1− θ)p1 + θp2 − p0]⇔
c ≥ [u(wH)− u(wL)][(1− θ)p1 + θp2 − p0]⇔
c ≥ c
(p2 − p1) + κ(p1 − p0)
[(1− κ)p1 + κp2 − p0]⇔
(p2 − p1) + θ(p1 − p0) ≥ (p1 − p0) + θ(p2 − p1)⇔
(p2 − p1)− (p1 − p0) ≥ θ[(p2 − p1)− (p1 − p0)]⇔
(1− θ) [(p2 − p1)− (p1 − p0)] ≥ 0,
while for altruistic preferences
U(0, 0,wAlt
∗; θ) ≥ U(1, 0,wAlt∗; θ)⇔
(1 + θ)[p0u(w
H
Alt) + (1− p0)u(wLAlt)] ≥ (1 + θ)[p1u(wHAlt) + (1− p1)u(wLAlt)]− c⇔
c ≥ (1 + θ)(p1 − p0)[u(wHAlt)− u(wLAlt)] = (1 + θ)(p1 − p0)
c
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1)
⇔
p2 − p1 ≥ p1 − p0.
Observe that the inequality for moral agents is always satisfied if θ = 1. On the other
hand, if κ ∈ [0, 1), that inequality holds iff p2− p1 ≥ p1− p0. Therefore, the following result
holds.
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 1 holds and that the principal offers the optimal contracts
wHM and wAlt for the teams of moral and altruistic agents, respectively. Then, eA = eB = 1
is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous choice of effort game played by
the agents iff p2− p1 < p1− p0, and θ < 1 for homo moralis agents. Otherwise, eA = eB = 0
is also a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
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One remark about asymmetric equilibria must be made here. If p2 − p1 = p1 − p0,
both an altruistic and a moral agent will be indifferent between shirking and exerting effort
when their partners are shirking. Moreover, since the optimal contract satisfies the incentive
compatibility constraint with equality for both types of pro-social preferences, the workers
are also indifferent between shirking or not when their partner is exerting the high effort.
Therefore, in this case, the asymmetric efforts (eA = 1, eB = 0) and (eA = 0, eB = 1) are
also pure strategy Nash equilibria of the simultaneous choice of effort game.
B Obtaining the Borch Rule for Asymmetric Efforts
Under Homo Moralis Preferences
Relax Assumption 1 and consider the contracting problem of a team of moral agents when
efforts are observable. If the principal wishes to induce asymmetric choices of effort, constant
wages are not optimal for moral agents, as they were to altruistic and selfish agents19. Note
first that the Borch rule for teams of selfish and altruistic agents are derived for an arbitrary
pair (eA, eB), and the ratio of marginal utilities with high or low wages are equal to 1 whether
eA = eB or not. For homo moralis preferences suppose, without loss of generality, that agent
A exerts high effort while agent B exerts low effort. In this case, the principal solves
maxwA,wB p1
(
















A ) + (1− p2)u(wLA)
]











B ) + (1− p0)u(wLB)
]
≥ u (IRB)
Close observation of the constraints reveals two differences between them. First, only (IRA)
contains the cost of effort, since agent A is the only one to exert high effort. Second, and
more important, the probabilities of high and low realizations of revenues in the Kantian
19As shown by the Borch rules (BRS), (BRAlt)
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morality terms of the two constraints are different, but the same in the other term. This
is true because each agent evaluates the consequence of his own effort should both agents
choose this particular effort.
The wages must satisfy the Borch rule, given by
p1
u′(wHA ) [(1− κA)p1 + κAp2]
=
1− p1
u′(wLA) [(1− κA)(1− p1) + κA(1− p2)]
,
p1
u′(wHB ) [(1− κB)p1 + κBp0]
=
1− p1
u′(wLB) [(1− κB)(1− p1) + κB(1− p0)]
.




i is only obtained if κi = 0, that is, only
if both agents display the standard selfish preferences. If the degree of morality is not zero,




(1− κA)p1(1− p1)− κAp1p2 + κAp1





(1− κB)p1(1− p1)− κBp1p0 + κBp1
(1− κB)p1(1− p1)− κBp1p0 + κBp0
> 1,







Therefore, should the principal want to induce the moral agents to undertake different
efforts, two differences arise in comparison to the selfish and altruistic preferences cases.
First, the general argument that the principal should pay a constant wage (that satisfies the
participation constraint) in case the appropriate level of effort is exerted by the agent no
longer holds. Indeed, for the agent exerting high effort, a monotonicity result similar to the
one obtained in the second-best cases of the traditional moral hazard problems is observed.
On the other hand, agent B, who is not supposed to exert effort, is paid according to a
reverse monotonicity result: wage after a good realization of revenue must be lower than its
counterpart after a bad realization. These results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 5: Suppose the principal restricts attention to asymmetric equilibria of the kind
ei = 1 > ej = 0 for i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j when the agents exhibit homo moralis preferences.






J ) that maximizes the
principal’s profits and satisfies the agents participation constraints.
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C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume ei = ej = e ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ {A,B}. The discussion in the main text shows that the
optimal contract under contractible efforts for teams of selfish or moral agents is
wFB = u−1 (u+ c(e)) ,









Denoting by V FB11 and V
FB
00 the principal’s expected profits in the cases where both agents
exert high and low effort, respectively, and the teams are comprised of either selfish or moral
agents. Plugging in the optimal wages obtained above yields
V FB11 = p2x
H + (1− p2)xL − 2u−1(u+ c)
V FB00 = p0x
H + (1− p0)xL − 2u−1(u)
and thus V FB11 ≥ V FB00 if and only if
u−1(u+ c)− u−1(u) ≤ (x
H − xL)(p2 − p0)
2
.
By assumption, p2 > p0 and x
H > xL, so the right-hand side is strictly positive, while u′ > 0
implies the left-hand side is also positive since c > 0. By continuity of u, there exists c′ > 0
such that 2 (u−1(u+ c′)− u−1(u)) = (xH − xL)(p2 − p0), and the inequality above holds for
all c ∈ (0, c′].
Now, doing the same for altruistic agents, write
V FB11,Alt = p2x






V FB00,Alt = p0x






where an argument similar to the paragraph above implies that there exists c′′ > 0 such
that, ∀c ∈ [0, c′′), V FB11,Alt > V FB00,Alt.
Letting c∗ = min{c′, c′′} concludes the proof.
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C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Since u is a strictly increasing strictly concave function by assumption, its inverse u−1 is, on
its turn, a strictly increasing strictly convex function. Therefore, since
u ≥ u 1
1 + θ
for all θ ∈ [0, 1], the amount of compensation dispensed by the principal is larger under homo
moralis or selfish preferences.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Under Assumption 1 and eA = eB = 1, the optimal symmetric contract wAlt
∗ = (wHAlt, w
L
Alt)
offered by the principal must solve
maxwH ,wL p2(x
H − 2wH) + (1− p2)(xL − 2wL)
s.t. (1 + θ)[p2u(w
H) + (1− p2)u(wL)− c] ≥ u (IR)
u(wH)− u(wL) ≥ c
(1+θ)(p2−p1) (IC)
where the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality, and given by
u′(wHAlt)(1 + θ)[λp2 + µ(p2 − p1)] = p2 (2.1)















Alt) + (1− p2)u(wLAlt)− c]− u ≥ 0 (2.5)
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1)[u(wHAlt)− u(wLAlt)]− c ≥ 0 (2.6)
λ ≥ 0 (2.7)
µ ≥ 0 (2.8)
Note that λ = 0 cannot be a solution since it violates equation (2.2), because u′ > 0 and







which yields wLAlt = w
H
Alt for all θ ∈ [0, 1] since u′′ < 0, thus violating the incentive compati-
bility constraint in (2.2). Therefore, any solution must have λ, µ > 0 such that λp2 + µ(p2 − p1) > 0λ(1− p2)− µ(p2 − p1) > 0
Since the Lagrange multipliers are strictly positive, the optimal contract is fully charac-





[(1− p1) + θ(p2 − p1)]





− c [p1 − θ(p2 − p1)]
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1)
.




Given the optimal contract, one must again wonder whether the principal will induce
both agents to exert high effort or not. If not, then the principal can offer the constant





as before, since this satisfies the participation constraint, but not the
incentive compatibility constraint. Thus, the principal’s expected payoff in this case is again
given by
V00(θ) = p0x
















Consequently, it is only beneficial to the principal demanding high effort from both agents
if V11(θ) ≥ V00(θ), that is,













c[(1− p1) + θ(p2 − p1)]






− c [p1 − θ(p2 − p1)]



















, and the inequality is automatically satisfied, since 1 > p2 > p1 > p0 > 0
and xH > xL by assumption.
Therefore, by continuity, ∃cAlt > 0 such that ∀c ∈ (0, cAlt], V11(θ) ≥ V00(θ).
C.4 Proof of Corollary 1







wage offered by the principal when agents display the degree of morality θ ∈ [0, 1]. More-
over, for any θ ∈ [0, 1], let C(θ) denote the set of contracts satisfying both the IR and IC
constraints for the degree of altruism θ, so that w∗Alt(θ) ∈ C(θ).
Then, using the constraints, one can check that
u(wHAlt(θ0))− u(wLAlt(θ0)) =
c
(1 + θ0)(p2 − p1)
>
c





so that w∗Alt(θ0) ∈ C(θ1). However, the KKT conditions imply that w∗Alt(θ1) is the unique so-





















Thus, keeping wLAlt(θ1) = w
L




Alt(θ0) − ε, ε ≈ 0, the principal
satisfies both constraints while increasing his payoff by 2p2ε > 0. Therefore, the principal’s
expected profit is strictly increasing in θ.
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C.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The principal’s problem is given by
L = p2
[


















u(wHi )− u(wLi )
)
((p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0))− c
]
for i = A,B and j 6= i. Then, the KKT conditions are given by the system of equations
−p2 + λip2u′(wHi ) + µiu′(wHi ) ((p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)) = 0 (3.1)
−(1− p2) + λi(1− p2)u′(wLi )− µiu′(wLi ) ((p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)) = 0 (3.2)
p2u(w
H
i ) + (1− p2)u(wLi )− c ≥ u (3.3)(
u(wHi )− u(wLi )
)










u(wHi )− u(wLi )
)
((p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0))− c
]
= 0 (3.6)
λi ≥ 0 (3.7)
µi ≥ 0 (3.8)
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) clearly show that λi = µi = 0 is not a possibility. Indeed, if
that was the case, then p2 = 0, which contradicts our initial assumption. Also, I cannot have
µi > 0 = λi, because this would imply equation (3.2) is not satisfied. So, I must either have
λi > 0 = µi or λi, µi > 0. Solving for the multipliers in equations (3.1) and (3.2) yields
λi =





p2(1− p2)(u′(wLi )− u′(wHi ))
u′(wHi )u
′(wLi )((p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0))
> 0
so both the (ICi) and (IRi) constraints bind. Thus, using equations (3.3) and (3.4) one finds
the optimal schedule must satisfy
u(wLi ) = u−
c[(1− κi)p1 + κip0]
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)
u(wHi ) = u+
c[(1− p1) + κi(p1 − p0)]
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)
.
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Differentiating this expressions with respect to κi yields
dwHi
dκi
= − (1− p2)(p1 − p0)












Given the optimal contract, one must again wonder whether the principal will induce
both agents to exert high effort or not. If not, then the principal can offer the constant wage
w = u−1(u) as before, since this satisfies the participation constraint, but not the incentive
compatibility constraint. Thus, the principal’s expected payoff in this case is again given by
V00(κ) = p0x
H + (1− p0)xL − 2u−1(u),









c[(1− p1) + κi(p1 − p0)]









u− c[(1− κi)p1 + κip0]
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)
)]
.
Consequently, it is only beneficial to the principal demanding high effort from both agents
if V11(κ) ≥ V00(κ), that is,








c[(1− p1) + κi(p1 − p0)]




u− c[(1− κi)p1 + κip0]
(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)
)]
.




and the inequality is automatically satisfied, since 1 > p2 > p1 > p0 > 0 and x
H > xL by
assumption.
Therefore, by continuity, ∃cHM > 0 such that ∀c ∈ (0, cHM ], V11(κ) ≥ V00(κ).
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C.6 Proof of Corollary 2



















c(p1 − p0)(1− p2)p2
[(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
×u




since wHi > w
L
i by the monotonicity implied by the (ICi) and u
′′ < 0. Therefore, the
principal’s expected payoff is strictly increasing in each degree of morality κi.













[(p2 − p1) + κi(p1 − p0)]2
[−p2(1− p2) + (1− p2)p2] = 0.
C.7 Proof of Lemma 1
Let κ = α = θ ∈ [0, 1], c > 0 and 1 > p2 > p1 > p0 > 0 by assumption. Then
c
(p2 − p1) + θ(p1 − p0)
≥ c
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1)
⇔
(p2 − p1) + θ(p2 − p1) ≥ (p2 − p1) + θ(p1 − p0)⇔
p2 − p1 ≥ p1 − p0.
C.8 Proof of Theorem 1
Let hH = u(wH) and hL = u(wL), which are uniquely determined for any values of w since











(hL, hH) ∈ CHM(θ) =
{




if the principal is hiring a team of moral agents, and
(hL, hH) ∈ CAlt(θ) =
{
(h1, h2) ∈ R2 : p2h2 + (1− p2)h1 − c ≥
u
1 + θ





where k1 = p1− p0 > 0 and k2 = p2− p1 > 0, if he considers a team of altruistic agents. The
sets CHM(θ) and CAlt(θ) collect all the values of hL and hH satisfying the participation and
incentive compatibility constraints for a given degree of morality or altruism θ ∈ [0, 1].
First, notice that for any value of θ ∈ [0, 1], a pair (hL, hL) ∈ CHM(θ) also satisfies the
(IR) constraint in CAlt(θ): indeed, p2h2 + (1− p2)h1 − c ≥ u ≥ u1+θ for u ≥ 0.
Suppose that p2−p1 ≥ p1−p0, i.e k2 ≥ k1. Then, by Lemma 1, hHHM−hLHM ≥ hHAlt−hLAlt,
which implies the optimal contract under homo moralis preferences also satisfies the incentive
compatibility of altruistic agents, so that (hLHM(θ), h
H
HM(θ)) ∈ CAlt(θ). This implies that
CHM(θ) ⊂ CAlt(θ), one can conclude that V Alt11 (θ) ≥ V HM11 (θ). This can be graphically seen
in Figure A.1.











Figure A.1: Optimal contracts for p2 − p1 > p1 − p0
Suppose now that p2−p1 < p1−p0, i.e. k2 < k1. In this case, the incentive compatibility
constraint for moral agents is below the one for altruistic agents, as can be seen in Figure
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A.2 and implied by Lemma 1, but because the reverse holds for the participation constraint,
one cannot say that CAlt(θ) ⊂ CHM(θ). Using the results in Propositions 2 and 3, one can
check that
hLHM − hLAlt = u−
u
1 + θ












(1 + θ)k2(k2 + θk1)
≥ 0
for all θ ∈ [0, 1], u ≥ 0, c > 0 and 0 < p0 < p1 < p2 < 1. Thus, the wage paid after a
bad realization of output for a moral agent is larger than the corresponding wage paid to an
altruistic agent if k1 > k2. Therefore, the principal can only be better off hiring a team of
moral agents if the wage paid after a good realization of output to the latter is sufficiently
smaller than the one paid for altruistic agents and the isoprofit curve is sufficiently flat. The
former holds only if










− (1− p2)cθ(k1 − k2)
(1 + θ)k2(k2 + θk1)
< 0.
For θ ∈ (0, 1], c > 0 and 0 < p0 < p1 < p2 < 1, the inequality above holds iff




that is, for u = 0 or small values of θ for u > 0.












Figure A.2: Optimal contracts for p2 − p1 < p1 − p0
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< 0, which becomes flatter as p2 approaches 1. Thus, if k1 > k2, the principal
is better off with a team of moral agents if p2 is close to 1 and either u = 0 or u > 0 and
θ → 0.
C.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Existence of the contract follows from the KKT conditions written on the main text. The
same goes for the inequalities on the wage schedules.
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This paper studies the problem of screening teams of either moral or altruistic agents,
in a setting where agents choose whether or not to exert effort in order to achieve a
high output for the principal. I show that there exists no separating equilibrium menu
of contracts that induces the agents to reveal their types unless the principal either (i)
excludes one group from the productive relationship, or (ii) demands different efforts
from different preference groups. I also characterize the contract inducing pooling
equilibria in which all agents are incentivised to exert the high level of effort.
Keywords: Moral hazard in teams, screening, homo moralis preferences, altruism.
JEL Classification: D82, D86, D03.
1 Introduction
Sarkisian (2017) explores a moral hazard in teams problem where an employer has to choose
between hiring a team of altruistic agents or a team of moral agents (as in Alger and Weibull
(2013, 2016, 2017)). The key finding is that the principal sometimes prefers the team of
∗This work is prepared under the supervision of professors Ingela Alger and François Salanié, as part of my
Ph.D. thesis at Toulouse School of Economics. I thank Renee Bowen, Leandro de Magalhaes, Roger Myerson
and Jörgen Weibull for very valuable feedback. Finally, I also thank seminar audiences at Toulouse School
of Economics, as well as conference participants at the 2018 Africa Meeting of the Econometric Society.
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moral agents over the team of altruistic ones depending on the production technology and
the common degree of morality or altruism. The author then argues that firms may have
incentives to collect information about their prospective employees preferences in order to
benefit from offering less costly contracts.
This last point, however, is not developed there. In particular, Sarkisian (2017) assumes
that the agents preferences are common knowledge, i.e. the principal knows not only which
kind of prosocial preferences the prospective employees have, but also what is the common
degree of morality or altruism displayed by the agents.
The objective of this paper is to relax that strong assumption: in what follows, it is
assumed that the degree of altruism or morality is known to all parties, but the utility func-
tion specification is private knowledge of the agents. The principal then seeks to distinguish
the two groups by offering menus of contracts that induce participation, effort provision and
revelation of private information by the employees.
This class of adverse selection followed by moral hazard problems has been analyzed
before. To cite but a few, Jullien et al. (2007) considers the problem of screening risk-averse
agents under moral hazard under the strong assumption that the utility function satisfies
single-crossing and CARA properties.1 As a result, they find that the power of incentives is
decreasing with respect to risk-aversion. Ollier and Thomas (2013) study a two-output model
with risk-neutral agent protected by limited liability and ex-post participation constraints,
and find that a fully pooling contract is optimal. Maréchal and Thomas (2018) build upon
the previous model by assuming that the agent is risk-averse, and also finds that pooling
contracts are difficult to avoid.
All the papers cited above differ from the environment studied here in one important
way: they assume that preferences are common knowledge, but that either the degree of
risk-aversion or a productivity parameter is private information of the single agent. Here,
as stated before, the utility function rather than the common degree of altruism or morality
1Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) have dedicated sections to this class
of problems, and provide more references to the literature.
2
is private information of the agents.2 The main results, however, are in line with Ollier
and Thomas (2013) and Maréchal and Thomas (2018): separation is difficult to achieve
by the principal if she desires the agents to exert effort in equilibrium. Intuitively, this
is a consequence of the utility functions not displaying a single-crossing-like property, an
assumption that is imposed in Jullien et al. (2007).
Screening prosocial preferences have been the central issue in some studies, both theo-
retically and empirically. von Siemens (2011) studies an environment with a single principal
screening a continuum of workers that have private information about their ability and pref-
erences over social comparisons. In particular, von Siemens (2011) contrasts the optimal
employment contracts for selfish and inequity averse agents, and finds that it is impossible
to screen workers of similar ability with respect to their social preferences within the firm, a
result that is line with the ones found here. The main differences between von Siemens (2011)
and the model in this study is that the former considers only the adverse selection problem
faced by the principal when hiring a single agent, while the latter assumes teamwork and
moral hazard. Closer in essence to this paper are the works of Cabrales and Charness (2011)
and Demougin et al. (2006), who consider screening followed by moral hazard when agents’
prosocial preferences are characterized by inequity aversion. Their results also suggest that
screening agents according to their social preferences is not feasible.
The paper goes as follows. The next session presents the environment and the concept
of separating equilibrium to be considered. Section 3 discusses screening and existence of
separating equilibria, while Section 4 characterizes contracts that support pooling equilibria.
Section 5 concludes. For ease of exposition, all proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2If the symmetry assumption used in Sarkisian (2017) and here was to be relaxed, the problem would




Consider a single risk-neutral principal (she/firm) who faces a continuum of potential em-
ployees with total mass normalized to one.3 The firm seeks to hire a pair of agents to work
on a common task that yields output x ∈ {xH , xL} to the principal, with xH > xL. The
probability p of the high outcome being achieved depends on the binary choices of effort
made by the agents employed in the firm, ei = 0, 1 for i ∈ {A,B}. In particular,
Pr(x = xH |eA, eB) = peA+eB , (1)
where I assume that 1 > p2 ≥ p1 ≥ p0 > 0. The cost of exerting effort is identical to every
agent, C(e) = ce, for c > 0.
Output is contractible upon, and the principal posts wage schedules wi(x) in order to
attract the teams of agents. If the firm successfully attracts a pair of employees, her realized
profit is
V (x,wA, wB) = x− wA(x)− wB(x). (2)
Denote by πi(ei, ej, wi(x)) the expected material payoff accruing to agent i from the
effort choices (ei, ej) and wage schedule wi(x), for i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. I restrict attention




i ) determining the payments following good and bad
realizations of revenues.4 In what follows, the material payoff function takes the expected
additively separable form









where u : R+ → R is the function that associates the agent’s consumption utility to each
wage realization w. The agents are risk averse towards wages: u(w) is assumed to be twice-
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Each pair of agents belongs to one class of preference group: altruists or moral. More
precisely, each team is composed by two agents drawn from the same preference group, as
3The model can be restated by considering n pairs of potential employees, without loss of generality.
4This is in line with Maréchal and Thomas (2018) and Ollier and Thomas (2013), where the schedules
are composed of a fixed plus a variable part.
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in Sarkisian (2017). The principal only knows the proportion of the population that each
group corresponds to: λ ∈ (0, 1) for altruist, and 1−λ for moral. The agents’ preferences in
each group are represented by the utility functions
UAlt(ei, ej,wi,wj, αi) = π(ei, ej,wi) + αiπ(ej, ei,wj) (4)
for the altruists and
UHM(ei, ej,wi, κi) = (1− κi)π(ei, ej,wi) + κiπ(ei, ei,wi) (5)
for the moral agents, where α ∈ [0, 1] and κ ∈ [0, 1] represent the agents’ degrees of altruism
and morality, respectively. In what follows, as discussed in Sarkisian (2017), I assume that
αA = αB = κA = κB = θ, and focus on the comparable functions
5
UAlt(ei, ej,wi,wj, θ) = π(ei, ej,wi) + θπ(ej, ei,wj), (6)
UHM(ei, ej,wi, θ) = (1− θ)π(ei, ej,wi) + θπ(ei, ei,wi). (7)
















Figure 1: Timing of the game.
5As pointed in Alger and Weibull (2013) and also explored in Bergström (1995), this is the formulation
that gives rise to the behavioral equivalence between homo moralis and altruistic preferences. Under an
appropriate change of variables, the altruistic utility function could be rewritten as UAlt(ei, ej ,wi,wj , θ) =
(1− θ̃)π(ei, ej ,wi) + θ̃π(ej , ei,wj), for θ̃ ∈ [0, 1/2].
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3 Screening
Due to the assumption of a common degree of morality or altruism, I restrict attention to
symmetric contracts offered to each team. These assumptions simplify the problem in the
sense that both the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are similar
to the ones studied in the literature with a single agent, save for their dependence on the





H) + (1− p2)u(wL)− c
]
≥ uAlt, (8)
u(wH)− u(wL) ≥ c
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1)
(9)
for altruistic agents, and
p2u(w
H) + (1− p2)u(wL)− c ≥ uHM , (10)
u(wH)− u(wL) ≥ c
(p2 − p1) + θ(p1 − p0)
(11)
for moral agents.
In contrast to Sarkisian (2017), I allow the different groups to have different reservation
utilities. Two particular cases deserve a special mention. First, as in Sarkisian (2017), agents
in each group may have exactly the same reservation utility uAlt = uHM = u, which generates
different utility levels for the participating agents whenever u > 0 due to the utility function
representing each prosocial preference. The second particular case is uAlt = (1 + θ)uHM , so
that the participation constraints for both moral and altruistic agents are identical for any
common degree of prosociality θ ∈ [0, 1]6.
Let CAlt denote the set of contracts that satisfy the participation and incentive compati-
bility constraints of altruistic agents, and similarly define the set CHM for moral agents. The
principal’s screening problem is to choose wAlt ∈ CAlt and wHM ∈ CHM such that neither
6If θ = 0, then both moral and altruistic agents behave as purely selfish individuals, and the screening
problem becomes irrelevant.
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group has an incentive to pick the contract designed for the other group7. The issue, how-
ever, is that the intersection between these two sets of feasible contracts is not empty, and
thus one can always construct a separating equilibrium by selecting two contracts, w and
w′, in CAlt
⋂
CHM , and arguing that each group will self-select into one, and only one, of
these contracts.
I will, therefore, focus on a stronger form of separation: I will require that a menu of
contracts has at most one element in the intersection of the feasible sets. This will ensure
that at least one group has no incentives to deviate and accept the contract designed for the
other group.
Let h = u(w), which is uniquely defined for each w ∈ R since u is strictly increasing by
assumption. I can therefore rewrite the sets of feasible contracts using the linear constraints
(1 + θ)[p2h
H + (1− p2)hL − c] ≥ uAlt, (12)
hH − hL ≥ c
(1 + θ)(p2 − p1)
(13)
for altruistic agents and
p2h
H + (1− p2)hL − c ≥ uHM , (14)
hH − hL ≥ c
(p2 − p1) + θ(p1 − p0)
(15)
for moral agents. I can easily draw the sets of feasible contracts for the cases in which the
production technology displays decreasing or increasing returns to efforts, by appropriately
choosing the reservation utilities uHM and uAlt. In Figures 2 and 3, I assume that uHM =
uAlt > 0. Notice, in Figure 2, that CHM ⊂ CAlt, which implies that any feasible contract
offered to moral agents is also accepted by altruistic ones at the same time that it also
provides the latter with incentives to exert high effort. Meanwhile, in Figure 3, a contract
in CHM is also accepted by altruistic agents, but it may not necessarily induce them to exert
the high effort.
7This is akin to the incentive compatibility constraint in the adverse selection problem. It can be seen as
an additional set of constraints in the principal’s maximization program.
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Figure 2: Feasible sets of contracts for p2 − p1 > p1 − p0.













Figure 3: Feasible sets of contracts for p2 − p1 < p1 − p0.
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Lemma 1: Suppose that uAlt < (1 + θ)uHM . There exists no strictly separating menu of
contracts that induces both agents to exert high effort. Similarly, if uAlt > (1 + θ)uHM , no
strictly separating equilibrium exists that induces all agents to exert effort.
Lemma 1 states that a separating equilibrium does not exist if the reservation utility
of both groups are such that the participation constraints are never identical and contracts
incentivize agents to exert the high effort. Then, for each case, one can find a profitable
deviation for a group, i.e. either the moral agents are better off taking the contract designed
for the altruistic teams, or altruists like the moral contracts better than their own.
Lemma 2: Suppose that uAlt = (1 + θ)uHM ≥ 0. There exists no strictly separating menu
of contracts that induces both agents to exert high effort.
The negative results in Lemmas 1 and 2 can be linked to the fact that the isoutility curves
of moral and altruistic agents never cross in the region where both groups are incentivized
to exert the high effort. Indeed, under the assumptions on each statement, the indifference
curves of each kind of prosocial agent is either identical to one another, or they are parallel.
It is this violation of a single-crossing-like property that prevents the principal from finding
schedules that elicit the agents’ preferences.
Proposition 1: There exists no strictly separating menu of contracts that induces both types
of agents to accept a contract and exert high effort for any uAlt, uHM ∈ R+.
3.1 Separating Equilibria with Low Effort
A separating equilibrium also doesn’t exist if the principal requires both types of agents to
exert the low effort. Indeed, due to risk aversion by the agents, the principal can induce
participation by offering the constant schedules wAlt and wHM for the altruistic and moral
9





u (wHM) ≥ uHM . (17)
By standard arguments, these constraints must bind in an equilibrium. However, if uHM 6=
uAlt
1+θ
, one preference group always has incentives to deviate and accept the contract design
to the second group. On the other hand, if uHM =
uAlt
1+θ
, then wAlt = wHM since u is strictly
increasing, which implies that all workers accept exactly the same contract, and thus picking
them apart is impossible for the principal. This argument is collected in the following result.
Proposition 2: No separating equilibrium exists if the principal wishes to induce both pref-
erence groups to accept the contract and exert the low effort.
3.2 Screening Preference Groups Through Exclusion
Propositions 1 and 2 have shown that the principal cannot screen moral agents from altruistic
ones when she must induce both participation and high effort. However, the principal might
be able to screen the different preference groups by offering a single (non-null) contract.
Turn once more to Figure 2, by assuming identical reservation utilities and increasing
returns to effort. If the principal offers a menu with a single contract that satisfies both the
participation and incentive compatibility constraint of the altruistic agent with equality (the
intersection of the green lines), she will ensure that: (i) altruistic agents accept the offer and
exert high effort; and (ii) moral agents choose not to participate in the relationship with the
principal. The same can be achieved under decreasing returns to effort by offering a similar
contract (Figure 3).
More generally, the principal can screen the preference groups by offering a singleton
menu, where the contract offered necessarily satisfies with equality the participation con-
straint of the preference group with the lowest reservation utility.
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Proposition 3: Suppose that uHM 6= uAlt1+θ . The principal can screen different preference
groups by offering a single contract that excludes the agents with the highest reservation
utility.
Proposition 3 holds either when the principal wishes to induce high or low effort. For the
latter case, the argument behind Proposition 3 is even more compelling since the principal
will offer a constant wage schedule to the risk-averse agents to exert zero effort, and therefore
she can simply choose to employ the cheapest of the preference groups in terms of reservation
utilities.
3.3 Screening with Different Efforts
So far, my analysis has focused on the case where both groups of agents are required by
the principal to exert the same level of effort, either high or low. The negative results are
basically a consequence of the indifference curves for the two groups being parallel to one
another when efforts are the same: this implies that the contract offered to the group with
the highest outside option also attracts the other team.
Although excluding one preference group from participating in the relationship with the
principal is one way to screen agents, a second one exists: namely, requiring that only one
group to exert exerts high effort.
If only one group is expected to exert effort, the incentive compatibility constraint with
respect to effort can be neglected for that group. Moreover, a constant schedule should
be offered to that same group due to the agents’ risk-aversion. In what follows, I will
denote by 1 the preference group that should exert effort, and by 2 the preference group
who shouldn’t exert effort. The feasible set of contracts for the principal will be given by all
values of w = ((wH1 , w
L
1 ), w2) satisfying the incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints for group 1, and the participation constraint for group 2.
One must, however, notice an important difference between the participation constraints
for both groups. For group 1, which is bound by the incentive compatibility constraint, the
11













Figure 4: Feasible sets of contracts for different efforts
(IR) is given by
p2u(w
H
1 ) + (1− p2)u(wL1 ) ≥ u1 for all (wH , wL) that satisfies (IC), (18)
p0u(w
H
1 ) + (1− p2)u(wL1 ) ≥ u1 otherwise. (19)
On the other hand, for group 2, participation must satisfy
u(w2) = p0u(w
H
2 ) + (1− p0)u(wL2 ) ≥ u2. (20)
If the individual rationality curves never intersect, i.e. if either u2 < u1 or u2 >> u1,
then a separating equilibrium doesn’t exist, for the simple reason that the contract offered
to the group with the highest outside option also attracts the agents of the other group, in
much a similar manner to the case where the principal induces no group to high effort.
This is not true if the participation constraints intersect (which requires that u2 ≥ u1).
Using the linearization h = u(w), the feasible set of contracts can be represented as in the
figure below.
The contract offered to the agents in group 2 is given by the intersection of the 45◦-
line with the participation constraint for said group, since such a point has the principal
proposing a constant schedule to the agents who are not expected to exert effort. On the
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other hand, agents in group 1 are offered the contract lying in the intersection between
the two participation constraints, which they strictly prefer to the constant schedule of
group 1 (while the latter is indifferent between the two contracts). The assumption that the
participation constraints intersect also implies that the incentive compatibility constraint for
group 1 is satisfied.
One remark is in order here: the principal leaves group 1 agents some rent for exerting
the high effort, in the sense that the incentive compatibility constraint is not necessarily
satisfied with equality (i.e. the pair (wH1 , w
L
1 ) doesn’t lie in IC1). This can be interpreted as
a no distortion at the top result: the principal’s offer doesn’t distort (downward) the effort
demanded from the least costly group, but she must still pay a rent to that group.
Proposition 4: Suppose that uHM and uAlt are such that uHM 6= uAlt1+θ and the individual
rationality constraints from both groups cross each other once. Then, a separating equilibrium
exists if the principal induces only one preference group to exert the high effort.
4 Pooling Equilibria
Let wHM be the contract that satisfies both conditions in CHM with equality, and similarly
define wAlt. Also, denote by wP the contract that satisfies both the participation constraint
for moral agents and the incentive compatibility constraint for altruistic agents with equality.
The following Proposition states the result formally.
Proposition 5: Suppose that uAlt = uHM = u > 0. wHM constitutes a pooling equilibrium
with both groups of agents exerting the high effort under increasing returns to efforts, while
wP constitutes such an equilibrium under decreasing returns to efforts.
I do not claim in Proposition 5 that wHM and wP are the unique pooling equilibrium
contracts under increasing and decreasing returns to efforts, respectively. Indeed, in the
former case, any contract in CHM indeed constitutes a pooling equilibrium. These two
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contracts, however, are completely characterized by a simple linear system of two equations.
They also characterize one pooling equilibrium when uAlt = (1 + θ)uHM : in this case, the
participation constraints for both groups are identical, and characterizing the feasible sets
for the contracts depends only on comparisons of the incentive compatibility constraints.
Moreover, they are the least costly for the principal to offer.
5 Discussion
The results presented above, in line with the literature on screening prosocial preferences,
imply that the principal may be unable to construct a menu of contracts that is successful
in screening teams of agents belonging to different preference groups. As a consequence,
developing experiments to infer agents preferences in a static environment would present the
same difficulties.
However, one possible strategy would be to offer the contracts sequentially. To fix ideas,
suppose that the production technology exhibits increasing returns to efforts, and that uAlt =
uHM . Under this circumstances, CHM ⊂ CAlt as was argued in the proof of Lemma 1. If
agents are perfectly patient, than the principal could offer wAlt in the first period, which
would be accepted by all the altruistic agents but not by the moral ones, and only then offer
wHM to the remaining agents. Such sequential mechanism would make use of time to screen
the agents, a channel that is not available in the static model described above.
There are two main issues with such an approach, at least from a theoretical viewpoint.
First, if all the potential employees are aware that the employer would utilize the sequential
offer mechanism above, altruistic agents would not accept wAlt in the first period in order to
contract under wHM in the second period and therefore enjoy a higher utility. Clearly, such
deviation by altruistic agents would again leave the principal unable to screen between the
two preference groups.
Secondly, the sequential approach relies on the agents being infinitely patient and the
two preference groups displaying the same reservation utility. The mechanism could still
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be employed in the situation where uAlt < (1 + θ)uHM and δAlt < δHM , where δj ∈ (0, 1)
denotes group j = {Alt,HM} discount factor. In this case, if the altruistic group discounts
the future much more than its moral counterpart, the mechanism could indeed lead to full
screening. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, I do not know any research estab-
lishing conditions under which different prosocial preferences lead to heterogenous discount
factors.
6 Conclusion
This paper extends the analysis in Sarkisian (2017) by relaxing the assumption that the
agents’ preferences are common knowledge in the contractual relationship. In particular,
the interest lies in characterizing a separating equilibrium in which moral and altruistic
individuals reveal their type and exert a high level of effort in the task proposed by the
principal.
In effect, the results are negative, but in line with the literature of adverse selection
followed by moral hazard: screening prosocial preferences is not possible. The empirical
implication follows naturally: one cannot distinguish groups of agents characterized by the
two classes of preferences described above when the degree of prosociality is the same for
the two groups, at least when one considers a static environment. On the other hand, an
alternative would be sequential mechanisms that offer contracts satisfying only one group’s
participation constraint in the first period, and only offering contracts satisfying the second
group’s participation constraint in the following period.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The assumption that uAlt < (1 + θ)uHM implies that the participation constraint for one
group is different than the one for the other. In particular, setting h = u−1(w), and drawing
the participation constraints on the plane (hL, hH) allows us to see that the participation
constraint for the altruistic group is always below its counterpart for moral agents.
The proof then considers two cases in turn. Suppose first that the production technology
is characterized by decreasing returns to efforts, i.e. p2 − p1 < p1 − p0. Then, any contract
w ∈ CHM satisfies the participation constraint of altruistic agents with slackness, and thus
it is profitable for this group of agents to deviate and take the contract designed for moral
agents. Thus, no separating equilibrium exists in this case.
Under increasing returns to efforts, p2− p1 ≥ p1− p0, on the other hand, one can readily
check that CHM ⊂ CAlt. Then, again, all altruistic agents would deviate and choose the
contract designed for moral agents, since this contract would satisfy the former group’s
participation constraint with slackness.
For uAlt > (1+θ)uHM , the proof if similar. If p2−p1 < p1−p0, then CAlt ⊂ CHM and thus
every altruistic agent has an incentive to deviate and take the contract designed for moral
agents. Conversely, if p2 − p1 > p1 − p0, every contract in CAlt satisfies the participation
constraint of the moral agents with slackness, and therefore such agents have incentives to
deviate and take the contract designed for the former group.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose first that p2 − p1 ≥ p1 − p0, so that the incentive compatibility constraint of moral
agents is always above the one for altruists. Then, CHM ⊆ CAlt and the latter always prefer
a contract designed for the former. If p2 − p1 < p1 − p0, the reverse holds: CAlt ⊆ CHM and
moral agents always prefer the contract designed for altruists rather than their own.
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A.3 Alternative Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Alternatively, the same









HM) are contracts that constitute a strictly separating equilibrium. Then,
no team of agents have incentives to deviate and take the contract designed for the other
group. In particular, this means that for altruistic agents the following inequality must hold
(1 + θ)[p2h
H




HM + (1− p2)hLHM − c > p2hHAlt + (1− p2)hLAlt − c (22)
must hold for moral agents. Since θ ∈ [0, 1], condition (21) reduces to
p2h
H
Alt + (1− p2)hLAlt − c > p2hHHM + (1− p2)hLHM − c, (23)
which together with (22) imply that
p2h
H
Alt + (1− p2)hLAlt > p2hHHM + (1− p2)hLHM > p2hHAlt + (1− p2)hLAlt, (24)
a contradiction.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
For uHM 6= uAlt1+θ , the proof is analogous to that of Lemma 1. The impossibility of screening
through exclusion when uHM =
uAlt
1+θ
comes from the argument of Proposition 2 if the principal
does not wish to induce high effort, and generalizes straightforwardly to the case when she
wishes to induce effort.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Under increasing returns to efforts, CHM ⊂ CAlt, and thus wHM ∈ CAlt. In particular, as
shown in Sarkisian (2017), this contract is the least costly one the principal can offer to
moral agents in order to induce both participation and effort.
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Under decreasing returns to efforts, c
(1+θ)(p2−p1) >
c
(p2−p1)+θ(p1−p0) , and thus any contract
satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint for altruistic agents automatically satisfies,
with slackness, its counterpart for moral agents. Therefore, let us take the most restrictive
set of constraints, namely the participation constraint for moral agents and the participation
constraint for altruistic agents. Any contract satisfying both constraints, in particular wP ,
will necessarily belong to both CHM and CAlt, so moral and altruistic agents alike accept such
contract and exert the high level of effort.
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I study optimal incentive schemes in a multi-agent moral hazard model, where each
agent has other-regarding preferences and an individual measure of output, with both
being observable by the principal. In particular, the two agents display homo moralis
preferences as in Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016). I find that, contrary to the case
with purely selfish preferences, tournaments can never be optimal when agents are risk
averse and as the degree of morality increases, positive payments are made in a larger
number of output realizations. Furthermore, I extend the analysis to a dynamic setting,
in which a contract is initially offered to the agents, who then repeatedly choose which
level of effort to provide in each period. As in Che and Yoo (2001), I show that the
optimal incentive schemes in this case are similar to the ones obtained in the static
setting, but for the role of intertemporal discounting.
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1 Introduction
While most of the traditional economic literature on moral hazard has focused on agents’
heterogeneous skills (Laffont and Tirole, 1986; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) and task
allocation (Crawford and Knoer, 1981; Besley and Ghatak, 2005), it is crucial to also take
into account social preferences in the context of incentive provision.1 As pointed out by
Nagin et al. (2002), a considerable fraction of the agents participating in their workplace
experiment do not behave as selfishly as standard theory would predict. Fehr and Schmidt
(2000) and Fehr et al. (2007) show that fairness concerns may drastically impact contractual
designs in principal-agent environments. Dohmen et al. (2009) surveys experimental evidence
of reciprocity both in stylized labor markets as well as in other decision settings. Bowles
and Polania-Reyes (2012) survey finds evidence that explicit economic incentives can either
reinforce or weaken prosocial behavior, and that the latter is more common, due to explicit
incentives adversely affecting the individual’s other-regarding preferences.
Here, I study the optimal incentives schemes a principal can offer to a team of two
agents characterized by a novel class of other-regarding preferences, namely homo moralis
preferences (Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2016). Using a multi-agent moral hazard environment,
as first proposed in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmström (1982), I show that the
optimal contracts offered to the teams of agents have to balance three different aspects:
the agents’ prosocial behavior, here characterized by their degree of morality, risk aversion
and incentive provision.2 I also consider the possibility of repeated interactions between
the agents, as in Che and Yoo (2001), and show that the optimal incentive scheme in the
dynamic setting largely maintains the structure of its static counterpart but for the effects
of discounting in the wages paid by the principal.
1Besley and Ghatak (2005) explores the notion of a mission-oriented production of collective goods,
emphasizing the role of matching between the mission preferences of principals and agents, since the former
economizes on the need for high-powered incentives.
2The next section explores in more depth the concept and the utility function representing moral prefer-
ences.
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More closely related to this paper are the theoretical contributions identifying the effects
of other-regarding preferences in contract design and incentives provision. Many of those
study inequity aversion, following the seminal work of Itoh (2004). While Demougin and
Fluet (2003) considers inequity-averse agents in tournaments, Rey-Biel (2008) and Englmaier
and Wambach (2010) look for the optimal incentive schemes under such preferences. While
the former focus on binary effort choices by the agent (as in Itoh (2004)), the latter allows
not only for continuous effort choice, but also consider incomplete contracts. In general,
the results in this literature show that team incentives may outperform both individual and
relative performance schemes when agents sufficiently dislike inequity.
In a similar vein to Itoh (2004) as well, Livio (2015) derives optimal incentive schemes for
reciprocal agents, a class of preferences first modeled in normal form games by Rabin (1993).
As a result, Livio (2015) finds that the optimal incentive scheme depends on the interplay
between risk aversion and the degree of reciprocity. More precisely, a relative performance
scheme, which induces negative reciprocity, is optimal when agents are not very risk averse,
while a joint performance scheme inducing positive reciprocity is better when agents become
more risk averse. A different form of reciprocity between agents is altruism.3 Dur and
Sol (2010) and Dur and Tichem (2015) study conditions under which explicit incentives can
improve or damage altruism between co-workers.4 In contrast to inequity aversion, and closer
to the results in reciprocity, they find that both team performance and relative performance
schemes can reinforce altruism in the workplace.
Differently than the literature above, I find that in most cases relative performance is the
optimal scheme for incentivising moral agents. In one particular case, team performance is
also optimal, but it is so because all other schemes are not available since limited liability
constraints rule them out. Moreover, I also show that tournaments are never optimal, in
3Bénabou and Tirole (2006) study a model where agents have heterogeneous degrees of altruism (and
greed). Their construction differs from Becker (1974) notion of altruism because on the latter it is the agents’
concern about each other’s wellbeing rather than their concern about own social reputation that induces
prosocial behavior.
4See Kolm and Ythier (2006a,b) for more on altruism.
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stark contrast to the studies of optimal incentive schemes with purely selfish individuals.
The choice of homo moralis preferences comes from the realization that, in all the litera-
ture listed above, other-regarding preferences are assumed based only on psychological and
experimental results. Although in most cases assuming a certain type of preferences have an
intuitive appeal, as in the intra-household models based on forms of altruism, a theoretical
foundation for the choice of one or other preference representation was lacking. The missing
link, then, is a specification of preferences that is robust in a general setting, or one that
evolves endogenously over time in a population. Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016) provide
such a link. They show that under incomplete information (agents’ preferences are privately
observed) and assortative matching, homo moralis preferences emerge as the evolutionarily
stable ones, and that the degree of morality is given by the degree of assortativity of the
matching process in which the individuals participate. Also, Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016)
argue that the utility function representing homo moralis preferences is the only one that
proves to be robust against invasion in monomorphic populations in the class of continu-
ous utility functions. As described in their paper, these preferences can be understood as
a convex combination of the well-known selfish homo oeconomicus preferences and Laffont
(1975)’s concept of Kantian morality.
The paper continues in the following way. Section 2 introduces the model and the homo
moralis utility function. Section 3 then analyses the problem faced by the principal in the
static setting, while Section 4 extends the results to the dynamic environment. Section 5
concludes. For ease of exposition, all proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a firm composed by one manager (principal) and two employees (agents), denoted
by i ∈ {A,B}. Each agent produces an observable output xi ∈ {xH , xL}, with xH > xL,
which is stochastically determined by the agent’s choice of either exerting effort or shirking,
i.e. ei ∈ {0, 1}. This production technology is characterized by the probability of achieving
4
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H |ei = 0
)
= q ∈ (0, p). (2)
This formulation assumes that the observable outputs xA and xB depend only on the corre-
sponding agent’s choice of effort and are independently drawn, and the production technology
is symmetric. The cost of exerting effort is given by
C(ei) = cei, c > 0, i ∈ {A,B}.
The principal is assumed to be risk-neutral, and can use a remuneration scheme w =
(wA,wB) to compensate her employees, which possibly depends on the output realizations
xA and xB. Thus, the principal’s expected payoff can be written as
V (xA, xB,w) =
∑
i
E [xi − wi] .
Each agent’s material payoff is assumed to be additively separable in wages and effort, i.e.
πi(wi, ei) = ui(wi)− C(ei).
For ease of exposition, I assume that employees A and B value wages identically: uA(w) =
uB(w) = w
1−ρ, for ρ ∈ [0, 1).5 Therefore, their material payoffs can be rewritten as
π(wi, ei) = w
1−ρ
i − cei. (3)
For any pair of effort choices (eA, eB), the space of possible output realizations is S =
{(xH , xH), (xH , xL), (xL, xH), (xL, xL)}, where each element s ∈ S is an ordered pair s =
(xA, xB). The principal can offer compensation schemes determining wages after each possi-
ble realization of output, namely
wi = (wiHH , wiHL, wiLH , wiLL) ,
5This specification allows to examine the behavior under risk neutrality (ρ = 0) as a limiting case of
risk-averse agents (ρ ∈ (0, 1)).
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where wiHH specifies, for instance, the wage received by agent i when both output realizations
are high and wiHL denotes the same agent’s wage when his realized output is high while his
partner’s output realization is low. The agents’ expected material payoff, conditional on
efforts, is
E [π(wi, ei)|ei, ej] = P (ei)P (ej)w1−ρiHH + P (ei) [1− P (ej)]w
1−ρ
iHL
+ [1− P (ei)]P (ej)w1−ρiLH + [1− P (ei)] [1− P (ej)]w
1−ρ
iLL − cei,
for i, j ∈ {A,B}, j 6= i.
Up to this moment the preferences of the employees haven’t been fully described. In
particular, I assume that the agents have homo moralis preferences6, represented by the
(expected) utility function
Ui(wi, ei, e−i;κi) = (1− κi)E[π(wi, ei)|ei, e−i] + κiE[π(wi, ei)|ei, ei], (4)
where κi ∈ [0, 1] denotes agent i’s degree of morality. Inspection of the above expression
shows that this specification is the convex combination between the usual representation of
selfish preferences (the first term) and agent i’s material payoff if agent j were to choose
the same action (second term). Also, the limiting cases are interesting: while taking κi = 0
reduces the utility function to the standard selfish preferences, κi = 1 captures a situation
where agent i doesn’t behave strategically: indeed, the problem in that case reduces to a
single decision where j 6= i choice of effort has not effect on agent i’s utility.
Throughout the exposition, I assume that the difference xH − xL > 0 is large enough
for the principal to always prefer to induce both agents not to shirk. Also, in order to
focus on incentives provision, I assume that the workers are already employed by the firm,
that contracts are bound by limited liability constraints and that preferences and costs are
common information. Thus, the only private information is the agents’ choices of effort.
Timing is as follows: the principal sets her preferred incentive schemes (possibly contingent
on both performance indicators (xA, xB)). The agents then simultaneously choose whether
6See (Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2016).
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or not to exert effort. Finally, (xA, xB) is realized and payments are made according to the
incentives schemes proposed by the employer.
Some remarks must be made. First, given any incentive scheme, agents A and B play
a static game with complete information. Not only do they know the proposed incentive
scheme, they also know their partner’s degree of morality, and thus his preferences. Also,
since this is a one-shot game, it is irrelevant whether the agents can observe each other’s
choice of effort after the outputs are realized or not, and thus discussions about commitment
are outside the scope of this model. Second, assuming the agents are already employed by the
firm somewhat relaxes the problem that will be solved by the principal, since participation
constraints will not be considered.7
3 The Principal’s Problem in the Static Framework
The principal’s problem is
maxw V (xA, xB,w)
s.t. Ui(wi, 1, 1;κi) ≥ Ui(wi, 0, 1;κi) (ICi)
wiHH , wiHL, wiLH , wiLL ≥ 0 (LLi)
for i ∈ {A,B}. Given the risk neutrality and the linearity of the expectation operator, and
assuming both agents will exert effort, the principal’s expected profits can be rewritten as





wiHH + p(1− p)
∑
i











iwiHH + p(1− p)
∑
i(wiHL + wiLH) + (1− p)2
∑
iwiLL
s.t. Ui(wi, 1, 1;κi) ≥ Ui(wi, 0, 1;κi) (ICi)
wiHH , wiHL, wiLH , wiLL ≥ 0 (LLi)
7I will consider, however, limited liability on wages. If the outside option on the participation constraint
would be set to zero, then limited liability would imply the former.
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Focus now on the incentive compatibility constraint. On the left-hand side both agents
are exerting effort, so that E[π(wi, e∗i )|e∗i , e∗j ] = E[π(wi, e∗i )|e∗i , e∗i ]. Therefore, one obtains
Ui(wi, 1, 1;κi) = E[π(wi, 1)|e∗i = 1, e∗j = 1]
= p2w1−ρiHH + p(1− p)w
1−ρ
iHL + (1− p)pw
1−ρ
iLH + (1− p)
2w1−ρiLL − c,
while the right-hand side writes
Ui(wi, 0, 1;κi) = (1− κi)
[
qpw1−ρiHH + q(1− p)w
1−ρ
iHL + (1− q)pw
1−ρ






q2w1−ρiHH + q(1− q)w
1−ρ
iHL + (1− q)qw
1−ρ




Plugging in the above equations into the incentive compatibility constraint and rearranging
the terms around the wages yields
w1−ρiHH
[
p2 − (1− κi)qp− κiq2
]
+ w1−ρiHL [p(1− p)− (1− κi)q(1− p)− κiq(1− q)]
+ w1−ρiLH [(1− p)p− (1− κi)(1− q)p− κi(1− q)q]
+ w1−ρiLL
[
(1− p)2 − (1− κi)(1− q)(1− p)− κi(1− q)2
]
≥ c.
This form of writing the (ICi) is very convenient to observe how the degree of morality
affects the incentives of agent i to exert effort. To start, take the term multiplying wiHH ,
and suppose κi = 0. In this case, one obtains p ·p− q ·p = (p− q) ·p, which exactly describes
the decrease in the probability of achieving the output realization (xH , xH) that would be
observed under selfish preferences: agent i would take the action e−i = 1 as given, and would
only consider the effects caused by his own shirking. On the other hand, for κi = 1, the term
would become p · p− q · q = (p− q) · (p+ q) > (p− q) · p: everything else fixed, the principal
would need a smaller wage wiHH to incentivise agent i, since now agent i would evaluate his
payoff as if both him and his partner were shirking. Similar reasoning can be applied to the
remaining terms.8
8One interesting remark is in order at this point. Under standard homo oeconomicus preferences, both
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For ease of exposition, the analysis will be divided in two: first, the risk-neutral case
(ρ = 0) will be tackled. Then I proceed to characterize the optimal incentive schemes when
the agents are risk averse (ρ ∈ (0, 1)).
3.1 Optimal Incentive Schemes for Risk-Neutral Agents (ρ = 0)
For now, focus is channeled towards risk-neutral agents (ρ = 0). Under this additional
assumption, the principal’s problem is a linear programming problem with five inequality
constraints: the incentive compatibility and the four limited liability constraints. The first
result states that the principal’s problem accepts three widely known solution candidates,
namely an individual incentive scheme, where the principal remunerates each agent i ac-
cording to his observable measure of output xi alone; a team incentive scheme, in which the
basis for remuneration is the sum of the individual observable measures; and a tournament
scheme, such that agent i receives a bonus if his output measurement has the highest value.
Lemma 1. When agents are risk neutral with respect to wealth and have homo moralis
preferences, the following two solution candidates implement ei = 1, ∀κi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {A,B}:
1. an individual incentive scheme, with
wiHH = wiHL =
c
p− q
> wiLH = wiLL = 0;
agents are characterized by the same degree of morality κi = 0, and thus each multiplicative term is identical
for employees A and B. However, if κA 6= κB , these terms may not be the same any longer, and the workers
would behave as if they possess heterogeneous beliefs about the realizations of output. This would, therefore,
give a rationale for different wages being proposed (and accepted in the case where participation constraints
are included in the model) by agents facing the same disutility of effort and attitude towards risk. See de la
Rosa (2011) for moral hazard problems with heterogenous beliefs. Observe, however, the two approaches
are radically different at heart: while de la Rosa (2011) assumes agents have heterogeneous beliefs about the
probability of success, thus implying that at least one of them have incorrect beliefs, in my model I assume
both agents have correct beliefs about the probability of success, but differ only on their degree of morality.
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, a tournament scheme also implements ei = 1:
wiHL =
c
(p− q)(1− p− κiq)
> wiHH = wiLH = wiLL = 0.
Proof: all proofs are in the Appendix.
Inspection of the remuneration structures reveals two interesting insights. First, under
the individual incentive schemes, the wage paid following a high realization of the observable
measure of output does not depend on the agents’ degrees of morality, in contrast with the
remaining schemes. Intuitively, this is a consequence of the independence assumptions on the
production technology and its stochastic measurement: together with an incentive scheme
that relies solely on individual performance, this environment reduces to zero the effect of
Kantian morality in the incentives provision; it is as if the employees are purely selfish.
Second, the tournament is only feasible if agent i does not exhibit a high degree of moral-
ity. The mechanism behind this is the asymmetric nature of this particular incentive scheme:
an employee can only receive the bonus if he outperforms his colleague, thus conflicting the
agent’s urge to do the right thing. However, if p + q ≤ 1, a tournament is feasible for all
κi ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, since the probability of realizing a high output measure is sufficiently
small, the incentives provided by the asymmetric scheme may overpower the agents’ morality
in order to induce both to exert effort.
In order to determine which scheme among the ones mentioned above is the most prof-
itable for the principal, one must simply compare the expected payments made under each
alternative structure.
Lemma 2. When agents are risk neutral with respect to wealth and have homo moralis
preferences, the principal is indifferent among the alternative schemes if κi = 0. If κi ∈ (0, 1],
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the principal strictly prefers the team incentive scheme over the individual and tournament
structures.
The statement considers two distinct cases: one for κ = 0 and another for κ > 0.
In the first case, the analysis boils down to standard homo oeconomicus preferences with
risk-neutral agents. Thus, since the agents’ are identical and risk-sharing is not an issue, all
three structures provide exactly the same expected payments to the employees and, therefore,
have the same expected cost for the principal. One concludes that the principal is indifferent
among the alternative compensation schemes.
The interesting case, however, lies on κ > 0. When the employees display a concern
with doing the right thing, the principal is strictly better off implementing a team incentive
scheme. Such a scheme implies that the desired outcome is a high output realization for
agents 1 and 2, which transforms exerting a high effort into being the right thing. Since
both agents now display a positive degree of morality, the total expected cost of explicitly
incentivising the agents is reduced.
Although Lemma 2 rules out individual performance and tournaments as the optimal
incentive schemes (for κi > 0), it does not fully characterize the solution to the principal’s
problem. This is done in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. When agents are risk neutral with respect to wealth and have homo moralis
preferences, the optimal incentive scheme for the principal is team performance.
Proposition 1 strengthens Lemma 2: team incentives are the best scheme a principal can
use to incentivise a team of moral and risk-neutral agents, among all schemes that satisfy
the incentive compatibility and limited liability constraints.
The proof of Proposition 1 is constructed in four steps. First, I show that any optimal
incentive scheme always has wiLL = 0 for i ∈ {A,B}. Then, it is easy to show that the
incentive compatibility constraint must be satisfied with equality. The third step uses Lemma
2, thus eliminating any incentive scheme such that wiHL > 0. Then, the fourth and last step
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must only consider schemes with wiHH , wiLH ≥ 0; finally, I show that the principal’s expected
transfers to the agents are minimized with a team incentive scheme for any κi ∈ [0, 1].
Closer inspection of the optimal incentive scheme shows that the principal is better off
with teams of highly moral agents. The mechanism behind this is that a larger degree of
morality slackens the incentive compatibility constraint, thus demanding a smaller transfer
from the employer to the employees. This is stated formally below.
Corollary 1. Under the optimal incentive scheme with risk-neutral agents (team perfor-
mance), the principal’s expected profit is strictly increasing in the agents’ degrees of morality.
3.2 Optimal Incentive Schemes for Risk-Averse Agents (ρ ∈ (0, 1))
Studying the risk-neutral case allows an understanding of the effects homo moralis prefer-
ences have on designing the optimal incentive scheme, without having to take into consid-
eration the trade-off between incentive provision and risk sharing. In particular, the agents’
urge to do the right thing makes team performance scheme the most profitable for the prin-
cipal in that case. In this section, the risk neutrality assumption is relaxed, and the optimal
incentive scheme will have to balance morality, incentive provision and risk aversion.
The assumption on a functional form for the utility function over wealth, namely u(w) =
w1−ρ for ρ ∈ [0, 1), comes in handy in this section since the results under risk neutrality can
be treated as a particular case of this more general framework. Thus, at least for sufficiently
high degrees of morality and low risk aversion, one expects team performance to be the
optimal incentive scheme. The analysis below aims to specify the conditions for that claim
to hold.
First, it is noteworthy that the usual incentive schemes (team, individual performance
and tournaments) can be used by the principal to elicit effort. However, one other scheme
must also be considered here: relative performance. In such a scheme, payments to agent i
are made whenever his output realization is high, but it differs from an individual incentive
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scheme in allowing different wages following good or bad realizations of output from agent
j. Under risk neutrality both schemes are identical because of the linearity of the utility
function. However, under risk aversion, the concavity of u allows the principal to induce
high effort by offering such a compensation scheme, since now any scheme must balance the
trade-off between incentive provision and risk sharing.
Lemma 3. When agents are risk averse with respect to wealth and have homo moralis
preferences, the following incentive schemes implement ei = 1 for i ∈ {A,B}:
1. an individual incentive scheme, for any κi ∈ [0, 1], with






> wiLH = wiLL = 0;







> wiHL = wiLH = wILL = 0;







(p− q)(1− p− κiq)
) 1
1−ρ
> wiHH = wiLH = wiLL = 0;










wiHL = wiHH · A(κi, ρ) > wiLH = wiLL = 0





ρ ∈ [0, 1].
For the first three schemes, taking ρ = 0 yields exactly the same expressions shown in
Lemma 1, which characterized such schemes for risk-neutral agents. Now, taking the limit
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as ρ → 0 on the relative performance scheme yields the same expression as in the team
performance: lacking the need for risk sharing, both schemes are identical.
Before characterizing the optimal incentive scheme for the principal, the following inter-
mediate results deserves a few remarks.
Lemma 4. For any ρ ∈ (0, 1) and κi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2 , the principal prefers an individual
incentive scheme over a tournament.
The intuition for Lemma 4 is very simple: since a tournament imposes more risk on the
agent than an individual incentive scheme, it must remunerate the agent for the increase in
the riskiness of the contract. However, this compensation for risk is not profitable for the
principal, for any degree of morality of the agent. Moreover, if the degree of morality is
sufficiently high, such a scheme does not even satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint.
In contrast to the risk-neutral case, the optimality of a team performance scheme no
longer holds for all values of κi, p and q. In particular, when compared to the individual
performance scheme, the principal will only prefer the former if the agents’ degrees of morality
are very high, or if their coefficient of risk aversion is sufficiently low.
Lemma 5. The principal strictly prefers team performance over individual performance




Again, observe this result extends the findings under risk neutrality: for ρ = 0, the
right-hand side of the necessary and sufficient condition becomes 0, and thus any positive
degree of morality will imply the optimality of team incentives over individual performance
as was seen before. However, the right-hand side is strictly increasing9 in ρ, which implies
only a very high degree of morality can offset an increase in the degree of risk aversion in













q lnp > 0 since p ∈ (0, 1).
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employee becomes more risk averse, the principal can benefit from a high degree of morality
by offering the agent a contract associating positive payments to a larger number of possible
output realizations. On the other hand, if the agent is not very risk averse but has a very
high degree of morality, remunerating solely on the case where both agents are successful in
obtaining the high output is optimal given the beliefs held by the moral agent.
Lemmas 4 and 5 rank the principal’s preferences over team, individual and tournament
schemes, but refrain from comparing them to relative performance schemes. Proposition
2 below strengthens the comparison, by determining the optimal incentive scheme for the
principal depending on the probabilities of attaining the high output, the agent’s risk aversion
and degree of morality.
Proposition 2. Suppose agents are risk averse with respect to wealth and have homo moralis
preferences. Then, for any ρ ∈ (0, 1):






: a relative performance scheme, with wiHH , wiHL ≥ 0 and wiLH =







: a team performance scheme, with wiHH ≥ 0 and wiHL = wiLH =
wiLL = 0, is optimal.






: a relative performance scheme, with wiHH , wiHL ≥ 0 and wiLH =






: a performance scheme with wiHH , wiHL, wiLH ≥ 0 and wiLL = 0 is
optimal.
The interplay between risk aversion and morality leads to the optimality of relative
performance schemes in most cases: it is profitable for the principal to offer compensation
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schemes that induce positive payments in as many output realizations as possible. One case,
however, does the exact opposite by proposing an incentive scheme where the only positive
payment comes only if both agents are successful in their tasks: if p + q > 1 and κi ≥ 1−pq ,
the principal can profit by exploring the agent’s high degree of morality and, thus, belief in
the realization of high outcomes to concentrate transfer to that particular realization instead
of promising positive transfers even when outputs are low.
Corollary 2. Under the optimal incentive scheme with risk-averse agents, the principal’s
expected profit is non-decreasing in the agents’ degrees of morality.
As was the case under risk neutrality, the principal benefits from hiring agents with large
degrees of morality, since they will need less explicit incentives embedded in the optimal
compensation scheme in order to exert effort. However, the interplay of employees’ morality
and risk sharing demands compensation schemes that spread out payments more evenly
across the possible realizations of output, in particular when the probability of realizing a
high output is not very large (i.e. when p+ q ≤ 1).
4 Repeated Interactions
In what follows, I consider a repeated setting where the agents are expected to either exert
effort (e = 1) or shirk (e = 0) in each period. As in Che and Yoo (2001), this arrangement
is open-ended and can be terminated at the end of each period t = 0, 1, . . . with probability
1 − δ ∈ (0, 1), where δ can also be thought of as the common discount factor for all three
parties. A history at time t is a sequence of effort choices made by the employees until period
t−1, and thus a strategy profile is a sequence of functions mapping from any possible history
at each period into actions10.
In this section, I will show that the optimal incentive schemes derived for the static model
and stated in Proposition 2 are also capable of providing the incentives for both agents to
10More precisely, into a probability distribution over effort choices.
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exert effort in the repeated setting. Firstly, note that a dynamic incentive compatibility
constraint, for any incentive scheme w∗, will be written as
Ui(w
∗, 1, 1;κi) ≥ (1− δ)Ui(w∗, 0, 1;κi) + δmin{Ui(w∗, 0, 1;κi), Ui(w∗, 0, 0;κi)}. (DICi)
Since 1 > p > q > 0 by assumption, and together with the limited liability constraints, it is
the case that Ui(w
∗, 0, 1;κi) ≥ Ui(w∗, 0, 0;κi) under the three optimal incentive schemes in
Proposition 2, so the relevant incentive constraint is
Ui(w
∗, 1, 1;κi) ≥ (1− δ)Ui(w∗, 0, 1;κi) + δUi(w∗, 0, 0;κi), (DIC ′i)
which holds whenever the static incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied; indeed, for
any of optimal static schemes and δ ∈ [0, 1],
Ui(w
∗, 1, 1;κi) ≥ Ui(w∗, 0, 1;κi)
= (1− δ)Ui(w∗, 0, 1;κi) + δUi(w∗, 0, 1;κi)
≥ (1− δ)Ui(w∗, 0, 1;κi) + δUi(w∗, 0, 0;κi).
Moreover, one can easily check that Ui(w, 1, 1;κi) ≥ Ui(w, 0, 0;κi), so collusion in shirking
is deterred by use of any of the three optimal incentive schemes in Proposition 2. However,
the argument built until now does not imply that e = 0 is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of
the stage-game. If it is not, then the trigger-strategy here considered does not induce both
agents to exert effort in the repeated game. Such issue does not arise if Ui(w
∗, 0, 0;κi) ≥
Ui(w
∗, 1, 0;κi), which can be written as
q2w1−ρiHH + q(1− q)w
1−ρ





pqw1−ρiHH + p(1− q)w
1−ρ






p2w1−ρiHH + p(1− p)w
1−ρ





Let c(w∗, κi) denote the value of c that satisfies the condition above with equality for some
optimal scheme w∗ and degree of morality κi. I can now state the following result.
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Proposition 3. Consider an incentive scheme w∗ characterized in Proposition 2. If
c ≥ max {c(w∗, κA), c(w∗, κB), 0}, then the static optimal incentive scheme w∗ induces both
agents to cooperate in the repeated setting.
An important point of Proposition 3 is that it holds for any value of the discount factor
δ. That is, as long as the cost of exerting effort is sufficiently high to avoid e = 1 being a
(weakly) dominant strategy for any of the employees, the optimal static incentive schemes
of Proposition 2 also generate implicit incentives deterring shirking in the dynamic case
irrespective of how patient the agents are. This is a consequence of the dynamic incentive
compatibility constraint (DIC ′i) being automatically satisfied by the schedules respecting its
static version. Therefore, tournaments and individual performance schemes can also sustain
effort in the dynamic game.
Corollary 3. Tournaments (wTourn) and individual performance scheme (wInd) induce both
agents to exert effort in the repeated setting if c ≥ max {c(w, κA), c(w, κB), 0}.
Now, I want to focus on the more general principal’s problem
minw p
2wiHH + p(1− p)(wiHL + wiLH) + (1− p)2wiLL
s.t. Ui(w
∗, 1, 1;κi) ≥ (1− δ)Ui(w∗, 0, 1;κi)
+δmin{Ui(w∗, 0, 1;κi), Ui(w∗, 0, 0;κi)} (DICi)
wiHH , wiHL, wiLHwiLL ≥ 0 (LLi)
If Ui(w
∗, 0, 1;κi) ≤ Ui(w∗, 0, 0;κi), the principal’s problem is identical to the one in the static
case, and the optimal incentive schemes described in Proposition 2 apply to the repeated
setting. The more interesting case happens if Ui(w
∗, 0, 1;κi) > Ui(w
∗, 0, 0;κi): for a large
discount factor δ, the unique optimal incentive scheme will be either a team incentive scheme
or a complete incentive scheme if p+ q < 1 or p+ q > 1, respectively. If, however, p+ q = 1,
then a relative performance scheme is uniquely optimal. The formal statement is given
below.
18












> 0 if p+ q < 1
= 0 if p+ q = 1





< 0 if p+ q < 1
= 0 if p+ q = 1
> 0 if p+ q > 1
.
Then, for any ρ ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1), the optimal incentive scheme for a risk-averse agent
characterized by homo moralis preferences is:
1. if p+ q > 1 and
• κ ∈ [0, κ(δ)): a relative performance scheme, with wiHH , wiHL > 0 and wiLH =
wiLL = 0;
• κ ∈ [κ(δ), 1]: a team performance scheme, with wiHH > 0 and wiHL = wiLH =
wiLL = 0.
2. if p+ q < 1 and
• κ ∈ [0, κ(δ)]: a relative performance scheme, with wiHH , wiHL > 0 and wiLH =
wiLL = 0;
• κ ∈ (κ(δ), 1]: a performance scheme with wiHH , wiHL, wiLH > 0 and wiLL = 0.
3. if p+q = 1, then κ(δ) = κ(δ) = 1 and a relative performance scheme, with wiHH , wiHL >
0 and wiLH = wiLL = 0, is optimal.
An increase in the discount factor has two effects. The first one is the shifts in the
thresholds κ(δ) and κ(δ). As δ approaches one, the values of the thresholds escape the
interval [0, 1] that characterizes the degree of morality of the agents, and thus only one
incentive scheme is optimal for each case.11
11In the proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix, I show that the limits go to plus and minus infinity
depending on whether p+ q > 1 or p+ q < 1.
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The second effect is that an increase in the discount factor decreases the wage that must
be paid to the agents, in particular if both output measures are high. This is true because
the incentive schemes satisfying the dynamic incentive compatibility constraint carry implicit
incentives for both agents to exert effort, by the existing threat of everlasting punishment in
case of an unilateral deviation. Therefore, the principal benefits the more moral and patient
his employees are, as intuition suggests.
5 Concluding Remarks
Studying optimal incentive schemes with other-regarding preferences highlights the fact that
the traditional trade-off between risk sharing and incentive provision is not the only one
to influence the characterization of optimal contracts, and thus, may provide a better un-
derstanding of why the contracts observed in reality are not as high-powered as the ones
predicted in the theory. In this line, Englmaier and Wambach (2010), Itoh (2004) and Livio
(2015), among others, explore the effects that altruism, inequity aversion and reciprocity
have on compensation schemes.
Using the recent results on the evolution of preferences provided by Alger and Weibull
(2013) and Alger and Weibull (2016), I study the problem of optimal incentive provision when
agents display other-regarding preferences and different attitudes toward risk. In particular,
I have shown that the optimal incentive scheme for moral agents may exhibit more risk than
for selfish agents, in the sense that compensation is spread among more possible outcomes
rather than aggregated around only one agent’s output realization, as a consequence of the
implicit incentives generated by morality. Also, in contrast to Itoh (2004) and Livio (2015),
I show that tournaments are never optimal for positive degrees of morality.
Following Che and Yoo (2001), I extend the analysis to a dynamic environment and show
that the optimal incentive schemes derived in the static case are also optimal when the agents
are engaged in repeated interactions. The only difference between the former and the latter
is intertemporal discounting, which affects the amount but not the underlying structure of
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Proof of Lemma 1. As a starting point, I claim that any optimal contract must satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint with equality, and must be such that wiLL = 0. To
see this, I rewrite the (ICi) constraint assuming ρ = 0 as follows:




Note that for any 0 < q < p < 1 and κi, wiLL is multiplied by a strictly negative term, while
wiHH is multiplied by a strictly positive term. For wiHL, the term multiplying it is strictly
positive for κi <
1−p
q
(and negative otherwise), and wiLH is multiplied by a strictly positive
term whenever κi >
p
1−q (and negative otherwise).
Therefore, suppose, by contradiction, that wi = (wiHH , wiHL, wiLH , wiLL) is an optimal
contract that satisfies the (ICi) with some slack and also satisfies the limited liability (non-
negativity) constraints. If wi is such that wiLH > 0, the principal can offer a new contract
w′i = (wiHH , wiHL, wiLH , 0) which doesn’t violate any of the constraints and make him better
off. Indeed, note that
wiHH [p+ κiq] + wiHL [(1− p)− κiq]− wiLH [p− κi(1− q)] >
wiHH [p+ κiq] + wiHL [(1− p)− κiq]− wiLH [p− κi(1− q)]− wiLL [(1− p) + κi(1− q)] ,
and
p2wiHH + p(1− p)(wiHL + wiLH) < p2wiHH + p(1− p)(wiHL + wiLH) + (1− p)2wiLL.
Thus, any optimal contract must have wiLL = 0. Moreover, a similar argument shows that
wiHL = 0 and wiLH = 0 whenever their multiplying terms are strictly negative, i.e. whenever
κi ≥ 1−pq and κi ≤
p
1−q , respectively.
Now, see that the principal can reduce the expected transfers to the agents by offering a
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contract w′′i = (wiHH − ε1, wiHL − ε2, wiLH − ε3, 0) where ε1 > 0 and
ε2










For ε1, ε2, ε3 ≈ 0, the incentive compatibility constraint is still satisfied, while
p2(wiHH − ε1) + p(1− p) [(wiHL − ε2) + (wiLH − ε3)] < p2wiHH + p(1− p)(wiHL + wiLH).
Thus, the principal reduces wiHH , wiHL and wiLH , when the latter are not already zero, until
the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied with equality.
Given the argument above, attention can be restricted to incentives schemes such that
wiHH , wiHL, wiLH ≥ 0 and wiLL = 0. Thus, it is easy to see the three common incentive
schemes, namely individual incentive scheme, team incentive scheme and tournament scheme,
satisfy the conditions above. I analyze each in turn.
First, consider the individual incentive scheme, such that wiHH = wiHL = wiH , wiLH = 0.
Substituting the first equality in (ICi) yields
wiH
[
p2 − (1− κi)qp− κiq2 + p(1− p)− (1− κi)q(1− p)− κiq(1− q)
]





since p > q by assumption.













p(1− p)− (1− κi)q(1− p)− κiq(1− q)
=
c
(p− q)(1− p− κiq)
.
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Observe that wiHL > 0 here if and only if 1 − p − κiq > 0, i.e. κi < 1−pq . Therefore, a
tournament is a candidate solution if and only if agent i’s degree of morality is not very
high. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof follows directly from the comparison of expected payments.
For ease of exposition, they are written:
1. Individual incentive scheme:
∑
i [p
2 + p(1− p)]wiH = 2p cp−q ;








3. Tournament: p(1− p)
∑








First, compare the individual incentive scheme against the team incentive scheme. For












< 1. Therefore, for all κi ∈ [0, 1] and i ∈ {A,B}, the principal is weakly better
off implementing a team incentives scheme.




; otherwise the latter scheme does not satisfy the non-negativity constraints.









p− p2 − κipq ≤ p+ κiq − p2 − κipq ⇔
κiq ≥ 0,
which is always satisfied, since κi ∈ [0, 1] and q ∈ (0, 1) by assumption. Therefore, a team
incentives scheme is also weakly preferred by a principal over a tournament scheme. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Building on the proof of Lemma 1, I restrict attention to schemes
in which wiLL = 0. As a first step, I show it is never optimal for the principal to offer a
24
contract with wiHL > 0 (given that κi <
1−p
q
). Indeed, suppose wi = (wiHH , wiHL, wiLH , 0)
satisfy the (ICi) with equality and the limited liability constraints; now, consider the alter-
native scheme w′i = (w
′
iHH , 0, w
′
iLH , 0) such that
w′iLH = wiLH




Note this scheme also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint with equality. Indeed,
[p+ κiq]w
′








− [p− κi(1− q)]wiLH





Now, observe the principal’s expected transfers under w′i are less or equal than under wi if
and only if




wiHL + p(1− p)wiLH ≤ p2wiHH + p(1− p)(wiHL + wiLH) ⇔
p2wiHH + p(1− p)(wiHL + wiLH) ≤ p(1− p) ⇔
(p+ κiq)(1− p) ≥ p(1− p− κiq) ⇔
κiq ≥ 0,
which is always satisfied, since κi ∈ [0, 1] and q ∈ (0, 1) by assumption (equality will only
hold for κi = 0).
Therefore, any optimal contract must have wiHL = wiLL = 0, which rules out individual
performance and tournament schemes. Note, however, a team incentive scheme may still be






























































However, since 0 < q < p < 1, the las inequality demands κi > 1, violating the assump-
tion about the agents’ degrees of morality. Thus, the principal optimally chooses the team
incentives scheme, given by wopti = (w
opt





for all κi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {A,B} and 0 < q < p < 1. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Simply take the derivative of wiHH under a team incentive scheme
with respect to κi, and note its sign is strictly negative. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider the principal’s problem described in the main text. The
KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize the candidate solutions, and are
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given by
p2 − µi(1− ρ)w−ρiHH [(p− q)(p+ κiq)]− λiHH = 0 (3.1)
p(1− p)− µi(1− ρ)w−ρiHL[(p− q)(1− p− κiq)]− λiHL = 0 (3.2)
(1− p)p− µi(1− ρ)w−ρiLH [−(p− q)(p− κi(1− q))]− λiLH = 0 (3.3)
(1− p)2 − µi(1− ρ)w−ρiLL[−(p− q)(1− p+ κi(1− q))]− λiLL = 0 (3.4)
wiHH(p+ κiq) + wiHL(1− p− κiq)
−wiLH(p− κi(1− q))− wiLL((1− p) + κi(1− q)) ≥ cp−q (3.5)
µi {wiHH(p+ κiq) + wiHL(1− p− κiq)
−wiLH(p− κi(1− q))− wiLL((1− p) + κi(1− q))− cp−q
}
= 0 (3.6)
wiHH ≥ 0 (3.7)
wiHL ≥ 0 (3.8)
wiLH ≥ 0 (3.9)
wiLL ≥ 0 (3.10)
λiHHwiHH = 0 (3.11)
λiHLwiHL = 0 (3.12)
λiLHwiLH = 0 (3.13)
λiLLwiLL = 0 (3.14)
λiHH ≥ 0 (3.15)
λiHL ≥ 0 (3.16)
λiLH ≥ 0 (3.17)
λiLL ≥ 0 (3.18)
µi ≥ 0 (3.19)
for all i ∈ {1, 2}, where µi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compati-
bility constraint while λis are the ones associated with the nonnegativity constraint.
As was the case under risk aversion, (ICi) must bind. If that was not the case, µi = 0
would imply through equations (3.1) − (3.4) that λiHH , λiHL, λiLH , λiLL > 0, and thus, by
force of the complementary slackness conditions (3.11)−(3.14), that wiHH = wiHL = wiLH =
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wiLL = 0. However, substituting into (3.5), one obtains 0 ≥ cp−q > 0, a contradiction
12.
The first three incentive schemes described in the text are obtained by using equation
(3.5), the incentive compatibility constraint, with equality and considering each case in turn:
1. Individual incentive scheme: wiHH = wiHL > 0 = wiLH = wiLL;
2. Team incentive scheme: wiHH > 0 = wiHL = wiLH = wiLL
3. Tournament scheme: wiHL > 0 = wiHH = wiLH = wiLL
For the relative performance scheme, assume 1 − p − κiq > 0 and compute the ratio of



















Since I assume 1 − p − κiq > 0, κi ∈ [0, 1] and 0 < q < p < 1, note that A(κi, ρ) > 0.
Moreover, A(0, ρ) = 1 and
∂A(κi, ρ)
∂κi
∝ −pq(1− p)(p+ κiq)− q(1− p)p(1− p− κiq) < 0,
so that A(κi, ρ) ∈ (0, 1] for all κi ∈ [0, 1] and ρ ∈ (0, 1). Plugging wiHH , wiHL = wiHHA(κi, ρ)
and wiLH = wiLL = 0 in (3.5) yields the result, taking into consideration the nonnegativity
constraint as well. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose 1−p−κiq > 0, so that a tournament is a candidate solution to
the principal’s problem. For ρ ∈ (0, 1), the principal prefers a tournament over an individual
performance scheme if and only if the expected transfers under the former are smaller than
12An argument similar to the one used in the risk-neutral case could be employed here as well, and would
fit the more general case of a utility function of wealth satisfying u′ > 0, u′′ ≤ 0, u(0) = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 5. The principal’s expected payments under team incentives are smaller



























Proof of Proposition 2. Using the KKT conditions obtained in the proof of Lemma 3, I
will look for the optimal incentive scheme. As argued before, such scheme must satisfy the
incentive compatibility constraint with equality (i.e. µi > 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2}). Moreover, it
must be such that wiLL = 0. Indeed, on equation (3.4), note that −(p−q)[(1−p)+κi(1−q)] <
0 for all 0 < q < p < 1 and κi ∈ [0, 1]; therefore, if wiLL > 0, the complementary slackness
condition implies that λiLL = 0, and thus the left-hand side of equation (4) is strictly positive,
contradicting the first-order condition.
A similar argument can be used on equations (3.2) and (3.3): whenever the term mul-
tiplying the wage is negative, a solution must have the nonnegativity constraint binding.
Therefore,
κi ≥ 1−pq ⇒ wiHL = 0, (A.1)
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and
κi ≤ p1−q ⇒ wiLH = 0. (A.2)






⇔ p+ q > 1, 1− p
q
≥ 1 ≥ p
1− q
⇔ p+ q ≤ 1,
so the analysis can be conveniently divided in two cases, namely p+ q > 1 and p+ q ≤ 1.






, conditions (A.1) and (A.2) imply that
wiHL = wiLH = 0, and the only solution candidate is the team incentive scheme described





, the two conditions above imply that
wiHH , wiHL ≥ 0 and wiLH = wiLL = 0, so the four incentive schemes in Lemma 3 are
candidate solutions.
It is easy to see that the relative performance scheme performs at least as good as any of
the other three schemes in this case. Indeed, let C =
{
w ∈ R4+ : wiHH , wiHL ≥ 0, wiLH = wiLL = 0
}





















w ∈ R4+ : wiHH , wiHL ≥ 0, wiLH = wiLL = 0
}
,
denote the set of contracts satisfying the conditions for the performance schemes described
in Lemma 3. One can readily note that CTeam, CInd, CTour ⊂ C and CRel = C. Therefore, a
team, individual or tournament schemes add more constraints to the set of contracts under
which the principal can maximize his profits, and must not yield a strictly higher profit than
the one obtained under the more relaxed constraint set C.
If p + q ≤ 1 and κ < p
1−q , the optimal scheme is the same as in the previous para-
graph, i.e. the relative performance scheme with wiHH , wiHL ≥ 0 and wiLH = wiLL = 0.





, the principal can maximize over the set C̃ =
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{
w ∈ R4+ : wiHH , wiHL, wiLH ≥ 0, wiLL = 0
}
. Now, the contract sets defined by the four
schemes presented above are strict subsets of C̃ and cannot, thus, yield a strictly higher
payoff to the principal. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Follows directly from the argument in the main text. 
Proof of Corollary 3. Follows from the observation that the proposed incentive schemes
satisfy the static incentive compatibility constraint and, thus, the dynamic version considered
in Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows closely the argument developed in Lemma 3
and Proposition 2. Suppose that Ui(w
∗, 0, 1;κi) > Ui(w
∗, 0, 0;κi). The principal’s problem
becomes
minw p
2wiHH + p(1− p)(wiHL + wiLH) + (1− p)2wiLL









(1− κi)(qpw1−ρiHH + q(1− p)w
1−ρ
iHL + (1− q)pw
1−ρ
















iLH) + (1− q)2w
1−ρ
iLL ) (DICi)
wiHH , wiHL, wiLHwiLL ≥ 0 (LLi)
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whose KKT conditions are given by
p2 − λiHH
−µi(1− ρ)w−ρiHH [p2 − (1− δ)((1− κi)pq + κiq2)− δq2] = 0 (4.1)
p(1− p)− λiHL
−µi(1− ρ)w−ρiHL[p(1− p)− (1− δ)((1− κi)q(1− p) + κiq(1− q))− δq(1− q)] = 0 (4.2)
(1− p)p− λiLH
−µi(1− ρ)w−ρiLH [p(1− p)− (1− δ)((1− κi)(1− q)p+ κiq(1− q))− δq(1− q)] = 0 (4.3)
(1− p)2 − λiLL
−µi(1− ρ)w−ρiLL[(1− p)2 − (1− δ)((1− κi)(1− q)(1− p) + κi(1− q)2)− δ(1− q)2] = 0 (4.4)









(1− κi)(qpw1−ρiHH + q(1− p)w
1−ρ
iHL + (1− q)pw
1−ρ






























(1− κi)(qpw1−ρiHH + q(1− p)w
1−ρ
iHL + (1− q)pw
1−ρ





















wiHH ≥ 0 (4.7)
wiHL ≥ 0 (4.8)
wiLH ≥ 0 (4.9)
wiLL ≥ 0 (4.10)
λiHHwiHH = 0 (4.11)
λiHLwiHL = 0 (4.12)
λiLHwiLH = 0 (4.13)
λiLLwiLL = 0 (4.14)
λiHH ≥ 0 (4.15)
λiHL ≥ 0 (4.16)
λiLH ≥ 0 (4.17)
λiLL ≥ 0 (4.18)
µi ≥ 0 (4.19)32
By assumption, 1 > p > q > 0, and thus
(1− δ)
[










so equation (4.4) can only be satisfied if wiLL = 0. Otherwise, the complementary slackness
condition (4.14) would imply λiLL = 0 and equation (4.4) would be violated for any µi ≥ 0.
Moreover, there exists no solution such that λiHH , λiHL, λiLH > 0: if that was true, then
wiHH = wiHL = wiLH = wiLL = 0, and (4.5) would be reduced to −c ≥ 0, a contradiction.
Notice that wiHH > 0 or wiHL > 0 or wiLH > 0 only if µi > 0 and the terms in brackets in
equations (4.1)− (4.3), respectively, are strictly positive. Thus, in any solution, the dynamic
incentive compatibility constraint must be binding.
On equation (4.1) it is easy to see that (1 − δ)((1 − κi)pq + κiq2) + δq2 < (1 − δ)((1 −
κi)pp+ κiq
2) + δq2 < (1− δ)((1− κi)pq + κip2) + δp2 = p2, so that wiHH > 0 for any values
of δ and κi. On equation (4.2), p(1− p) > (1− δ)((1−κi)q(1− p) +κiq(1− q)) + δq(1− q) iff
κi < κ(δ) =





and, on equation (4.3), p(1− p) > (1− δ)((1− κi)(1− q)p+ κiq(1− q)) + δq(1− q) iff
κi > κ(δ) =
δq(1− q)− p(1− p)

















> 0 if p+ q < 1
= 0 if p+ q = 1





< 0 if p+ q < 1
= 0 if p+ q = 1





 +∞ if p+ q < 1−∞ if p+ q > 1 , limδ→1κ(δ) =
 −∞ if p+ q < 1+∞ if p+ q > 1 .
As was the case in Proposition 2, if p + q > 1, then κ(0) > 1 > κ(0) > 0. Thus, for




p2 − (1− δ)q[(1− κi)q + κiq]− δq2
) 1
1−ρ














· p(1− p)− (1− δ)q[(1− κi)(1− p) + κi(1− q)]− δq(1− q)













If p + q < 1, then 0 < κ(0) < 1 < κ(0). For κi ≤ κ(δ), the optimal incentive scheme is
the relative performance described in the last paragraph. On the other hand, for κi > κ(δ),













· p(1− p)− (1− δ)(1− q)[(1− κi)(1− p) + κi(1− q)]− δ(1− q)
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· p(1− p)− (1− δ)q[(1− κi)(1− p) + κi(1− q)]− δq(1− q)














D(κi, δ, ρ) = p[p+ (1− p)(A+ B)]
− (1− δ) {(1− κi)[pq + q(1− p)A+ (1− q)pB] + κiq[q + (1− q)(A+ B)]}
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Can informal risk-sharing crowd out formal insurance policies? I consider an insurance
model where altruistic agents can buy insurance, self-protect against a loss and cross-
insure by means of bilateral transfers. Such altruism-driven transfers may lead the
agents to free-ride on each others’ choices of effort and demand for formal insurance,
and hence hinder the development of formal insurance markets. Absent any information
asymmetries, I show that an actuarially fair insurance policy providing full coverage
can be crowded out by the agents’ informal risk-sharing arrangements. A similar
result holds when the agents’ self-protection efforts cannot be contracted upon by the
insurer. These findings suggest a novel source of inefficiency in insurance markets,
namely prosociality among the insurees.
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1 Introduction
It is not uncommon to observe individuals engaging in market trades and nonmarket ar-
rangements for risk-sharing purposes. Individuals rely not only on insurance contracts to
protect themselves against occasional losses but also on family members and friends to help
in adverse situations. In most cases, such reliance on nonmarket arrangements is more pro-
nounced in less developed societies or those where kinship ties among members is higher,
while more developed societies are associated with stronger formal institutions, such as the
rule of law and well-established banking and credit markets (Cox et al., 2006; Cox and
Fafchamps, 2008).
Figure 1 displays total non-life insurance premiums by private companies as a percentage
of GDP. While average insurance penetration in the poorer countries, displayed on the top
two panels of Figure 1, is less than half of the one displayed by the richer countries in the
bottom two panels, no clear pattern can be observed within each group. Moreover, coun-
tries with lower insurance penetration rates, such as Brazil, Bolivia, India, and Indonesia,
display strong family ties, while countries with higher insurance penetration, such as France,
Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland display weaker family ties (Alesina and Giuliano,
2014).1 Among European countries, Costa-Font (2010) estimates a negative effect of family
ties in the demand for long-term care insurance.2 While a common interpretation of these
patterns is that the lack of formal insurance fosters informal family insurance (Coate and
1The United States display the second highest insurance penetration rates in the sample, but also has
strong family ties. This result is biased due to the presence of poor and tightly-knit minorities communities,
according to Alesina and Giuliano (2014).
2While Alesina and Giuliano (2014) construct their measure of family ties using only the World Value
Survey, Costa-Font (2010) constructs an index of familism using both the World Values Survey and Euro-
barometer survey questions on the importance of family.
2
Figure 1: Non-life insurance penetration as a percentage of GDP.
Source for insurance penetration: OECD. URL: https : //stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode = INSIND. This includes health, vehicles
and housing insurance policies. Source for GPD: World Bank. URL: https : //data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?end =
2017&start = 2017. The values are the most recent available, PPP, current international USD.
Ravallion, 1993; Udry, 1994; Besley, 1995), I ask whether a causal relationship in the oppo-
site direction can be at work as well, i.e. whether formal insurance contracts offered by a
firm can be crowded out by informal risk-sharing arrangements among individuals.
In what follows, I examine the demand for formal private insurance policies when agents
can also engage in informal risk-sharing arrangements with other individuals, possibly be-
cause of family ties. In accordance with the empirical evidence mentioned above, I will let
the strength of altruism be a key driver of insurance demand. I consider a model in which
altruistic agents engage in three actions: (i) buy market insurance by individually engaging
in a contractual relationship with the insurance provider; (ii) self-protect by exerting effort
to reduce the probability of a loss taking place; and (iii) cross-insure by transferring wealth
to one another after observing the realized outcomes.
3
While the usual incentive problem due to moral hazard is present in my model, altruism
introduces new channels through which formal insurance can be, a priori, either hindered or
fostered. The main channel through which altruism affects the outcome is cross-insurance
transfers. Intuitively, an agent’s cross-insurance transfers become larger as he becomes more
altruistic, and they induce better risk-sharing among the agents. However, larger cross-
insurance transfers generate a substitution effect: one agent can choose to rely on another’s
transfers instead of purchasing an insurance policy himself. Additionally, a free-riding effect
on self-protection effort also takes place, since cross-insurance transfers reduce the risk faced
by an agent and, thus, his incentives to exert a costly effort to avoid a loss. Therefore, a
firm’s insurance policy can be crowded out by altruism if the substitution and free-riding
effects generated by cross-insurance transfers are large.
A second channel also exists which can affect the agents’ demand for formal insurance
contracts. As his altruism increases, an agent exerts more effort for two reasons. First, he
wishes to avoid a loss from taking place so that he does not burden the other agent with
cross-insurance transfers. Second, he works harder to avoid a loss in order to be able to help
his partner if the other agent does suffer a loss. A priori, this empathy effect3 may thus help
alleviate the free-riding effect induced by a reduction in the risk due to formal insurance.
Last, formal insurance contracts affect both cross-insurance transfers and self-protection
efforts directly. The latter corresponds to the usual free-riding effect in moral hazard prob-
lems: as risk is reduced by the formal insurance policy, the agents’ incentives to exert a
costly effort to avoid a loss are also reduced. For the former, larger coverage against a loss
decreases the need for cross-insurance transfers between agents. Overall, the combination of
these substitution, free-riding, and empathy effects may lead to the crowding-out of formal
insurance contracts.
My main results are twofold. First, I show that insurance contracts can be crowded out
when a self-interested individual substitutes a formal insurance contract for an altruistic
agent’s cross-insurance transfers. Absent moral-hazard between insurer and insurees, I show
3As discussed in Alger and Weibull (2010).
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that the substitution effect can be strong enough that a self-interested agent rejects an
actuarially fair insurance policy providing him with full coverage.
Under moral-hazard, the contract that would maximize the firm’s expected profit when
trading with a purely self-interested agent will be rejected by sufficiently altruistic agents,
since it fails to take into account the cross-insurance transfers made by these prosocial
individuals. In this case, the offered contract sets too high a premium vis-à-vis the coverage
and the risk such altruistic agents face when cross-insurance transfers are present. Therefore,
individuals are better off not buying the insurer’s contract.
Second, the firm can induce altruistic agents to buy insurance contracts with small pre-
mium and coverage. Intuitively, the insurer anticipates the agents’ cross-insurance transfers
complementing his contract and offers a contract with partial coverage that doesn’t induce
too low an effort on the insurees’ part. Since the agents are risk-averse, this contract may
have higher than actuarially fair premium, thus providing the insurer with positive expected
profits at the same time that it prompts the agents to buy it.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation and the single-agent
model that serves as a benchmark for the multi-agent setting presented later in that section.
Section 3 analyzes insurance demand when self-protection is not available to the agents,
while Section 4 does the same in the presence of self-protection. Section 5 introduces the
insurance firm and evaluates the offers it makes to the agents. Section 6 discusses testable
implications, extensions and future research, before the concluding remarks that appear in
Section 7. For ease of exposition, all proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
The literature has identified several factors that may prevent the emergence of formal mar-
kets. A large body of literature has devoted attention to the information asymmetries plagu-
ing the relationship between insurers and insurees since the pioneering works of Ehrlich and
Becker (1972), Pauly (1974), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). More recently, Hendren
(2013) and Attar et al. (2019) point to adverse selection as being a contributing factor to
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market breakdown, in the same spirit as Akerlof (1970), while Einav and Finkelstein (2018)
underline the role of moral hazard. Another possibility for the underdevelopment of formal,
private insurance markets is the presence of additional players, such as the government, that
offer a substitute to the contracts proposed by private insurance companies. However, Brown
and Finkelstein (2011) and Gruber and Simon (2008)empirically show that the crowding-out
of private insurance by expansions in public health insurance is not that large. While these
articles focus on supply-side issues pertaining to insurance markets, I focus on factors affect-
ing the demand side that hinder the emergence of formal insurance markets. The novelty of
my results rests on bringing forth the link between altruism and the underdevelopment of
formal insurance markets.
My model studies the interaction of a formal market, captured by a principal offering
insurance contracts to a pair of agents, and informal arrangements, represented by transfers
made by this pair of agents. There are a small number of theoretical articles that analyze
such an interaction. Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) provide an early modeling attempt at un-
derstanding the interaction between market and nonmarket insurance, but where the agents
have to choose exclusively between formal and informal trade. My model does not have
the same limitation: agents can participate simultaneously in formal and informal trades
and therefore choose when to trade in both, one or none of them. Kranton (1996) and Jain
(1999) also consider the interaction between formal and informal arrangements, but focus,
respectively, on monetary exchange and credit rather than insurance as in my setting.
A large body of literature studying informal risk-sharing agreements in poor regions has
also been developed. Udry (1990, 1994) and Townsend (1994) were among the first to study
the behavior of rural villagers engaging in quasi-credit transactions with each other in order
to smooth consumption. The main observations of these analyses are that households in
these rural areas mostly engage in trades with other individuals who are close to them, even
when they have the possibility to sign a credit contract with a bank or interact with local
and itinerary merchants that could also provide them with credit. Coate and Ravallion
(1993), Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon et al. (2002), Fafchamps and Lund (2003) and, more
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recently, Dubois et al. (2008), pay attention to the issue of limited commitment present in
these interactions by considering infinitely repeated structures, where the threat of exclusion
from future trades sustains these informal arrangements. In contrast to these papers, my
model posits altruism as the channel through which informal risk-sharing is sustained in a
one-shot interaction. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) show that altruism plays an important
role in sustaining informal risk-sharing among individuals, but do not evaluate the impact
of such arrangements in the demand for formal risk-sharing instruments as in this paper.
Motivated by the findings of Udry (1990, 1994), Townsend (1994), and Foster and Rosen-
zweig (2001) that most risk-sharing agreements take place among individuals who are closely
related to one another, a recent literature has explored the role of altruism, transfers and
risk-sharing in networks. Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), Cox
and Fafchamps (2008), and Di Falco and Bulte (2013) empirically explore altruism in eco-
nomic networks as a means to diversify risk, and their results show that stronger kinship
ties lead to more risk-sharing among agents in the same network. Bourlès et al. (2017) and
Bourlès et al. (2018) provide formal models of social networks where agents care about each
other and may transfer funds to one another to share risk. Their focus, however, lies in iden-
tifying conditions in the network structure that induce positive transfers among its members.
I study a simpler network structure, namely, one with only two individuals, but focus on the
agents’ equilibrium choices of risk-sharing, self-protection and demand for insurance policies,
where the last two elements are absent in Bourlès et al. (2017) and Bourlès et al. (2018).
While this paper can be seen as evaluating the role of altruistic preferences in canonical
insurance settings of asymmetric information, it also provides an independent contribution on
modelling prosocial behaviors. There is by now a large literature on the effects on outcomes
in otherwise standard economic models of other-regarding preferences - such as altruism
(Becker, 1974, 1976), warm-glow (Andreoni, 1990), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999) and morality (Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2016). Recent papers exploring the role of
other-regarding behavior in contracting situations are Itoh (2004), Rotemberg (2006), Rey-
Biel (2008), von Siemens (2011), Sarkisian (2017) and Biener et al. (2018). Most of these
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papers explore the effects of other-regarding preferences in alleviating contracting constraints,
either in moral hazard (i.e., reducing the incentives to free-ride or to slack) or screening
(e.g., individuals self-selecting to job propositions according to their perception of the firms’
missions), while my main concern is how prosociality influences the choices of the agents to
engage in trades either with a formal institution or informally among themselves. Closer
to my main message, Bernheim and Stark (1988), Lindbeck and Weibull (1988), and Alger
and Weibull (2017) also study situations in which altruism has adverse effects on economic
outcomes but do not study how altruism affects market structures. My model extends the
stage game in Alger and Weibull (2010) by introducing an insurer and her contractual offers,
but while I focus on how altruism will affect the demand for formal insurance, Alger and
Weibull (2010) ask the reverse question of how the environment affects the evolution of
altruism itself.4
The papers by Costa-Font (2010), Costa-Font and Courbage (2015), Cremer et al. (2013,
2017), Cremer and Roeder (2014, 2017), Cremer et al. (2016), De Donder and Pestieau (2017)
and Klimaviciute et al. (2019) study the effect of altruism and family help in long-term care
(LTC)5 and LTC insurance. They consider the interaction between parents and siblings,
where the former may become dependent on care in their old age, while the latter can decide
either to care for their parents directly, pay for care, buy insurance or not collaborate at
all. Most of these studies assume that parents are pure altruists towards their children,
while children display either impure altruism or care primarily about the bequest left to
them by the parents. Moreover, it is also usually assumed that parents and children obtain
an exogenous income stream, and that parents face an exogenous probability of becoming
dependent, assumptions I relax in my model.6
4I will explore this point in more detail in a later section.
5See Cremer (2014) and Einav and Finkelstein (2018) for a more detailed discussion on long-term care
and LTC insurance.
6There are two more strands of literature that are related to this paper. The first one is the literature
on moral hazard in teams, firstly analyzed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmström (1982) and more
recently by Che and Yoo (2001). The second one is the literature on nonexclusive contracting analyzed by
Attar et al. (2011, 2014, 2017) in the adverse selection case, and by Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) and Attar
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2 The Model
I consider an interaction between a principal (or insurer) and two agents over three periods.
First, an insurance contract is proposed by the insurer, and each agent decides whether to
buy or to reject the contract. After observing each other’s decisions, agents simultaneously
and noncooperatively choose how much self-protection effort they will exert to prevent a loss
from happening. Losses are realized, wealth levels are observed and contractual terms are
executed, thus prompting each agent to decide whether to make a cross-insure transfer to




































Figure 2: Timing of the game.
I must stress that the interaction between the two agents constitutes a game of complete
information: at each moment they are called to take an action, they know (i) if the other
has bought insurance or not; and (ii) the realized output of the other. This assumption is in
line with the observation in the informal risk-sharing literature that agents mostly engage in
trades with close friends and families, even in small villages (Udry, 1990, 1994; Townsend,
and Chassagnon (2009) under moral hazard. Indeed, one can take the view that in my model an agent will
choose to buy the market insurance to complement the risk-sharing arrangement he already has with his
partner, hence the link with nonexclusive contracting.
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1994), and, therefore, that information asymmetries are small between agents.
On the other hand, I will analyze the firm’s contract offers under two polar assumptions.
First, I will assume that the insurer cannot observe or contract upon the transfers between
the agents, but she observes the realized outputs at the end of period 2. This is a natural
assumption, given that insurance companies typically cannot observe informal arrangements
among potential insurees. Second, I assume the firm anticipates the cross-insurance transfers
between agents, and offer contracts that internalize the substitution and free-riding effects
generated by such transfers.
The analysis is divided into three parts. The first part studies the demand for insurance
when the agents cannot self-protect, while the second part of the analysis considers insurance
demand under self-protection. The third and last part of the analysis focuses on the insurance
policies offered by the principal given the agents’ demand. To introduce the notation, the
next subsection presents the model with a single agent.
2.1 Benchmark: A Single Agent
An agent faces a loss with probability (1−p) ∈ [0, 1]. The wealth of this agent is either high,
wH , when he suffers no losses, or low, wL < wH , when losses take place. Let L = wH−wL > 0
denote the agent’s loss.
Let u(w) denote the utility of consuming wealth w ≥ 0 and ψ(p) the disutility of choosing
the probability of not suffering a loss p. I assume that both u and ψ are twice continuously
differentiable, with u′ > 0 > u′′, ψ′ ≥ 0, ψ′′ > 0, and ψ′(0) = 0. The expected payoff of an
agent under autarky is
U(p) = pu(wH) + (1− p)u(wL)− ψ(p). (1)
The optimal choice of effort for the agent is given by the first-order condition
ψ′(pAut) = u(wH)− u(wL) > 0. (2)
As expected, the higher the loss L = wH − wL the agent can potentially suffer, the higher
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his effort to prevent it from happening will be. Let
UAut ≡ pAutu(wH) + (1− pAut)u(wL)− ψ(pAut) (3)
denote the agent’s expected utility in autarky.
The agent can buy an insurance policy C = (q, t), where q denotes the coverage of the
policy, while t is the insurance premium, from the set of contracts
C = {(q, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ q ≤ L} . (4)
Notice that I impose two conditions on the set contracts. The first condition is that the
premium of an insurance policy cannot exceed the coverage. Indeed, any policy with a
premium larger than the coverage would be rejected by the agent, since it would reduce his
wealth after any realized output. The second condition is that the coverage does not exceed
the loss the agent is subject to. This inequality can be justified by the fact that an insurance
company would not offer a coverage larger than the loss, since such a contract would always
incur a loss7.
If the agent buys the insurance policy C ∈ C, his expected utility becomes
U(p;C) = pu(wH − t) + (1− p)u(wL − t+ q)− ψ(p). (5)
The agent’s rejection of such a contract is equivalent to trading the null contract C0 = (0, 0),
which makes (5) identical to the expected utility of the agent under autarky (1), and thus
leads to the same choice of effort as when no transaction between insurer and agent takes
place. The agent’s choice of effort for C 6= (0, 0) is given by
ψ′(pMH) = u(wH − t)− u(wL − t+ q), (6)
where the right-hand side of (6) is positive for any q ≤ L, and strictly positive for q < L.
7Such restrictions may be relaxed if one considers an environment where the government subsidizes
insurance policies. Since my model seeks to explain the emergence of formal insurance companies, these
assumptions improve the likelihood of a firm making a positive profit, and therefore they fit the model well.
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As can be seen from comparing equations (2) and (6), the equilibrium effort made by the
agent when accepting the insurance policy is smaller than the one he would exert in autarky.
This is a consequence of the agent’s risk aversion together with the fact that the contract
reduces the overall risk he faces8.
In Appendix B, I derive the contract that maximizes the principal’s expected profit
when dealing with this single agent. Such contract is characterized by partial coverage that
induces the agent to exert positive effort to avoid the loss, and by a higher than actuarially
fair premium.
2.2 My Setup: Two Altruistic Agents
I now turn to the model studied hereafter. There are two agents, 1 and 2, independently
facing a loss Li = w
H
i − wLi with probability (1 − pi) ∈ [0, 1]. The agents are altruistic
towards each other, such that if only one of them suffers a loss, the rich agent is inclined to
transfer part of his wealth to the poor agent. These transfers between individuals can be
thought of as an informal risk-sharing device complementing the contracts Ci = (qi, ti), for
i = 1, 2.
To formalize this notion, let di ∈ {a, r} be agent i’s decision to buy (a) or not (r) the
contract Ci = (qi, ti), while ω = (w1, w2) ∈ Ω = {wH1 , wL1 } × {wH2 , wL2 } denotes the realized
outputs. Let yi(wi, di, Ci) denote the pretransfer wealth available to agent i, i.e.
yi(wi, di;Ci) =

wHi − ti if wi = wHi and di = a,
wLi − ti + qi if wi = wLi and di = a,
wHi if wi = w
H
i and di = r,
wLi if wi = w
L
i and di = r.
(7)
The wealth consumed by agent i at the end of the game is equal to the pretransfer wealth
8Formally, one has that ψ′(pAut) = u(wH) − u(wL) ≥ u(wH − t) − u(wL − t + q) = ψ′(pMH) due to
concavity of u and 0 ≤ t ≤ q ≤ L. Then, since ψ(·) is a convex function, I conclude that pAut ≥ pMH for
any (q, t) ∈ C.
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yi(·) minus any transfer he makes to his pair, denoted by τi, plus any transfer τj received
from his pair.
Define a strategy for agent i in the three-stage game as the triple si = (di, pi, Ti), where
di : C → {a, r}, pi : C × d → [0, 1] and Ti : C × d × [0, 1] → R+. Each strategy profile
s = (sA, sB) determines the utility to each agent i and output ω, conditional on contracts
C = (C1, C2):
Ui(s,C) = Vi(s,C) + αiVj(s,C), (8)
where j 6= i and Vi denotes agent i’s expected material payoff
Vi(s,C) = Ep [u(yi(·)− Ti(·) + Tj(·))|pi, pj]− ψ(pi(·)), (9)
and αi ∈ [0, 1] represents i’s degree of altruism towards his partner.9,10 In the next two
sections I will characterize subgame perfect equilibria of this game, assuming first in Section
3 that the probability of obtaining the high output, pi, is fixed, and then relaxing this
assumption in Section 4.
3 Insurance Demand Without Self-Protection
The analysis in this section is divided in two parts, following backwards induction analysis
of the game absent self-protection. The timing is presented in Figure 3.
The first part focuses on cross-insurance, representing the last stage of the game (Period
2). I derive the conditions under which cross-insurance transfers take place and show that
cross-insurance is independent of the probabilities of suffering a loss and in the receiver’s
9If αi = 0, agent i is said to be selfish, while for αi = 1 the agent is called fully altruistic.
10Alternatively, one can think of the agents having preferences that take into consideration the internal-
ization of the collective benefits generated by their actions. Indeed, let xi and xj denote the strategies
for two different agents, and suppose that agent i’s utility is given by Ui(xi, xj , αi) = (1 − αi)πi(xi, xj) +
αi[πi(xi, xj) + πj(xj , xi)], where πi(x, y) denotes the material payoff of the game played between agents i
and j. This specification is also aligned with Bergström (1995), where Ui = U(π, αi, Uj) = π(xi, xj) + αiUj































Figure 3: Timing of the game without self-protection.
degree of altruism. The second part focuses on the agents’ insurance demand (Period 1),
given equilibrium transfers functions. I show that an actuarially fair full coverage insurance
contract is crowded out when one agent is very altruistic and the other is not. Moreover, if
only one agent buys the insurance policy, he is not willing to buy a coverage larger than his
loss at the actuarially fair price to cover for his partner’s lack of insurance coverage.
3.1 Cross-Insurance for Given Contracts (C1, C2)
At the beginning of the last stage of the game without self-protection, agents 1 and 2 are
aware of each other’s decision to purchase or not their insurance policies C1 and C2, as well
as the realized outputs ω = (w1, w2). For any pair of pre-transfer wealths (y1, y2) defined in
(7), and given τj, agent i chooses to transfer τi to agent j to maximize
u(yi − τi + τj) + αiu(yj − τj + τi). (10)
Suppose that agent i believes his pair will give him zero transfers, i.e. τj = 0. Then, i would
choose τi to maximize
u(yi − τi) + αiu(yj + τi), (11)
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leading to the first-order condition
u′(yi − τi) = αiu′(yj + τi). (12)
Consider what happens when the left-hand side of (12) is smaller than the right-hand side:
the marginal utility of agent i’s own wealth is smaller than the marginal utility of his pair j,
weighted by the degree of altruism αi. To equalize both, i’s wealth should be reduced while
j’s wealth should increase, which is achieved by a positive transfer τi from i to j. On the
other hand, if the left-hand side of (12) is greater than the right-hand side, agent i making
a positive transfer will only further drive the difference between the two marginal utilities,
so he must choose τi = 0 in this case.
This argument also implies a minimum degree of altruism for which agent i makes a
positive transfer. Indeed, consider the pre-transfer wealths yi and yj, and let α̂i be such
that u′(yi) = α̂iu
′(yj). Then, no transfers are made by agent i, since the weighted marginal
utilities of wealth are equalized. If, however, i’s degree of altruism increases to some αi > α̂i,
then u′(yi) < αiu
′(yj), and agent i would be inclined to make a positive transfer to equalize
marginal utilities.11 Therefore, I can conclude that, for any given vector of pretransfer





There are two important remarks to be made about these transfers. The first one is
that they never flow from a poorer agent to a richer one. Indeed, suppose that yj > yi;
then, because u(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, u′(yj) < u′(yi) which in turns
implies that (13) is greater than 1. Therefore, since αi ∈ [0, 1] by assumption, agent i does
not transfer a positive amount to his richer partner j. On the other hand, when yi > yj,
α̂i(yi, yj) < 1 and positive transfers thus take place for sufficiently high degrees of altruism.
If yi = yj, then α̂i(yi, yj) = 1 and (12) implies that τi = 0
12.
11Appendix A computes the degree of risk-aversion for altruistic agents. Interestingly, I show that altruism
decreases an agent’s risk-aversion for fixed wealth levels.
12Alternatively, note that α̂j(yi, yj) ≡ u
′(yj)
u′(yi)
= 1α̂i(yi,yj) . Therefore, for any (yi, yj) such that α̂i ≤ 1, it
must be that α̂j ≥ 1, thus implying that Tj(·) = 0.
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The second remark is that each agent’s equilibrium transfer depends neither on the prob-
abilities with which each agent faces a loss, nor on the other agent’s degree of altruism.
This happens because each individual is choosing how much to transfer only after any un-
certainty about outputs has been realized, and noting that equation (12) does not depend
on the recipient’s degree of altruism.
Proposition 1: For each (y1, y2), there exists at least one Nash equilibrium of the transfers
subgame. If α1α2 < 1, then this equilibrium is unique, and at most one agent makes a
transfer, which is never made from the poorer to the richer agent, and does not depend on
the poorer agent’s degree of altruism. If α1α2 = 1, there is a continuum of Nash equilibria,
but a unique equilibrium value for final incomes, namely y1+y2
2
.
In the following lemma, I further show that an agent’s transfer increases in the agent’s
degree of altruism and in the difference between pretransfer wealths of the rich and poor
agents. Naturally, as one individual becomes more altruistic, he is more inclined to help an
agent with a lower wealth, even if the latter agent did not suffer a loss. If such an individual
values his partner’s material payoff as much as he values his own, then transfers are chosen to
equalize final incomes. Additionally, for any given degree of altruism, a higher gap in outputs
requires a larger transfer to satisfy the weighted marginal utilities condition in equation (12).
Two other comparative statics results must be made with respect to the equilibrium
transfers defined in (12), related to the terms of the insurance policies C1 and C2. In a broad
sense, any terms of the policies that make agent i richer than agent j for a given output
increases the transfers from the former to the latter, while the reverse holds if j becomes
relatively richer. Thus, agent i will be aiding agent j less if i has to bear a larger premium in
his contract or if his coverage decreases, while the opposite happens when it is j’s contract
that is subject to a raise in premium or diminishing coverage. These results are summarized
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The equilibrium transfer function Ti : C×d× [0, 1]→ R+ is continuous, positive
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if αi > α̂i(·), and zero otherwise. Moreover, Ti is differentiable for all αi 6= α̂i(·), increasing
in αi and yi, and decreasing in yj.
The most important point to be made about equilibrium transfers is that they locally
alter the individuals’ behavior towards risk. Indeed, this can be seen in Figure 4, where
the dashed line represents an individual’s utility absent any transfers, while the solid line
represents the same agent’s utility for different levels of wealth, holding constant the other
agent’s wealth and the degrees of altruism. When one agent is making the transfers, his
disposable wealth is reduced in comparison to his pre-transfer wealth, thus resulting in a
locally more risk-averse behavior around the threshold yH(α1). On the other hand, when an
agent is the one receiving a transfers, his disposable wealth is larger than the pre-transfer
one, and locally said agent becomes risk-loving around yL(α2). This induced change in the
individuals’ risk behavior together with the substitution effect generated by the presence of
cross-insurance transfers will determine the purchasing decision of insurance contracts, as I
will discuss in more detail in the next section.
3.2 Insurance Contract Purchasing Decision
Given the equilibrium transfers characterized in Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 above, I can
proceed by backwards induction in the game played between agents 1 and 2 absent moral-
hazard. Since I am now focusing on the case where the agents cannot self-protect (i.e.,
p = (p1, p2) is exogenously given), I can compute each agent’s expected utility Ui(d) for
arbitrary tuples of contracts, outputs, probabilities of suffering losses and degrees of altruism.
Therefore, the agents’ decisions to buy or not buy the insurance policy being offered to them
can be summarized in the normal form game Γ(C,p, α), represented by the payoff matrix
I am now in a position to state my first main result. Absent any transfers, efficiency would
require a full coverage actuarially fair insurance policy Cafi = (Li, (1− pi)Li) for each agent
i = 1, 2. Such a contract would eliminate the risk faced by an individual agent by equalizing
all outputs to the expected wealth wi = piw
H
i + (1 − pi)wLi and, thus, would be strictly
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a U1(a, a), U2(a, a) U1(a, r), U2(a, r)
r U1(r, a), U2(r, a) U1(r, r), U2(r, r)
preferred by the risk-averse agents over no insurance. The introduction of cross-insurance
transfers, however, may change this result, as shown next.
Proposition 2: Suppose that (wH1 , w
L




2 , p2), α1 = 1, and α2 is small enough.
Then, buying the full coverage actuarially fair insurance policy Caf = (L, (1 − p)L) is a
strictly dominant strategy for agent 1. Agent 2 will prefer not to buy Caf if he is not too risk
averse.
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The main insight here is that a purely selfish, risk-averse, and rational agent may reject
an actuarially fair insurance contract that eliminates all the risk he faces in favor of a small,
but free of charge, help from his altruistic partner.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that rejecting the actuarially fair full coverage
insurance policy yields a lottery of payoffs to the altruistic agent 1 that is a mean-preserving
spread of the lottery induced by purchasing such a contract, irrespective of the decision made
by the self-interested agent 2, since he receives no transfers from agent 2. Then, because
agents are assumed to be risk averse with respect to wealth, I obtain that agent 1 strictly
prefers to insure himself.
The same, however, is not true for agent 2 since, given that agent 1 buys the insurance
policy, the expected wealth he obtains when rejecting Caf given that 1 buys the policy
is higher than the expected wealth he would obtain when purchasing Caf . Therefore, a
second-order stochastic dominance argument cannot be applied here, and for some parameter
configurations the best response of agent 2 to d1 = a might be either to accept or to reject
Caf .
Proposition 2 implies that altruism may lead to an inefficient outcome due to the sub-
stitution effect. In particular, one agent’s altruism may induce the other to free-ride on
cross-insurance transfers and not to purchase an insurance policy that would eliminate all
the risk faced by the agents.
Example: I will use the following example to illustrate my results. Suppose that u(w) =
√
w
and that both agents have identical wealth and suffer a loss with the same probability. More
precisely, let wH1 = w
H




2 = 1 and p1 = p2 = 0.6. In this case, the full coverage
actuarially fair insurance policy is identical for both agents and is given by Caf = (2, 0.8).
Figure 5 represents the equilibrium decisions for agents 1 and 2 to accept or reject the policy
Caf for different values of the degrees of altruism (α1, α2) ∈ [0, 1]2. Notice first that, for low
degrees of altruism, both agents will buy the insurance policy. This is not surprising, since
no transfers are made when agents care very little about each other and must therefore rely
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solely on the insurance contract to protect themselves against a loss.
If both agents display high degrees of altruism, buying insurance is the unique equilibrium
strategy for both of them: recall that equilibrium transfers cannot completely eliminate the
risk the agent faces, and thus the improved risk-sharing offered by the insurance policy is the
most preferred alternative to the agents when both display high degrees of altruism. These
two cases are captured in the central area in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Equilibrium demand for insurance.
Figure 5 also exhibits two regions (the top left and bottom right corners, respectively)
with asymmetric equilibria, in which only one agent accepts the insurance offer. As pointed
out in Proposition 2, the self-interested agent rejects his insurance policy and free-rides on
the transfers provided by his altruistic partner to dissipate risk. The altruistic agent, on the
other hand, always prefers to buy the insurance policy both to protect himself against a loss
and to help the other agent in case of need.
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Meanwhile, Figure 6 exhibits insurance demand behavior for different values of p, and
associated actuarially fair full coverage contracts Caf (p). The top left panel has the highest
probability of suffering a loss, namely 1 − p = 0.75, while the bottom right panel has the
smallest probability of suffering a loss at 1 − p = 0.1. As the probability of suffering a loss
decreases, the gains of a deviation from (a, a) for a self-interested individual becomes larger,
and so do the regions associated with asymmetric equilibria (a, r) and (r, a). 
Figure 6: Equilibrium demand for insurance without self-protection, for p ∈
{0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9}.
One interesting question that arises from Proposition 2 and Figures 5 and 6 is the fol-
lowing: knowing that his partner will be uninsured, would the altruistic agent be willing to
buy an actuarially fair insurance policy with a coverage larger than his own loss in order to
protect both himself and his partner? Equilibrium transfers imply that the altruistic agent
will make a positive transfer whenever his partner suffers a loss if the latter is uninsured,
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and when his partner suffers a loss but he himself doesn’t if both are insured. In particular
for the former case, the altruistic agent could potentially buy larger coverage to insure both
himself and his partner in the case both suffer a loss. Proposition 3 below shows this is not
the case.
Proposition 3: Suppose that (wH1 , w
L




2 , p2) and (α1, α2) = (1, 0). If (d1, d2) =
(a, ·) and agent 1 can buy any actuarially fair insurance policy C = (q, (1− p)q), he buys the
full coverage (q = L) policy.
The intuition is simple: although both agents would benefit from sharing a larger coverage
if both suffer a loss, the increased premium associated with such a coverage would ultimately
reduced the altruistic agent’s utility. On the other hand, a smaller coverage at an actuarially
fair price would increase the risk faced by the altruistic agent, thus reducing expected utility
due to risk aversion.
4 Insurance Demand with Self-Protection
Let us focus now on the more general game between the agents, first presented in Section
2 and reproduced in Figure 7 below, where the agents choose how much effort they will
exert to avoid a loss from happening (Period 2). For any output vector w and contracts
C, agents 1 and 2 play a three-stage sequential game, where they must first choose whether
to buy insurance, then choose the effort to avoid the loss, and finally choose how much to
transfer to one another. In the previous section, I have shown that one agent can free-ride on
another’s cross-insurance transfers and not buy an insurance policy due to the substitution
effect generated by cross-insurance transfers. In this section, I will focus on the free-riding
and empathy effects, namely the effects that altruism has on self-protection effort through
equilibrium transfers.
In the third period of the game described in Figure 7, when agents choose equilibrium





































Figure 7: Timing of the game.
that the probabilities with which each output is realized are now endogenous. Therefore,
equilibrium transfers are given by equation (12) exactly as in the benchmark case with
exogenous probabilities, and the results in Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 still hold.
Given equilibrium transfers, each agent must now choose his level of effort to maximize
expected utility, i.e. each agent i = 1, 2 now solves13
maxpiUi(di, dj, pi, pj, Ti, Tj;Ci, Cj, αi, αj,w)
= pipj
[








u(wLi − ti + qi − Ti + Tj) + αiu(wHj − tj + Ti − Tj)
]
+ (1− pi)(1− pj)
[
u(wLi − ti + qi − Ti + Tj) + αiu(wLj − tj + qj + Ti − Tj)
]
− ψ(pi)− αiψ(pj). (14)
Equilibrium effort for agents 1 and 2 are given as the solution to the system of first-order
13For ease of exposition, I omit the dependence of Ti on d,C, ω, α1, α2. Also, if di = r for some i = 1, 2,
setting ti = qi = 0 appropriately adjusts equation (14).
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conditions
ψ′(p1) = a1(w,C,d, α1) + p2 [b1(w,C,d, α1)− a1(w,C,d, α1)] (15)
ψ′(p2) = a2(w,C,d, α2) + p1 [b2(w,C,d, α2)− a2(w,C,d, α2)] , (16)
where the constants ai(w,C,d, αi) and bi(w,C,d, αi) are given, respectively, by
ai(w,C,d, αi) = u(yi(w
H
i , Ci, di)− Ti((wHi , wLj ),C,d) + Tj((wHi , wLj ),C,d))









j ),C,d)− Tj((wHi , wLj ),C,d))




bi(w,C,d, αi) = u(yi(w
H
i , Ci, di)− Ti((wHi , wHj ),C,d) + Tj((wHi , wHj ),C,d))









j ),C,d)− Tj((wHi , wHj ),C,d))
−u(yj(wHj , Cj, dj) + Ti((wLi , wHj ),C,d)− Tj((wLi , wHj ),C,d))
]
. (18)
I will focus on the case where the agents are symmetric in terms of wealth and altruism,
that is, (wH1 , w
L




2 , α2). Moreover, because agents are identical both in their
preferences and in the risk they face, I will assume that a single insurance policy C = (q, t) ∈
C is offered to both individuals.
Suppose that both agents accept the policy C. The first consequence of such assumptions
is that, for any α < 1, equilibrium transfers only take place when one agent suffers a loss
and the other does not, and it is the last one who makes a positive transfer if the degree of
altruism is sufficiently high. Formally, for α > α̂(C) ≡ u
′(wH−t)
u′(wL−t+q) , T (α,C) > 0 is given by
the equilibrium condition
u′(wH − t− T (α,C)) = αu′(wL − t+ q + T (α,C)). (19)
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Each agent chooses his individual success probability to maximize his ex ante expected utility
Ui(pi, pj) = pipj(1 + α)u(w
H − t)
+ (1− pi)(1− pj)(1 + α)u(wL − t+ q)
+ pi(1− pj)[u(wH − t− T (α,C)) + αu(wL − t+ q + T (α,C))]
+ (1− pi)pj[u(wL − t+ q + T (α,C)) + αu(wH − t− T (α,C))]
− ψ(pi)− αψ(pj) (20)
for i, j = 1, 2 and j 6= i, and thus, a necessary and sufficient condition14 for the pair (p1, p2) ∈
(0, 1)2 to be a Nash equilibrium of G∗(C) is that each of them satisfy the first-order condition
ψ′(pi) = u(w
H − t− T (α,C))− u(wL − t+ q)
+ α[u(wL − t+ q + T (α,C))− u(wL − t+ q)]
− pj(1 + α)
[
(u(wL − t+ q + T (α,C))− u(wL − t+ q))
−(u(wH − t)− u(wH − t− T (α,C)))
]
(21)
for j 6= i.
Notice that the right-hand side of equation (21) is an affine function of pj. For α ≤ α̂(C),
T (α,C) = 0 and the slope is equal to zero, while the intercept is u(wH−t)−u(wL−t+q) ≥ 0
since q ≤ L and u′ > 0 by assumption. This leads to exactly the same first-order condition
that determined the self-protection of a single agent faced with an insurance policy C in
equation (6). In other words, if altruism is not high enough to induce transfers between the
agents, each will ignore the presence of the other and choose the level of effort that maximizes
expected utility under the insurance contract C = (q, t). Because u′′ < 0 and α ∈ (α̂(C, d), 1]
by assumption, I find that wH − t − T (α,C) ≥ wL − t + q + T (α,C) > wL − t + q, and
thus the slope is strictly negative. Furthermore, given the assumptions about the disutility
of effort, the right-hand side of equation (21) is strictly increasing in pi. These observations
lead to the following result.
14The second-order condition is given by −ψ′′(p) < 0 by assumption for all values of p.
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Lemma 2: If α1 = α2 = α and d1 = d2 = d, then G
∗(C) has a unique symmetric equilibrium
(p∗, p∗). If p∗(α,C, d) > 0, then it solves the equation
ψ′(p∗) = u(wH − t− T (α,C))− u(wL − t+ q)
+ α[u(wL − t+ q + T (α,C))− u(wL − t+ q)]
− p∗(1 + α)
[
(u(wL − t+ q + T (α,C))− u(wL − t+ q))
−(u(wH − t)− u(wH − t− T (α,C)))
]
(22)
if d = a and
ψ′(p∗) = u(wH − T (α,C))− u(wL)
+ α[u(wL + T (α,C))− u(wL)]
− p∗(1 + α)
[
(u(wL + T (α,C))− u(wL))
−(u(wH)− u(wH − T (α,C)))
]
(23)
if d = r.
Contrary to equilibrium transfers, equilibrium efforts are not monotonic in the degree
of altruism. Indeed, for low degrees of altruism (α ≤ α̂(C, d)), agents cannot affect each
other’s material payoff because no transfers are made in equilibrium and the occurrence of
a loss for one of them is independent of the other’s choice of effort. Thus, agents 1 and 2
behave as if they were in an autarky relation with the insurer. In particular, the right-hand
sides of equations (22) and (23) become identical to the right-hand sides of the first-order
conditions for a single agent who buys (equation (6)) and who does not buy (equation (2))
the insurance contract C. Moreover, for any C ∈ C, the equilibrium effort of the uninsured
agents is greater than the equilibrium effort of the insured ones, as is the case when analyzing
the single agent problem.
For degrees of altruism larger than but close to α̂(C, d), the positive transfers between
agents reduce the expected loss they face, and thus a free-riding effect appears: agents reduce
their equilibrium effort in the vicinity of α̂(C, d) due to the decrease in the risk each of them
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faces because of the equilibrium transfers. However, as α approaches 1, the problem faced
by each agent in G∗(C) becomes ever more similar to one that would be solved by a social
planner seeking to maximize total utility, and thus the free-riding problem is mitigated by
the empathy effect and a higher equilibrium effort is exerted.15
Proposition 4: Consider the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (p∗, p∗) of G∗(C) when
d1 = d2 and α1 = α2 = α. If p
∗(α̂(C), C, d) > 0 and p∗(1, C, d) > 0, then there is an
ε(C) > 0 such that p∗(α̂(C) + ε, C, d) < p∗(α̂(C), C, d) and p∗(1 − ε, C, d) < p∗(1, C, d) for
all ε ∈ (0, ε(C, d)) for any C ∈ C.
Example (continued): The results in Proposition 4 can be observed in Figure 8 for the
quadratic cost function ψ(p) = p
2
2
. Firstly, equilibrium effort when both agents reject an
insurance contract is higher than the effort they would exert had the policy been accepted,
due to the higher risk the agents are facing. For low degrees of altruism such that no transfers
are made, equilibrium efforts are constant with respect to the common degree of altruism α,
but become smaller as cross-insurance transfers become positive, reflecting the free-riding
effect. As α increases, so does the empathy effect, and thus equilibrium effort also increases
for sufficiently large values of α. 
After computing transfers and effort in the unique symmetric equilibrium of G∗(C), the
equilibrium expected material payoff of each agent is given by
V ∗(α,C) = [p∗(α,C)]2u(wH − t) + [1− p∗(α,C)]2u(wL − t+ q)
+ p∗(α,C)[1− p∗(α,C)][u(wH − t− T (α,C)) + u(wL − t+ q + T (α,C))]
− ψ(p∗(α,C)), (24)
while symmetry implies that the utility function can be written as
U∗(α,C) = (1 + α)V ∗(α,C). (25)
15For α = 1, the agents fully internalize the effects of their choices on each other’s payoffs, and therefore
the free-riding problem disappears.
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Figure 8: Symmetric equilibrium effort.
Similar expressions can be derived for the case where both agents reject the insurance policy.
Two important comparative statics results about the equilibrium expected material payoff
(and consequently expected utility) can be made. First, the highest expected material payoff
is reached at full altruism, that is, when α = 1. In that case, each agent attaches the
same weight to own and the other’s material payoff, and therefore the free-riding effect is
minimized. Secondly, the expected material payoff is increasing in the degree of altruism
even in the region where equilibrium effort decreases with α. These statements are collected
below.
Proposition 5: Fix any insurance contract C = (q, t) ∈ R2+, and take d1 = d2 and α1 =
α2 = α. Then,
1. V ∗(1, C, d) ≥ V ∗(α,C, d) for all α ∈ [0, 1];
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2. If p∗(α̂(C), C, d) > 0, there is an ε(C, d) > 0 such that V ∗(α̂(C)+ε, C, d) > V ∗(α̂(C), C, d)
for all ε ∈ (0, ε(C, d)).
So far, the analysis with self-protection has examined the symmetric insurance demand
profiles (a, a) and (r, r). The equilibrium conditions for effort described in equations (15)-
(18) suggest that even when the agents are identical, their choices of effort under asymmetric
insurance purchase decisions are not trivial due to equilibrium transfers and their effects on
effort.
Example (continued): To illustrate this point, consider Figure 9, which depicts the equi-
librium effort for agents 1 and 2 with symmetric outputs (wH , wL) = (3, 1) and quadratic cost
function ψ(p) = p
2
2
. In this example, I assume that agent 1 buys an insurance policy C ∈ C,
while agent 2 remains uninsured. As was the case when the purchase decision was identical
for the two agents, equilibrium efforts are constant when both agents display a low degree
of altruism, since the absence of any transfers induces them to behave as in an autarky.
Moreover, one can also observe that the equilibrium effort for the uninsured agent (p2(a, r))
is larger than the effort for the insured agent (p1(a, r)) for the same degrees of altruism.
One interesting observation coming from inspection of Figure 9 is that, for a given degree
of altruism for agent 2, an increase in agent 1’s degree of altruism has opposite effects
in equilibrium efforts: p1 decreases, while p2 increases. For agent 1, who purchases the
insurance, the intuition is that he shirks in his self-protection to avoid making a large positive
transfer to the uninsured agent and therefore mitigate any free-riding the latter would enjoy
by not purchasing the policy C. On the other hand, agent 2 must engage in higher effort to
avoid a loss due to correctly anticipating the lower probability of receiving a transfer from
agent 1.
Focusing on the cases where α1 = α2 in both level plots of Figure 9 suggest that p1(a, r)
and p2(a, r) will also exhibit the nonmonotonic behavior on a common degree of altruism
α ∈ [0, 1] as the symmetric equilibrium efforts p∗(C, a) and p∗(C, r) derived in the previous
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Figure 9: Equilibrium efforts for asymmetric purchase decisions (d1, d2) = (a, r).
section. Such pattern is more evident for p2(a, r) than for p1(a, r). 
As was the case without self-protection, for α1α2 < 1 equilibrium transfers are uniquely
determined for any profiles of actions regarding the purchase of insurance and disposable
wealth. Proceeding by backwards induction, suppose that the system of equations (15)-(16)
admits a unique solution16. Then, the choice of buying insurance or not boils down to the
normal form game Γ̃(C,w, α), with associated payoff matrix
As before, each entry in the payoff matrix corresponds to an agent’s expected utility
following an action profile (d1, d2) ∈ {a, r}2, with the difference that now the probabilities
of suffering a loss for each agent are endogenous objects and the functions Ui also take into
consideration the costs of effort for both agents whenever α1α2 > 0.





a U1(a, a), U2(a, a) U1(a, r), U2(a, r)
r U1(r, a), U2(r, a) U1(r, r), U2(r, r)
.
Example (continued:) Figure 10 below extends the previous example with (wH , wL) =
(3, 1) and u(w) =
√




C = (1.5, 0.85) ∈ C, different from the actuarially fair full coverage one. For this particu-
lar parametrization, the introduction of self-protection effort does not qualitatively alter the
results: a self-interested agent would free-ride on his altruistic partner’s transfers and not
purchase the insurance policy.
However, increasing the cost parameter c reduces the regions under which an agent rejects
the insurance policy. Moving from the top left panel to the bottom right, one can observe that
the regions in which the asymmetric equilibria (a, r) and (r, a) prevail diminish. This is due
to the increase in the cost parameter associated with the increase in the equilibrium effort as
seen in Figure 9. For sufficiently high values of c, a unique equilibrium exists for all values
of α1 and α2 in this parametrization: (a, a). 
5 The Insurer’s Contractual Offers
Until now, the insurance policy C ∈ C offered to the agents has been exogenous. Absent
the possibility of self-protection, the natural candidate to consider was the actuarially fair
full coverage insurance policy Caf = (L, (1 − p)L). Such a contract maximizes the agents’
expected utility given a nonnegative profit condition for the principal. As I have shown,
even such a contract is crowded out by informal risk-sharing when dispersion in the degrees
of altruism is high.
On the other hand, when the agents can affect the probability of a loss taking place,
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Figure 10: Equilibrium demand for insurance with self-protection for different c ∈
{0.98, 1, 1.02, 1.05}.
such a contract is no longer a natural candidate. The problem facing a monopolistic insurer,
then, is to choose a menu of policies (C1, C2) ∈ C2 to be offered to the agents that maximizes
the firm’s expected profits given the equilibrium behavior it will induce in the insurance
demand game played by agents 1 and 2. However, given transfers and self-protection effort,
the insurance company could find it not profitable to offer any contract at all to the agents.17
I will divide the analysis of the offers made by the insurance firm in two parts, reflecting
two polar assumptions about the information the firm has about the agents’ preferences and,
consequently, transfers.
First, I assume that the firm cannot observe the agents’ degrees of altruism and thus
offers contracts as if the agents are purely self-interested. This assumption reflects the ideas
17Alternatively, offer the null contract C0 = (0, 0) to both agents.
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that there may be heterogeneity in altruism in the population, and this heterogeneity is
unobserved, and that some agents do not have friends or family with whom they can engage
in informal risk-sharing. In that case, each agent’s equilibrium behavior is identical to the
one an agent would have had he been alone. The next subsection thus argues that while
such a contract would be accepted by both agents if altruism is low, insurance demand goes
to zero when agents care sufficiently about one another.
Second, I consider the symmetric case where both agents share a common degree of
altruism that is observed by the firm, capturing the idea that the insurance company faces
a more homogenous population. Then, focusing on symmetric equilibria of the game played
between agents, I show that equilibrium transfers and self-protection cannot crowd out formal
insurance for any α ∈ [0, 1], but can substantially reduce the insurer’s profits.
5.1 Demand for the Candidate Insurance Contract for the Näıve
Insurer
In the symmetric case, under the assumption that both agents accept the insurance policy
C = (q, t), the introduction of moral hazard does not allow using the full coverage actuarially
fair insurance policy Caf = (L, (1 − p)L) as the benchmark contract to analyze the agents’
decisions to buy insurance or not. The reason for that is the lack of incentives to exert any
effort when the agent has full coverage. Indeed, closer inspection of equation (19) shows
that all transfers are equal to zero under full coverage, for any specified premium, and thus
the right-hand side of first-order condition (22) also becomes zero, leading to no effort by
the agents due to the assumption that ψ′(0) = 0. Finally, any firm offering such a contract
would make losses equal to L per agent.
To circumvent this problem, I will consider a policy CB = (qB, tB) offered to agent i
when the firm assumes that both agents are purely selfish (i.e., no transfers are made). This
assumption reflects an informational asymmetry between the firm and the agents, in the
sense that the firm cannot observe and/or contract upon the degree of prosociality one agent
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has for the other.
As shown in Appendix B, such insurance contract must satisfy two conditions











The first condition is the participation constraint, which extracts all the surplus of the agent
through the appropriate choice of premium tB, while the second condition is a akin to the
incentive compatibility constraint, selecting the coverage qB that maximizes profits given the
equilibrium effort to be made by the agent.
Finally, the agents’ equilibrium demand decision regarding the contract offered by the
principal can be analyzed. By construction, the benchmark insurance contract CB = (qB, tB)
is such that a purely self-interested agent is indifferent between purchasing it or not18. The
same is true if the agents are not very altruistic: if α1, α2 are low enough such that no
positive equilibrium transfers are made, then effectively not very altruistic agents will also
prefer to buy the policy CB.
However, as the degree of altruism increases and equilibrium transfers become positive,
the benchmark policy CB will be rejected by symmetric agents. This is due to two crucial
features of CB. First, it can provide very low coverage: for instance, in the example below
coverage is less than 25% of the loss an agent faces. Second, CB is expensive: it has a higher
than actuarially fair premium.
Proposition 6: Suppose that (wH1 , w
L




2 , α2) and that the firm offers C
B =
(qB, tB). Then, the set of Nash equilibria of the insurance demand game between agents 1
and 2 is

















18In line with the literature in mechanism design, I assume that in case of such indifference the agent will
accept the principal’s offered mechanism.
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3. {(r, r)} otherwise.
The suboptimality of CB is related to the informational disadvantage of the principal.
When altruism is relatively low, the agents’ equilibrium behavior in terms of transfers and
self-protection is identical to the one they would exhibit in autarky, and therefore the prin-
cipal’s informational disadvantage has no bite. On the other hand, for high degrees of
altruism, the insurance company misjudges the actual risk the agents face and therefore
offers an inefficient contract that is rejected by the agents.
Example (continued): For the example symmetric wealths (wH , wL) = (3, 1) and assuming
a quadratic cost function ψ(p) = p
2
2
, the contract satisfying equations (26)-(27) is given
by CB = (0.4485, 0.2108), while equilibrium effort is p = 0.5576. Figure 11 exhibits the
equilibrium insurance demand for the agents, with a more elaborate pattern than before.
Focusing on symmetric degrees of altruism, Proposition 6 is clear: for low degrees of
altruism, such that no cross-insurance transfers are made, agents 1 and 2 purchase the
insurance contract due to the absence of substitution effect. For the region in which only
transfers between uninsured agents exist, represented by the dark yellow region in the middle
of Figure 11, two symmetric equilibria exist: (a, a) and (r, r). The former is present because
no cross-insurance transfers are made when a unilateral deviation from (a, a) occurs, and
therefore the agents are better off with the insurance contract. The latter is due to the
opposite: given that an agent chooses to reject the insurance contract, the best-response for
the other is to also reject it and engage in symmetric cross-insurance transfers.
Last, for degrees of altruism such that cross-insurance transfers are positive in asymmet-
ric purchase decision profiles, unilateral deviations from (a, a) are now profitable. On the
other hand, the best-response to dj = r still is to reject C
B, and therefore the unique Nash
equilibrium is (r, r). 
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Figure 11: Equilibrium demand for insurance with self-protection, for c = 1 and CB =
(0.4485, 0.2108).
5.2 Insurance Supply and Demand for a Fully Informed Principal
Now let us study the polar opposite case, where the principal is fully informed about the
agents’ common degree of altruism α ∈ [0, 1] and therefore correctly anticipates transfers
and self-protection effort produced by 1 and 2 in a symmetric equilibrium. I show that the
principal can then always find a contract that will yield him positive profits and induce both
agents to purchase the contract.
Consider first low degrees of altruism, such that no positive transfers are made. Then,
the benchmark contract CB derived above yields positive profits, since its premium is larger
than the actuarially fair one, at the same time that it makes the agents indifferent between
accepting and rejecting it19.
19A contract Cε = (qB , tB − ε) for ε ≈ 0 would still yield positive profits for the principal and make the
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To show the existence of a contract that generates gains from trades for all parties for
high degrees of altruism, I extend the idea used to compute the benchmark contract CB. In
particular, I compute the indifference curve for the agents and the principal’s zero profit line
in the (q, t)-plane for any degree of altruism, and show that, at (q, t) = (0, 0), the agent’s
indifference curve is steeper than the ZPL for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, there exist partial
coverage insurance contracts with larger than actuarially fair premiums that yield positive
profits to the firm and are accepted by the agents. Proposition 7 synthesizes the result.
Proposition 7: Consider the symmetric case where (wH1 , w
L




2 , α2), and con-
sider symmetric strategies for the agents. Then, there exist contracts C ∈ C/{(0, 0)} that the
insurer can profitably offer to the agents for any α ∈ [0, 1].
Example (continued): Figure 12 and Figure 13 depict the firm’s optimal contractual offer
to the symmetric agents for different values of α and c. In both cases, the optimal contract
exhibits a downward shift when cross-insurance transfers become positive. Such a shift reflects
the principal’s desire to minimize the free-riding effect, as well as the fact that the agents’
outside option, given by the expected utility they would obtain from only cross-insuring with
one another, is increasing in the common degree of altruism, as established in Proposition 5.
Indeed, had the contract be kept constant, the cross-insurance transfers would lead both
agents to drastically reduce equilibrium effort due to the free-riding effect, and therefore the
firm would suffer losses. By reducing the coverage, the firm ensures that equilibrium effort
remains high, and she accordingly adjusts the premium to extract as much surplus as possible,
while taking into consideration the higher outside option obtained by the agents through cross-
insurance transfers.
Such reduction in the contract’s terms ultimately decreases the firm’s expected profits:
for either low or high cost parameter, the firm’s expected profit is reduced close to zero after
cross-insurance transfers become positive. Thus, in this example, if the firm faces a fixed
entry cost or has a loading factor, it may choose not to trade at all with highly altruistic
agents strictly prefer it to being uninsured.
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agents. 
Figure 12: Optimal contract offer, equilibrium effort and firm’s profit for c = 1.
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Figure 13: Optimal contract offer, equilibrium effort and firm’s profit for c = 2.
6 Discussion
The presentation has mostly focused on the symmetric case where both agents share the same
wealth and independent losses and, in the case without self-protection, the same probability
of suffering a loss. In this section, I would like to briefly discuss some extensions and other
issues related to the model.
1. Estimating altruism: The first testable implication of my model is related to informal
transfers. For low degrees of altruism, no transfers should be observed, while they
should become larger and more frequent as the degree of altruism increases. Moreover,
if losses and insurance policies are known, one can use the threshold degree of altruism
α̂ to indirectly estimate the functional form of the utility of wealth by observing when
transfers become positive.
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The second testable implication is related to self-protection efforts. Due to the free-
riding effect, one should observe an increase in the ratio of claims repayments to premi-
ums when transfers are small in comparison to the same ratio when no cross-insurance
transfers are observed if both agents are purchasing insurance. Also, for fixed losses
and insurance terms, the ratio of claims repayments to premiums should behave non-
monotonically as transfers increase.
While the two implications above can test the overall degree of altruism, the model can
also be used to test dispersion of altruism by looking at insurance purchase decisions.
In particular, if agents have similar wealths and face similar losses, observing cross-
insurance transfers from an insured agent to an uninsured one is suggestive of the
latter free-riding on the former’s insurance policy, which should happen, according to
my model, when the insured agent is very altruistic towards the uninsured one, whilst
the uninsured agent is more self-interested.
Last, but not least, the main testable implication is that insurance penetration must be
smaller in countries with higher degrees of altruism, due to the crowding-out of formal
insurance demand by cross-insurance transfers. Costa-Font (2010) finds a similar result
when studying LTC insurance demand in European countries, but using an constructed
index of family ties instead of altruism.
2. Adverse selection: While I have focused on moral hazard as the main information
asymmetry between insurer and insurees, an extensive body of literature has focused
on adverse selection as the main information friction between the two parties. For
instance, Hendren (2013) develops a model of adverse selection on insurance provision
and tests it with data on life, disability and long-term care (LTC) insurance. In his
setting, a unit mass of agents have the same wealth w > 0 and suffer a loss L > 0
with privately known (and exogenously given) probability p ∈ [0, 1]. My analysis of
the case without self-protection is very much the same, save for the assumption that
the principal knows p in my model.
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The important remark that has to be made here is that introducing privately known
probabilities does not affect the agents’ transfers decision, since those are made ex
post, i.e. only after realizing each other’s output. Moreover, as long as the agents
can compute their respective expected utilities, any contract offered by the principal
will induce a lottery that can be compared in much the same way as in Proposition
2. Therefore, if the agents are privately informed about their probability of suffering a
loss, their equilibrium decisions about transfers and insurance demand are unchanged
from my analysis.
However, the same will not be true for the insurer. As stated by Proposition 2, even
an actuarially fair full coverage insurance policy may be crowded out by one agent’s
altruism towards his pair. Introducing private information on the agents’ part would
just worsen the outlook for the principal. Indeed, suppose for instance p = {pr, ps} such
that ps > pr and Prob(p = ps) = λ ∈ (0, 1). A pooling full coverage contract would
induce losses for the principal, and so would a menu C = ((L, (1−ps)L), (L, (1−pr)L)),
since it would either attract only a altruistic but risky type r at the correct contract
(L, (1− pr)L) or attract a risky agent on the low premium contract (L, (1− ps)L).
3. The ”chicken-and-egg” problem: I have studied whether altruism, by means of the
informal risk-sharing between agents it sustains, can hinder the emergence of formal
insurance markets in the sense that a monopolistic insurer would have no demand for
its policies when trying to enter the market populated by altruistic agents.
The other side of the coin is how the presence of a formal insurance market would
affect the degree of altruism of the agents populating such a market. In essence,
what would be the evolutionarily stable degree of altruism in the society? Such a
question would extend the analysis of Alger and Weibull (2010), who briefly discusses
the effect of mandatory public insurance in their model. In particular, they argue that
the introduction of public insurance may lead to a higher degree of altruism, unless
transfers between agents are completely crowded out.
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By fixing an insurance policy C in the game between agents of my model, one can fol-
low the same steps as Alger and Weibull (2010) to determine the evolutionarily stable
degree of altruism arising from the interaction between agents whenever a symmetric
equilibrium is considered. Alternatively, one can study the evolutionarily stable strate-
gies of such game, in particular the agents’ decisions about insurance purchases. Last,
but not least, determining the evolutionarily stable triplet of agents’ strategies, princi-
pal’s contract offers and degrees of altruism could potentially be done numerically and
provide a first glimpse at how all these factors coevolve.
4. Remittances: The attentive reader will notice that the setup of my model allows for
asymmetric levels of wealth. One particularly interesting case that can be analyzed
by such extension is the effects of remittances on the development of local insurance
markets.20 For instance, suppose that agent 1 is a parent who lives in a poor region,
while sibling 2 is a child who moves to a richer region or country.21 In particular,






1 , and suppose that each party has access to a local
insurance market offering policies satisfying 0 ≤ ti ≤ qi ≤ Li for i = 1, 2. Then, one can
see that transfer will always happen from the child to the parent, whenever the former’s
degree of altruism is not too low. In that case, if the difference in wealth is sufficiently
large, the child may transfer amounts large enough to render the parent’s demand for
insurance null, thus effectively hindering the emergence of the local insurance market
in the poor region.
A similar result could be obtained for wH2 > w
H
1 ≥ wL2 > wL1 , if wH1 and wL2 are
sufficiently close. In this case, transfers always flow from agent 2 to agent 1, with one
exception: when the former has suffered a loss but the latter hasn’t. Then, once again,
if α2 is sufficiently high and so are the differences in wealth when agent 2 makes the
transfers, then agent 1’s demand for the local formal insurance market may be crowded
out by the help he receives from agent 1.
20See, for instance, Azam and Gubert (2006) for a more detailed discussion of remittances.
21An alternative story could be a well-off parent and a child who goes away to study.
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5. Savings and self-insurance: In the classical work of Ehrlich and Becker (1972), agents
can self-insure, i.e., affect the size of the loss each faces. If self-insurance is costless,
then formal insurance rejection is going to happen more often. In particular, if agents
are able to eliminate the risk through self-insurance, not only formal insurance but also
cross-insurance will be crowded-out.
On the other hand, if self-insurance is costly, the interaction among all risk-sharing
mechanisms is not obvious. While equilibrium transfers will still be computed ex post
and exhibit a monotonic behavior with respect to the degree of altruism, self-protection
and self-insurance may exhibit even more nonmonotonic behavior. I must point out
that if such actions are not too costly, the crowding-out effect on formal insurance
should become stronger.
A similar result should be observed if agents are allowed to save (or redistribute wealth
between outputs in any other way): the additional channel through which agents can
share risk would ultimately reduce the need for formal insurance policies.
6. Public vs. private insurance: The exposition above has focused on the case of privately
provided insurance policies. Another possibility is that the government provides the
risk-sharing mechanism, either in place of the firm or in addition to it.
If the government posts an insurance policy comprised only of a premium and a cov-
erage, the demand for such policy can be studied in exactly the same way as above.
The interesting question then would be how the private firm would design its policies
to compete with the government’s offer, a point that is beyond the scope of this paper.
On the other hand, the public insurance can be compulsory, and the agents’ choice is
simply how to complement such policies.22 Such a design can be incorporated in the
model by rewriting the agents’ levels of wealth to reflect the payments they make and
22This is the case for automobile insurance in many countries, where all individuals purchasing a car or
motorcycle must pay the mandatory social liability policy and then choose to complement it with privately
provided coverage policies.
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receive for each possible output.
Overall, since the presence of a publicly provided insurance policy reduces the risk faced
by agents, equilibrium transfers, effort and private insurance demand should decrease.
7 Concluding Remarks
I have studied why private insurance markets may fail to develop. While there are well-
known issues on the supply side, such as information asymmetries and the presence of other
players (like the government), this paper shows that issues also arise on the demand side.
In particular, I have asked whether altruism and the informal risk-sharing sustained by it
can be one factor hindering the emergence of formal insurance markets, and the analysis
has provided a positive answer for this question. In an insurance setting with two altruistic
agents, I consider the demand for insurance policies both when the agents can self-protect
from a loss by exerting effort to change the probability of such loss taking place and when
the agents become poorer with an exogenous probability.
Without self-protection, I have shown that even an actuarially fair full coverage insurance
policy can be crowded out by informal risk-sharing between the agents when the dispersion
of prosociality is high. More precisely, a self-interested agent may choose not to buy such a
contract when he is paired with a highly altruistic agent, who makes large transfers in case
the uninsured agent suffers a loss. This result is in line with the literature of long-term care
insurance, in which formal insurance policies are rejected in favor of familial care.
Under certain parameterizations, a similar result holds for the case in which the agents
can affect the probability of suffering a loss. However, due to the presence of informal risk-
sharing, equilibrium levels of effort are not necessarily monotonic in the agents degrees of
altruism, and such effort must balance two effects: a free-riding effect, in which an agent
reduces his effort due to an increase in his partner’s transfers to himself, and an empathy
effect, which makes an agent increase his own effort in order to reduce the burden of his own
loss in his partner.
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Last, I considered a monopolistic insurer designing the contract to be offered to the
agents. I have shown that, if the insurer cannot observe the agents’ degree of altruism and
thus offers the contract that would maximize her profits had she been facing a single self-
interested agent, then both agents will reject such an offer for a sufficiently high common
degrees of altruism. This is due to the principal’s misinformation about the true preferences
of the agents, who informally insure one another by means of transfers when they care enough
about one another.
I also show that if the insurance firm can offer contracts contingent on the agents’ common
degree of altruism, gains from trade always exist. However, the insurer’s quest to mitigate
the substitution and free-riding effect may lead to reduced profitability for the firm, which
may induce the firm to choose not to trade with altruistic agents if fixed costs or loading
factors are present.
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A Altruistic Agent’s Risk-Aversion
Recall that an agent i = 1, 2 with degree of altruism αi ∈ [0, 1] chooses transfers Ti to solve
EmaxTiu(yi − Ti) + αiu(yj + Ti) (28)
for j = 1, 2, j 6= i. By the Envelope Theorem,
∂Vi
∂yi















u′′(yi − Ti)+αiu′′(yj + Ti)
∈ (0, 1] (31)
for all αi ≥ α̂i = u
′(yi)
u′(yj)
. Therefore, the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion is given by

















Inspection of (32) indicates that the coefficient of risk-aversion for an altruistic individual
is equal to the coefficient for a selfish agent multiplied by a factor smaller than one, that is
to say, for the same wealth, an altruistic agent is less risk-averse than a selfish counterpart.
A second remark is that the altruistic agent’s risk-aversion also depends on his partner’s
wealth, yj, something absent when considering a selfish agent.
B Equilibrium Contract Offer for a Single Agent
Suppose that the principal offers a policy C = (q, t) ∈ C to a single agent. Such a policy
assumes that agent i chooses effort to solve
maxppu(w
H − t) + (1− p)u(wL − t+ q)− ψ(p), (33)
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leading to the first-order condition
u(wH − t)− u(wL − t+ q)− ψ′(pB) = 0 (34)










−u′(wH − t) + u′(wL − t+ q)
ψ′′(pB)
≥ 0 (36)
for all C = (q, t) such that 0 ≤ t ≤ q ≤ L. Writing
V (q, t) ≡ pB(q, t)u(wH − t) + (1− pB(q, t))u(wL − t+ q)− ψ(pB(q, t)), (37)











(1− pB(q, t))u′(wL − t+ q)



















= pB(q, t)u′(wH − t)
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+ (1− pB(q, t))u′(wL − t+ q)
×
[
pB(q, t)u′′(wH − t) dt
dq





















′(wH − t)u′(wL − t+ q)
ψ′′(pB(q, t)) [pB(q, t)u′(wH − t) + (1− pB(q, t))u′(wL − t+ q)]
. (41)
On the other hand, the expected profit made by contract C is given by
π(q, t) = pB(q, t) · t+ (1− pB(q, t)) · (t− q) = t− (1− pB(q, t))q. (42)
Then, denote by F =
{
(q, t) ∈ R2+ : 0 ≤ t ≤ q ≤ L, π(q, t) ≥ 0
}
the set of nonnegative ex-




(q, t) ∈ R2+ : 0 ≤ t ≤ q ≤ L, π(q, t) = 0
}
. (43)
For any arbitrary expected profit k ∈ R, I can define the isoprofit curve
π(k) =
{
(q, t) ∈ R2+ : 0 ≤ t ≤ q ≤ L, t− (1− p)q = k
}
. (44)
As was the case with the agents’ expected utility, the isoprofit π(k) implicitly defines the
premium t as a function of coverage q, subject to 34 determining the agents’ equilibrium
effort. Therefore, by applying the implicit function theorem to the system of equations




u(wH − t)− u(wL − t+ q)
]
, (46)
23One might find these results at odds with the seminal work by Arnott and Stiglitz (1991), but I must
highlight two crucial differences from our approaches in modelling insurance. While I explicitly model
premium and coverage separately, Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) consider the net payments after each output,
namely β = t and α = q − t. Secondly, I map the choice of effort x into the choice of probability of not
suffering a loss p and analyze the model in terms of the latter as well as allowing for a generical convex cost
function for x, while Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) considers a linear cost of effort and does not simplify the
model to a single effort/probability choice variable.
24This is exactly the Zero Profit Locus described in Arnott and Stiglitz (1991).
25Two remarks: First, note that C0 = (0, 0) belongs to the ZPL by construction. Second, C
L = (L,L)
also belongs to the ZPL; indeed, at q = L, effort is zero following (34), and thus L− (1− 0)L = 0.
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(1− p)ψ′′(p) + qu′(wL − t+ q)
ψ′′(p) + q[u′(wL − t+ q)− u′(wH − t)]
> 0. (47)





(0, 0) = 1− p < (1− p)u
′(wL)







so that there exists some contract C̃ 6= (0, 0) that yields a higher expected utility to the agent
and a positive expected profit to the principal, i.e., there are gains from trade to be had in
the interaction between the firm and a single agent. Thus, the principal chooses (qB, tB) to
maximize expected profits, and the benchmark insurance policy must satisfy the conditions











where the first condition, (49), implies that the principal chooses the policy that makes the
agent indifferent between purchasing it and remaining uninsured, while (50) is the tangency
condition for maximization. Notice that (50) can be written as
− q
1− p
u′(wH − t) = pψ′′(p)
[
u′(wH − t)− u′(wL − t+ q)
u′(wL − t+ q)
]
, (51)
where the left-hand side is strictly positive for q = L while the right-hand side is equal to
zero for full coverage. Therefore, as I have argued before, the benchmark contract under self-
protection must offer only partial insurance, so the agents have incentives to exert positive
effort. Additionally, surplus extraction by the principal implies that such contract is not
actuarially fair.





> 0, i.e. the isoprofit curve
is a convex function in the (q, t)-plane.
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C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose, by contradiction, that α1α2 < 1 and that (b1, b2) ∈ R2++ is a Nash equilibrium of
G(ω). The first-order conditions for the maximization problem of the agents in (10) are
u′(y1 − b1 + b2) = α1u′(y2 − b2 + b1) (52)
u′(y2 − b2 + b1) = α2u′(y1 − b1 + b2). (53)
Substituting (52) into (53) yields u′(y2− b2 + b1) = α1α2u′(y2− b2 + b1), which can only hold
if α1α2 = 1 since u
′ > 0 by assumption, a contradiction. Thus, if α1α2 < 1, at most one
transfer is positive.
Let τ̂i : ω → [0, wH ] be the transfer agent i would give to his pair if the latter makes no
transfer to i. Then, if u′(yi) ≥ αiu′(yj), agent j is already richer than i, and thus i makes
no transfers, i.e. τ̂i(ω) = 0. Otherwise, τ̂i(ω) is positive and determined by the first-order
condition u′(yi − τ̂i) = αiu′(yj + τ̂i), which is uniquely defined.
Thus, if α1α2 < 1, the unique Nash equilibrium of G(ω) is
• (b1, b2) = (0, 0)) when y1 = y2;
• (b1, b2) = (τ̂1(ω), 0) when y1 > y2;
• (b1, b2) = (0, τ̂2(ω)) when y1 < y2.
Finally, if α1 = α2 = 1, then
• if y1 > y2, any (b1, b2) = (τ̂1(ω) + ε, ε) is a Nash equilibrium of G(ω) for all ε ∈
(0, y1 − τ̂1(ω));
• if y1 < y2, any (b1, b2) = (ε, τ̂2(ω) + ε) is a Nash equilibrium of G(ω) for all ε ∈
(0, y2 − τ̂2(ω));
• if y1 = y2, any (b1, b2) = (ε, ε) is a Nash equilibrium of G(ω) for any ε ∈ [0, y1].
50
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Fix (α1, α2) = (1, 0) and C
af = (L, (1 − p)L), while wealth and probabilities of losses are
symmetric and given by (wH , wL, p). Since α2 = 0, T2(d, ω, C) = 0 for any triple (d, ω, C).






if (d1, d2) = (r, a), ω = (w












if (d1, d2) = (r, r), ω = (w





where w = pwH + (1− p)wL.
Given transfers, the expected utilities for the altruistic agent 1 are




















U1(a, r) = p[u(w) + u(w






U1(r, r) = 2p







+ u(wH) + u(wL)
]
(57)
for each profile of insurance purchase decisions (d1, d2). Dividing each expression by 2, I can
compute the lotteries induced by the decision profiles and, in particular, I can show that
E[w] = w for every one of them. It is then trivial to check that the lottery induced by (r, a)
is a mean-preserving spread of the lottery induced by (a, a), while the same is true for the
lottery induced by (a, r) with respect to the one from (r, r). Because the agents are assumed
to be risk-averse, second-order stochastic dominance then implies that U1(a, a) > U1(r, a)
and U1(a, r) > U1(r, r), and therefore, buying the policy C
af is a strictly dominant strategy
for the altruistic agent.
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Meanwhile, the expected utilities for the purely self-interested agent 2 are
U2(a, a) = u(w), (58)
U2(a, r) = pu(w











+ (1− p)u(w), (60)
U2(r, r) = p





+ (1− p)2u(wL). (61)
First, notice that the lotteries induced by (r, a) and (r, r) have the same mean, but the
later can be constructed as a mean-preserving spread of the former, and therefore I have that
U2(r, a) > U2(r, r), i.e. the best response for the self-interested agent when the altruistic one
rejects insurance is to buy it. On the other hand, notice that
E(a,r)[w] = pwH + (1− p)
wL + w
2
> pwH + (1− p)wL = w = E(a,a)[w] (62)
for any p ∈ (0, 1). Thus, if i = 2 is risk-neutral, he strictly prefers not to buy Caf when
i = 1 does so, and, by continuity, the same holds true if the agents are not too risk-averse.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Fix (wH1 , w
L




2 , p2), (α1, α2) = (1, 0) and (d1, d2) = (a, r). Then, equilibrium
transfers from agent 1 to agent 2 must satisfy
T (ω,C, (a, r)) =

0 if ω = (wH , wH),
wH−wL−t
2
if ω = (wH , wL),
0 if ω = (wL, wH),
q−t
2
if ω = (wL, wL),
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so that the expected utility of agent 1 is given by
E [U1(a, r;C)] = p2
[


































when the actuarially fair policy C = (q, (1− p)q) is considered.






























> 0 if q < L,
= 0 if q = L,






















since u′ > 0 > u′′ by assumption. Therefore, q = L is a global maximum when (d1, d2).
Now, suppose that (d1, d2) = (a, a), so that equilibrium transfers become
T (ω,C, (a, r)) =

0 if ω = (wH , wH),
wH−wL−q
2
if ω = (wH , wL),
0 if ω = (wL, wH),
0 if ω = (wL, wL),
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while expected utility is
E [U1(a, a;C)] = 2p2u(wH − (1− p)q) + 2(1− p)2u(wL + pq)
+ 2p(1− p)u
(





u(wL + pq) + u(wH − (1− p)q)
]
. (66)











u′(wL + pq)− u′
(




which is positive for q < L and equal to zero if q = L, while the second derivative is
∂2E [U1(a, a;C)]
∂q2










C.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Fix C = (q, t) ∈ C, and assuming a symmetric equilibrium, clearly (21) becomes (22), which
can be rewritten as
ψ′(p) = a(ω,C, α)− (1 + α)pb(ω,C, α) (69)
for
a(·) = u(wH−t−T (α,C))−u(wL−t+q)+α[u(wL−t+q+T (α,C))−u(wL−t+q)] ≥ 0 (70)
and
b(·) = u(wL−t+q+T (α,C))−u(wL−t+q)+
[
u(wH − t)− u(wH − t− T (α,C))
]
≥ 0, (71)
with strict inequalities holding for q < L. Therefore, the left-hand side of (69) is a continuous
and increasing function from zero to plus infinity by assumption, while the right-hand side is
a decreasing affine function with positive intercept, which establishes the uniqueness claim.
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C.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Let yL = wL− t+ q and yH = wH − t for any C = (q, t) ∈ C. Applying the Implicit Function






















A = ψ′′(p∗) + (1 + α)b(ω,C, α) > 0 (73)
and b(·) is the same given in (70). Recall that dT
dα
> 0 whenever α ≥ α̂(C). As α ↓ α̂(C), a
point in which p∗ is not differentiable, the first two terms in (72) tend to zero while the last
term is negative, thus implying that dp
∗
dα
< 0 for all α > α̂(C) close to α̂(C). On the other
hand, as α ↑ 1, the third term in (72) goes to zero whie the first two terms remain positive,
thus implying that dp
∗
dα
> 0 for large degrees of altruism.
C.6 Proof of Proposition 5
For item (1), I first characterize the socially optimal probability p and transfer τ to be
given from the richer to the poor under a social welfare function, and then verify that these
coincide with equilibrium probabilities p∗ and transfers T (·) if and only if α = 1.
Let yH = wH − t and yL = wL − t+ q for any C ∈ C. A hypothetical social planer must
then choose p and τ to maximize the expected material payoff of one individual (due to the
symmetry assumption), i.e. choose (p, τ) to maximize
W (p, τ ;C) = p2u(yH) + (1− p)2u(yL) + p(1− p)
[
u(yH − τ) + u(yL + t)
]
− ψ(p). (74)
The necessary first-order condition for an interior solution for p is
ψ′(p) = 2pu(yH)− 2(1− p)u(yL) + (1− 2p)
[




while, for any value of p, full risk-sharing maximizes W (·), i.e. transfers are such that
yH − τ = yL + τ for every output.
Looking back at the equilibrium condition for transfers in (12), u′′(·) < 0 implies that
yH − T (·, α) = yL + T (·, α) if and only if α = 1. Moreover, for α = 1, the symmetric
equilibrium effort condition in (22) coincides with (75), and therefore α = 1 is a necesary
and sufficient condition for the equilibrium output to coincide with the welfare maimizing
result.
For item (2), let V (α, β;C) denote the expected material payoff obtained by one individ-
ual with degree of altruism α ∈ [0, 1] in equilibrium play with another agent characterized
by the degree of altruism β ∈ [0, 1], i.e.
V (α, β;C) = p(α, β)p(β, α)u(yH)
+ [1− p(α, β)][1− p(β, α)]u(yL)
+ p(α, β)[1− p(β, α)]u(yH − T (·, α))
+ [1− p(α, β)]p(β, α)u(yL + T (·, α))
− ψ(p(α, β)). (76)












For the remainder of the proof, I will omit the conditioning on policy C and denote partial
derivatives of a function f(x1, x2) with respect to argument xi by fi(x1, x2).
From (76), the corresponding probabilities of not suffering a loss, p(α, β) and p(β, α),
satisfy the system of first-order conditions
ψ′(p(α, β)) = u(yH)− u(yL)
+ [1− p(β, α)]
[








ψ′(p(β, α)) = u(yH)− u(yL)
+ [1− p(α, β)]
[




u(yL + T (α)) + βu(yH − T (α))− (u(yL) + βu(yH))
]
. (79)
Taking the partial derivatives of V with respect to the degrees of altruism α and β lead,
respectively, to
V1(α, β) = [p1(α, β)p(β, α) + p(α, β)p2(β, α)]u(y
H)
− [p1(α, β)[1− p(β, α)] + [1− p(α, β)]p2(β, α)]u(yL)
+ [p1(α, β)[1− p(β, α)]− p(α, β)p2(β, α)]u(yH − T (α))
− [p1(α, β)p(β, α)− [1− p(α, β)]p2(β, α)]u(yL + T (β))
− p(α, β)[1− p(β, α)]u′(yH − T (α))T ′(α)
− ψ′(p(α, β))p1(α, β) (80)
and
V2(α, β) = [p2(α, β)p(β, α) + p(α, β)p1(β, α)]u(y
H)
− [p2(α, β)[1− p(β, α)] + [1− p(α, β)]p1(β, α)]u(yL)
+ [p2(α, β)[1− p(β, α)]− p(α, β)p1(β, α)]u(yH − T (α))
− [p2(α, β)p(β, α)− [1− p(α, β)]p1(β, α)]u(yL + T (β))
+ p(β, α)[1− p(α, β)]u′(yL + T (β))T ′(β)
− ψ′(p(α, β))p2(α, β). (81)
From the system of equations (78)-(79), one can write
ψ′(p(α, β)) = p(β, α)(1 + α)u(yH)
− [1− p(β, α)](1 + α)u(yL)
+ [1− p(β, α)]
[








which I use to replace the last terms in equations (80)-(81) and simplify to obtain
V1(α, β) = [p(α, β)p2(β, α)− αp(β, α)p1(α, β)]u(yH)
− [[1− p(α, β)]p2(β, α)− α[1− p(β, α)]p1(α, β)]u(yL)
− p(α, β)p2(β, α)u(yH − T (α))
+ p1(α, β)p(β, α)αu(y
H − T (β))
+ [1− p(α, β)]p2(β, α)u(yL + T (β))
− [1− p(β, α)]p1(α, β)αu(yL + T (α))
− p(α, β)[1− p(β, α)]u′(yH − T (α))T ′(α) (83)
and
V2(α, β) = [p(α, β)p1(β, α)− αp(β, α)p2(α, β)]u(yH)
− [[1− p(α, β)]p1(β, α)− α[1− p(β, α)]p2(α, β)]u(yL)
− p(α, β)p1(β, α)u(yH − T (α))
+ p2(α, β)p(β, α)αu(y
H − T (β))
+ [1− p(α, β)]p1(β, α)u(yL + T (β))
− [1− p(β, α)]p2(α, β)αu(yL + T (α))
+ p(β, α)[1− p(α, β)]u′(yL + T (β))T ′(β). (84)
Rearranging the expressions after evaluating them at (α, β) = (α, α) yields
V1(α, α) = p(α, α) [p2(α, α)− αp1(α, α)]
[
u(yH)− u(yH − T (α))
]
+ [1− p(α, α)] [p2(α, α)− αp1(α, α)]
[
u(yL + T (α))− u(yL)
]
− p(α, α)[1− p(α, α)]u′(yH − T (α))T ′(α) (85)
and
V2(α, α) = p(α, α) [p1(α, α)− αp2(α, α)]
[
u(yH)− u(yH − T (α))
]
+ [1− p(α, α)] [p1(α, α)− αp2(α, α)]
[
u(yL + T (α))− u(yL)
]
+ p(α, α)[1− p(α, α)]u′(yL + T (α))T ′(α). (86)
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By employing the first-order condition determining equilibrium transfers (12) for any
degree of altruism above the threshold α > α̂(C), and rearranging terms, I obtain
V1(α, α) + V2(α, α) = (1− α)[p1(α, α) + p2(α, α)]p(α, α)
[
u(yH)− u(yH − T (α))
]
+ (1− α)[p1(α, α) + p2(α, α)][1− p(α, α)]
[
u(yL + T (α))− u(yL)
]
+ (1− α)p(α, α)[1− p(α, α)]u′(yL + T (α))T ′(α). (87)
As α ↓ α̂(C), T (α) → 0 and the first two terms tend to zero. Meanwhile, the third term
tends to a positive number, and therefore the condition in (77) is satisfied.
C.7 Proof of Proposition 6
By construction, the benchmark policy CB = (qB, tB) is a solution to the principal’s problem
max(q,t) π(q, t) = t− (1− p)q
s.t. ψ(p) = u(wH − t)− u(wL − t+ q)
pu(wH − t) + (1− p)u(wL − t+ q)− ψ(p) ≥ pAutu(wH) + (1− pAut)u(wL)− ψ(pAut)
where pAut satisfies ψ(pAut) = u(wH) − u(wL). Standard arguments imply that the tB is
such that the agent is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the principal’s offer, i.e.
the last inequality is satisfied with equality. Assuming, as in common in mechanism design,
that the indifference will be broken in favor of the principal, the agent accepts CB.
Let us now turn to the agents’ demand for CB. First, suppose that α is small enough so
that no transfers take place, i.e.




Indeed, notice that α is the threshold for transfers when both agents reject the insurance
contract, and since I focus on C ∈ C, α is the lowest threshold for transfers in any possible
equilibrium of the game between agents 1 and 2. In this case, the each agent’s problem is
maxp pu(w
H − t) + (1− p)u(wL − t+ q)− ψ(p) (89)
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for (q, t) ∈ {(0, 0), (qB, tB)}, and thus, by construction of (qB, tB), the each prefers to buy
the benchmark policy CB. Therefore, (a, a) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the insurance










u′(wL − tB + qB)
}]
. (90)
In this case, positive transfers take place only if the strategy profile of the agents involves
(r, r). By construction of CB, the unilateral deviation of an agent from (a, a) to (r, a) is
not profitable, since it is equivalent to the problem (88). Thus, (a, a) is a Nash equilibrium
of the game. On the other hand, it must be the case that Ui(r, r;C
B, α) > Ui(a, r;C
B, α):
for this range of degrees of altruism, the utility obtained by the agents in a symmetric
equilibrium with positive transfers is necessarily larger than the utilities they would obtain
absent transfers due to the optimality of the functions T and p, while by construction of CB
the utility each agent receives for an asymmetric profile d ∈ {(a, r), (r, a)} is identical to the
one they would obtain absent any transfers. Therefore, (r, r) is also a Nash equilibrium of














u′(wL − tB + qB)
]
, (91)
the agents can now make positive transfers to one another under the asymmetric profiles
(a, r) and (r, a), while the same is not possible for the symmetric profile (a, a), which induces
a larger payoff than when transfers are zero. Therefore, (a, a) is not an equilibrium, since
the agents can profitably unilaterally deviate from (a, a). Now, I must show that the best-
response for agent i when agent j rejects CB is r. If that was not the case, then the lottery
induced by (a, r) has a mean no smaller than the lottery induced by (r, r), since the last has
the widest possible range. But this is not possible since tB > (1− pB)qB by construction of
the benchmark policy. Thus, BRi(r) = r and (r, r) is the Nash equilibrium for the interval
in (91).
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Last, but not least, suppose that
α ≥ u
′(wH − tB)
u′(wL − tB + qB)
, (92)
so that positive transfers take place for any action profile (d1, d2). By the same argument
as in the previous case, (r, r) is a Nash equilibrium, since BRi(r) = r. Now, I must show
that BRi(a) = r, i.e. (a, a) is not an equilibrium, but as before, since t
B is inefficiently high
from the perspective of an individual agent, i can profitably deviate to di = r when dj = a.
Thus, (r, r) is the unique Nash equilibrium for the interval in (92) when CB is offered by the
principal.
C.8 Proof of Proposition 7
This section generalizes the argument made when deriving the optimal benchmark contract,
where I have shown that a risk-neutral principal can offer an insurance policy to a single self-
interested agent that will yield that principal positive expected profit, and expected utility
above the autarky one for the agent.
I will impose symmetry in the wealths of the agents, their respective degrees of altruism,
the contract offered by the firm, and, finally, in the equilibrium behavior of the agents. Let U
the agents’ reservation utility. There are two system of equations implicitly defining premium
as a function of coverage (and degree of altruism) to be considered: F̂ (t, p, T ; q, α) for the
agents and F̃ (t, p, T ; q, α) for the principal. Each system is composed by three equations:
F̂1 = (1 + α)
{
p2u(wH − t) + (1− p)2u(wL − t+ q)
+ p(1− p)
[
u(wH − t− T ) + u(wL − t+ q + T )
]}
− U, (93)




u(wH − t− T )− u(wL − t+ q) + α
[
u(wL − t+ q + T )− u(wL − t+ q)
]}
+ p(1 + α)
[




′(wH − t− T )− αu′(wL − t+ q + T ), (96)
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where F̂1 is the agents’ indifference condition between accepting C or rejecting it, F̃1 is
the principal’s zero profit condition, F2 determines the agents’ symmetric equilibrium effort
while F3 determines transfer for any α ≥ α̂(ω,C) ≡ u
′(wH−t)
u′(wL−t+q) . If α < α̂(ω,C), equation
(96) is ignored in the systems and all transfers in equations (93)-(95) are set to zero.






















for each system F (·) and notice that
det(J̃) > 0 > det(Ĵ) (98)
if ψ′′(·) > 0 is sufficiently large. Therefore, by the Implicit Function Theorem, the implicit
functions (t, p, T ) are well-defined and continuously differentiable with respect to (q, α), and



























i.e., that the marginal rate of substitution between premium and coverage is steeper than
the slope of the zero profit line for the principal in a neighborhood of zero, and, thus, that























































= 1− p, (101)
since ∂F̃1
∂T




= 2q|(0,0) = 0.
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